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The goal of this thesis is to shed new light on the mechanisms behind the high rates of disability-
related non-employment in Norway, and to find explanations for the apparent rise of labor market 
exclusion problems within some demographic groups. The thesis focuses on the role of economic 
incentives, for individuals as well as firms, and on possible trends in the competitive environment 
that may (or may not) have changed the health- and productivity requirements in the labor market. 
 In the first paper we study whether and how recipients of temporary disability insurance 
(TDI) respond to economic incentives. In order to identify causal effects, we make use of a reform 
of the TDI system in Norway which was implemented in January 2002. The reform involved a new 
principle for calculation of the benefits, which changed from being based on the entire income 
history to being based on income in the last year (or the last three years) prior to disablement. In 
addition, the minimum level of benefit was raised while the maximum level of child allowance was 
reduced. This result in changing benefit level, where the benefit level increased for some 
individuals and reduced for others. We find that the benefit level has a causal impact of the outcome 
and duration of TDI. According to the point estimates, a 10% cut in the benefit level would induce 
a 3.3% increase in the transition rate to employment, 2.5% increase in the transition rate to 
permanent disability, and a 3.9% increase in the transition rate to unemployment. The results are 
in line with previous findings indicating that there is a significant labor supply potential among 
temporary disabled people, which can be realized by financial incentives. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that cutting benefit level is the desired policy from a welfare perspective. Many 
of the recipients suffer from severe physical and mental illnesses and generous benefits protect 
them, as well as their dependents, from poverty. Additionally, it provides claimants having the 
capacity to return to work, with more time to find a suitable and viable job match.    
 The second paper studies the effect of firm incentives on sickness absence behavior. In 
most of the industrialized countries (including Norway) the employers are responsible for the costs 
during an initial period of sickness absence spell, after which the public insurance system covers 
the costs. Hence, the employers have incentives to prevent short-term absences. But when absence 
spells stretch beyond the co-payment period, employers may not put much effort in facilitating a 
quick return to work, since return to work potentially involves new absence spells where the 
employers are again financially responsible. We examine the impacts of employers’ incentives by 
exploiting a reform in the Norwegian sick leave insurance scheme. The reform was implemented 
in 2002 where employers’ pay liability was removed for pregnancy-related illnesses. The intention 
with this reform was to make it more attractive for employers to hire young women. Our findings 
show that firm incentives actually affect sickness absence behavior by raising short-term 
absenteeism significantly, while the duration of long-term spells declined. According to the point-
estimates the reform increases the probability of starting a period of sickness absence by 10 %, but 
the probability of ending a period of sickness declines by 12 % for spells exceeding the earlier 
copayment period. We also find some evidence indicating that the reform actually affect the job-
opportunities for young women positively. By following individuals after graduation at school, the 
reform raised the employment propensity one year after graduation by around 1.5 percentage points 
for young women in general and by 3.0 percentage points for those who were pregnant at the time 
of graduation. This implies that there is a trade-off between incentives for sick-leave prevention 
and incentives for employing workers with high expected absenteeism.  
  The third paper investigates how exogenous changes in employment opportunities 
influence take up of disability insurance. Exogenous variations in employment opportunities are 
measured by variation in firms’ economic performance – including profitability, downsizing and 
firm closure – and fluctuations in local industry-specific labor market conditions. The data we use 
is Norwegian employer-employee registers together with firms’ audited accounts and information 
from the bankruptcy courts. With data about bankruptcy we are able to distinguish mass layoffs 
from organizational restructuring, demergers, and takeovers. The estimation results show that job 
opportunities have significant impact on take up of disability benefits, particularly for men. Job 
loss, in terms of bankruptcy, more than doubles the risk of entering permanent disability retirement 
for men while raising entry by approximately 50% for women. Furthermore, it doubles the risk of 
nonparticipation for both men and women. We also detect that other indicators, as profitability, 
downsizing and local labor market tightness affect the probability of claiming disability benefits, 
as well as the probability of being outside the labor force. Putting altogether, the paper shows that 
there is a considerable element of substitution between unemployment and disability insurance 
schemes.    
In the fourth paper, I explore how employment propensities and earnings of vulnerable 
groups have developed relative to the population at large. Vulnerable groups are defined as 
individuals having either poor health, low cognitive ability or coming from low socioeconomic 
classes. My main indicator of poor health is low birth weight, which is observed for both men and 
women. In addition, I use information about height, Body Mass Index (BMI) and cognitive ability 
measured at age 18-19 for men entering the military service. Socioeconomic class is defined 
according to parents’ earnings rank during their age 50-54. For men, lower birth weight and 
underweight at age 18-19 has become a stronger predictor of low earnings and non-employment, 
while there is quite constant effect of height and obesity. For women, where birth weight is the 
only health-measure I have, I do not find any evidence of changing impact. The influence of 
cognitive skills on labor market performance has become less important over time, which is due to 
decreasing returns to high ability. The most striking finding, however, is that poor social 
background has become a steadily more important determinant of non-employment and low 
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Compared to other OECD-countries, Norway has high take-up rates of health-related benefits 
(sickness absence and disability insurance) while the rates on unemployment insurance are low 
(OECD, 2010). The purpose of this thesis is to shed new light on the mechanisms behind the high 
rates of disability-related non-employment in Norway, and to find explanations for the apparent 
rise of labor market exclusion problems within some demographic groups. The thesis focuses on 
the role of economic incentives, for individuals as well as firms, and on possible trends in the 
competitive environment that may (or may not) have changed the health- and productivity 
requirements in the labor market. It consists of four papers. Paper I investigates whether economic 
incentives affects the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance spells. Paper II is 
also about the influence of economic incentives, but in this paper the focus is on how employers 
(not employees) respond to changes in the system of sickness insurance. Paper III studies how 
changes in employment opportunities influence take up of disability insurance, and paper IV 
focuses on whether the employment opportunities among vulnerable groups have changed over 
time. 
All the four paper in my thesis seek to find explanations behind the high share of individua ls 
receiving health-related benefits in Norway and why the fraction is higher today than what it was 
some decades ago. I focus on three possible explanations. The first explanation is that economic 
incentives for (potential) employees and/or employers are designed in a way that unintentiona lly 
promotes this outcome. The second explanation points to a hidden unemployment problem, where 
entry into disability insurance is triggered by lack of employment opportunities. Finally, the third 
explanation focuses on changes in the labor market, with increased emphasis on productivity and 
efficiency, which might have narrowed the job opportunities for individuals with health problems 
or low ability. 
 I start in this introductory chapter of my thesis by presenting an overview of the system of 
social security institutions in Norway, including a description of the reforms used in paper I and 
paper II, while section 2 discusses the concepts of “health” and “disability” in the context of 
empirical research. Section 3 provides separate summarizes of the four papers. In light of the 




rates of health-related benefits in section 4, while section 5 provides some policy implicat ions 
based on the previous discussion. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
1.1   Institutional background 
Norway has one of the most generous system of social security benefits in the world, providing 
universal coverage for income loss due to both unemployment and short- and long-term disability. 
For individuals with health problems there are three social insurance programs that provide wage 
replacement: sickness absence benefits (sick pay), temporary and permanent disability insurance. 
Unemployed individuals may be covered by unemployment insurance. Both for workers and 
working age individuals without labor market attachment, health problems may qualify for 
temporary or permanent disability insurance while unemployment insurance is restricted to 
workers with a minimum of past working experience. 
 
Unemployment insurance (UI) 
In order to be entitled to unemployment insurance, individuals have to satisfy a minimum earnings 
requirement based on labor earnings in the calendar year before job loss (or, if higher, the average 
of the three previous calendar years). In 2017, this threshold was 140,000 NOK Additiona lly, 
working hours must be reduced by at least 50%. The replacement rate of UI is 62.4% of previous 
earnings up to a threshold.1 As of January 2003 maximum duration was shortened from three to 
two years.  
 
Sick pay 
Being employed for at least four weeks, all workers are eligible for sick pay for absence spells 
lasting up to 1 year. The replacement rate is 100% up to a ceiling of 6 times the base amount in the 
Norwegian pension system.2 Sickness is graded from 20 to 100%.  The first 16 days of each spell 
is paid for by the employer, whereas the social insurance system covers the wage costs from the 
                                                                 
1Maximum threshold was 6 times the base amount corresponding to 560,000 NOK in 2017 value, which is similar to 
the maximum threshold of disability insurance. Hence, maximum payout of unemployment insurance is 351,000 NOK, 
while maximum payout of disability insurance is 377,000 NOK. 
2 Employers may offer compensation for workers earning more than the threshold of 560,000 NOK. Dale-Olsen 
(2018) shows that approximately 60% of workers above the earnings threshold are offered additional compensation 




17th day. There is no experience rating. In order to be entitled to sick pay the absence must be 
clearly due to own illness or injury. Absence spells lasting more than three (or eight, depending on 
agreement) calendar days must be certified by a physician. According to the working Environment 
Act, absent employees cannot be dismissed on grounds that are related to their sickness. When the 
period of sickness absence has expired, however, the employers can legally lay off absent workers 
on grounds directly related to their sickness. The firm has no responsibility for subsequent social 
insurance payments.    
 
Temporary disability insurance (TDI) 
Individuals who have not recovered after 12 months on sick leave are entitled temporary disability 
insurance, given that their work capacity is reduced by at least 50% due to illness, injury or defect. 
TDI is also offered to people who are not employed at the time of disablement.  
During TDI enrolment, claimants may be offered – and also required to take part in - medical 
treatment, training, education, courses or other activities intended to help them (back) into 
employment. The replacement rate is typically around 66% with a minimum and maximum 
threshold. Maximum duration of TDI is now three years, but it is possible to apply for extension 
of the period. TDI corresponds to work assessment allowance which was introduced March 1st 
2010. Work assessment allowance replaced medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits (1992-
2010) and time-limited disability benefits (2004-2010). Before March 1st 2010, there were different 
rules for maximum length of the different benefits and it was no clear limit on the overall duration 
of TDI.3 
 
Permanent disability insurance (PDI) 
If the capacity to work is permanently reduced by at least 50%, people may apply for permanent 
disability insurance, where the compensation rate is roughly the same as temporary disability 
insurance. Many individuals granted permanent disability insurance have experienced longer 
periods on temporary benefits and social assistance, particularly among the youngest claimants. 
For example, Fevang and Røed (2006) show that as long as ten years prior to the first take-up of 
permanent disability insurance, 45% of the claimants already received some kind of transfers. For 
                                                                 
3 Maximum duration for rehabilitation benefits was 52 weeks, but claimants could apply for extension of the period. 




those who were below age 40 at the time of enrolment, this was the case for as much as 67% of 
claimants. Permanent disability insurance is graded from 50 to 100%. 
 
Description of reforms utilized in paper I and paper II 
In order to investigate the role of economic incentives, paper I and paper II utilize two different 
reforms of the benefit system in Norway.    
Calculation of both UI-benefits and health related benefits are based on previous earnings. 
In 2002, the calculation of TDI benefits was subjected to a reform that changed the replacement 
rate in different directions for different claimants, depending on several observable and 
predetermined background characteristics. This reform introduced a new principle for calculat ing 
benefits, which went from being based on the entire labor-income history of the individual to being 
based on labor-income in the last year (or the last three years) prior to disablement. Furthermore, 
maximum child allowance was reduced and the minimum level of benefits was raised.  Examples 
of persons who would receive more with entry after than before the reform are immigrants with 
few years of residence in Norway and claimants with very low and unstable past earnings. 
Examples of individuals with higher benefits before the reform are claimants with a declining 
income path before disablement and claimants with many children earlier entitled to higher (means -
tested) child allowance (see Hardoy et al. 2004). This reform is utilized in paper I. 
Except from the first 16 days of sickness absence, which are generally covered by the 
employer, all the social insurance programs are paid for by the social security administration. This 
implies that employers have strong incentives to prevent short-term absenteeism, but limited 
incentives to prevent long-term absenteeism. In particular, they may exert little effort to facilitate 
a smooth return to work for employees already being long-term absent, since the return to work is 
associated with a potential future cost of new absence-spells. In paper II we exploit a reform 
(introduced in April 2002) of the copayment period for pregnant employees where firms’ pay 
liability were removed from pregnancy-related absences. This reform involves a change of the 
firms’ incentives to influence absence behavior. Short-term absenteeism become less costly, but 
for pregnant workers already being sick a return to work is not associated with any risk of potential 
costs with new absence spells. More specifically, if employers respond to economic incentives, we 
will expect both an increased probability of starting a period of sickness absence and an increased 




1.2   The concepts of health and disability 
Both the concepts of “health” and “disability” are multidimensional and complex phenomena 
which, to some extent, depend on the social context and available jobs.  They are intrinsica l ly 
unobserved, and must, in empirical analyses, therefore be replaced by proxy variables either 
capturing subjective assessments of own health or objective indicators that are considered to be 
correlated with the underlying health status. The concepts of health and disability are important for 
every articles in the thesis, particularly paper IV. 
 
Health  
A widely used definition of “health”, provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) explains 
that health is “a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 1946). The definition is holistic since it includes both the physical, 
mental and social dimensions and does not only concentrate on the absence of disease. However, 
the formulation has been criticized for being too ambitious and with this definition almost everyone 
would be considered as unhealthy (Huber et al., 2011). 
When describing health, we often use three different concepts; disease, illness and sickness 
(see, e.g., Boyd, 2000). Disease refers to a pathological process being diagnosed by a physician or 
another medical expert. Examples of diseases are cancer, diabetes, multiple sclerosis and mental 
health disorders such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Illness is a subjective feeling of being 
unwell. Examples are fatigue, fever, pain, weakness, discomfort, distress, confusion. Disease is 
often the cause of illness, but illness can also occur without an underlying disease or the disease 
may be undeclared. Being ill is a personal experience and a given disease may trigger symptoms 
varying tremendously between individuals and also from time to time for each person. In some 
cases, a person has a disease without feeling ill. Sickness is then the social role a person with 
disease or illness takes, for example being absent from work.  
Using survey data for the period 1988-2001 containing yearly observations of 3,500 
employed or self-employed Swedish individuals, Wikman et al. (2005) investigate the prevalence 
of disease, illness and sickness absence and the overlap between them.4 The authors find that almost 
                                                                 
4 Register data was used in order to measure sickness absence. A person was considered to have an illness if he/she 
reported symptoms such as pain, sleeping disorders, fatigue and anxiety . A person had a disease if he/she answer yes 




70% of the respondents report to have some kind of illness, while 40% have a long-term disease, 
and one in seven was observed with an absence spells lasting for more than two weeks during one 
year. Despite a high prevalence of illness and disease, 80% consider themselves to be in good or 
very good health. The overlap between the different concepts was quite low; 8% was observed with 
both illness, disease and sickness absence while 25% had none of these. The rest combined the 
three concepts in various ways. The authors also shows that the different concepts of morbidity 
showed different trends over the period 1988-2001; the fraction reporting poor general health was 
quite stable while there was an increase both in reported illness and disease. Sickness absence 
increased somewhat, but only during the latest years. This illustrates that health is a complex 
phenomenon meaning that change in one aspect does not necessarily trigger change in another 
aspect.   
 
Disability 
Disability is also a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. The World Health Organizat ion 
explains it as follows:  
 “Disabilities is an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participat ion 
restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or structure; an activity limitation is 
a difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action; while a participat ion 
restriction is a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations.  
Disability is thus not just a health problem. It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the 
interaction between features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she 
lives”. (see https://www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/) 
Disability is historically related to the medical model (see WHO, 2011). The medical model 
focuses on how a disability diagnosis limits functioning, which may be corrected or diminished 
with medical interventions. The role of medical professionals is important in order to cure or 
manage disabilities medically. During the last decades there has been a shift from the medical 
model to the social model. Within the social model people are disabled by barriers in the society, 
rather than by their bodies. Examples of barriers are people’s attitude towards difference, like 
                                                                 
diagnosed according to ICD-9. Self-reported health was measured by the question; “In your opinion, how is your 
state of health? Is it very good, good, fairly, bad, very bad. Note that the indicator for sickness absence is measured 




employers assuming that disabled people can’t do certain work tasks. WHO’s definition of 
disability represents a compromise of the medical and social model understanding “disability as a 
dynamic interaction between health conditions and contextual factors (both personal and 
environmental)” (WHO, 2011. p. 4). 
The prevalence of disability is often examined on the basis of surveys with self-reported 
assessments of own health. The measured prevalence is sensitive to the number and type of 
questions included, the range of explicit disabilities, inclusion of certain groups, f. ex. 
institutionalized individuals (WHO, 2011, chapter 2).  In Norway, one way of measuring disability 
rates is to use the Norwegian labor Force Sample Survey. According to this survey, a high fraction 
of working-age individuals reports having some kind of disability. The survey from 2017 shows 
that 17% (15% of men and 19% of women) of the population between 16 and 66 years report 
having a physical or mental disability.5 The same survey shows that the employment rate among 
disabled people was 43% in 2017 compared to 73% in the working-age population in general, and 
this rate has remained quite stable since 2006 when the question of disability was included in the 
survey. This illustrates that many disabled individuals manage to work.  
 
Work capacity 
In order to be entitled to health-related benefits, health problems must influence work capacity. 
Work capacity is related to the concept of disability, but a person reporting some kind of disability 
does not necessarily have reduced work capacity. It may depend on the type of work being available 
for the individuals. For example, a given health limitation (f.ex. hearing impairments) will affect 
work capacity in some type of jobs, but have no or only minor impact on work capacity in other 
types of jobs. 
 
                                                                 
5 The question of disability in the Norwegian Labor Force Survey is formulated like this: “By disability, we mean 
physical or mental health issues of a lasting character that may cause limitations in your daily life. This can, for 
instance, mean reduced sight of hearing, difficulties with reading and writing, mobility impairment, heart - or lung 
issues, cognitive difficulties, mental disorders, or other things. Are you, in your opinion, disabled?” Interesting to note 
is that “only” 30% of people with disabilities report having poor health (compared to 6% of the general population).  




1.3 Summaries of the papers 
Paper I “Temporary Disability and Economic Incentives” (Joint with Ines Hardoy and 
Knut Røed) 
During the last decades, the share of working-age individuals receiving disability insurance has 
increased substantially in many countries (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Burkhauser and Daly, 2011; 
Bratsberg et al., 2013). A number of studies have investigated how unemployment insurance 
claimants are affected by economic incentives (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006; Card et al., 2007; 
Røed et al., 2008), but only a few studies have focused on the impacts of economic incentives on 
the duration and exit from temporary or permanent disability. 
In order to identify the role of economic incentives we utilize a reform of the Norwegian 
temporary disability insurance (TDI) system in 2002, involving a full-scale overhaul of the TDI 
benefit scheme. Claimants were affected differently by the reform. For some individuals with 
certain income paths and personal characteristics, the benefit level was reduced, whereas it 
increased benefits for others.  Using this random assignment like variation of changes in benefits, 
we estimate causal impacts of the benefit level on the duration and outcome of TDI spells. 
 We use multivariate (mixed) proportional hazard rate model to quantify the effects of 
changes in the benefit level on the duration and outcome of TDI spells. A crucial element of our 
identification strategy is that we use both the two hypothetic replacement levels that would have 
had under the old (pre-reform) and the new (post-reform) regimes (𝑏𝑖
𝑜 , 𝑏𝑖
𝑛), and the actual benefit 
level (𝑏𝑖
𝑎). The actual benefit level will be 𝑏𝑖
𝑜  for entrants in the old regime and 𝑏𝑖
𝑛  for entrants in 
the new regime. In addition, we account for calendar time effects by including dummies for 
calendar time. Since the reform affected the claimants in different ways this will not create a perfect 
multicollinearity problem.  However, the hypothetical benefit level will capture all of the spurious 
effects arising from the fact that replacement levels is based on the income history and the actual 
benefit level is quasi-random assigned, i.e. it only depends on the timing of TDI spells.  
 Our main finding is that the benefit level affects the duration and outcomes of TDI spells. 
For fully disabled TDI claimants, the estimates imply that a 10% reduction in the replacement level 
generate a 3.3% increase in the hazard rate to employment, a 2.5% increase in the hazard rate to 
permanent disability, and a 3.9% increase in the hazard rate to unemployment. Our results support 




and that the realization of this potential to some extent can be realized by means of financ ia l 
incentives.  
 The reform was intended to be cost-neutral, but this paper shows that the benefit level 
actually increased by 14%. Results from simulations imply that the reform, by lowering the exit 
rates out of TDI, may have been responsible for increasing the stock of TDI claimants by 
approximately 4-5%. By comparison, the number of TDI claimants rose by as much as 35% from 
2001 (the last year before the reform) to 2004, and this increase seems to be a part of an upward 
trend. Hence, in order to understand the overall rise in TDI, other explanations are called for. 
 
Paper II “The Sick Pay Trap” (Joint with Simen Markussen and Knut Røed) 
A large body of research has documented that workers respond to economic incentives of the 
sickness insurance scheme, in the sense that if sickness absence becomes more costly for the 
workers, they will also tend to have less sickness absence (Henreksson and Persson, 2004; 
Johansson and Palme, 2005; Ziebarth, 2013; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2014; D’Amuri, 2011).6  
However, there is little evidence regarding the impact of firm incentives. OECD (2010, p. 133) 
notes that countries where employers are responsible for a large share of their employees’ sick pay 
costs tend to have lower absence than countries where the public insurance system cover (most of) 
the bill, and also that absenteeism has dropped significantly in the Netherlands and UK after a shift 
of financial responsibility towards employers. Yet, to our knowledge, no studies have established 
a causal relationship between firm incentives and worker absenteeism. The design of firm 
incentives with respect to sick-leave prevention also involves a potential tradeoff between sick-
leave and labor market exclusion: While more extensive pay liability  improves incentives for 
absence prevention for already employed individuals, it may at the same time undermine incentives 
for hiring persons perceived to have a high risk of absence.  
In Norway, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during the first 16 days of a 
sickness absence spell, while the public insurance system covers the whole bill after this period. 
This division of financial cost with sick pay, where employers are financially responsible for sick 
pay during an initial period of a workers’ sick leave, while the public insurance system covers the 
bill after some duration threshold are also typically the case in most other industrialized countries 
                                                                 
6 Individuals responsiveness to the system of sickness absence is further confirmed by more recent studies(see 




(OECD, 2010, Table 5.1).  This means that firms have strong financial incentives to prevent short-
term absences.  But when absence spells stretch beyond the co-payment period, employers may not 
put much effort in facilitating a quick return to work, since return to work potentially involves new 
absence spells where the employers are again financially responsible. 
By using Norwegian administrative register data, we examine the impacts of employers’ 
incentives by exploiting a reform in the Norwegian sick leave insurance scheme. The reform was 
implemented in 2002 where employers’ pay liability was removed for pregnancy-related illnesses. 
The intention with this reform was to make it more attractive for employers to hire young women. 
Markussen et al.  (2011) show that the increased risk of absenteeism associated with pregnancies 
is substantial; the hazard rate of entering into a sick-leave spell is raised by a factor of five at the 
onset of a pregnancy and further to a factor of 15 during the last 2-3 months before delivery. Hence, 
the reform clearly removed a potentially important disincentive with respect to hiring young 
women; but at the same time it also enhanced employers’ incentives to prevent sick leave among 
pregnant workers. 
On the one hand, the reform made short-term absence – absence spells with durations up to 
16 days – less costly for the firm. On the other hand it also made it less risky letting long- term 
absent pregnant employees return to work, since the employers no longer were responsible for the 
sick pay costs associated with new absence spells. Hence, the reform offers a neat setting for 
identifying the impacts of firm incentives.   
Our findings show that firm incentives actually affect sickness absence behavior 
considerably, as the reform raised short-term absenteeism, while the duration of long-term spells 
declined. We estimate that the reform increased the entry-rate into absenteeism by 10%, but also 
raised the transition rate back to employment by 12% for spells exceeding 16 days. This suggests 
that policy makers indeed may have good reasons to focus on improving employer incentives in 
order to reduce absenteeism.  
We also find some evidence indicating that the reform actually affected the job-
opportunities for young women positively. By following individuals after graduation at school, we 
show that the reform raised the employment propensity one year after graduation by around 1.5 
percentage points for young women in general and by 3.0 percentage points for those who were 
pregnant at the time of graduation. This implies that there is a trade-off between incentives for sick-





Paper III “Job Loss and Disability Insurance” (Joint with Bernt Bratsberg and Knut Røed) 
In welfare states, there seem to be a grey area between unemployment and disability insurance. 
The motivation behind this study is that the recent rise in claimants of disability insurance does not 
seem to be driven by deterioration of health conditions, and countries with comprehens ive 
disability insurance programs also tend to have low unemployment rates (OECD, 2010; Røed, 
2012) 
Since the individual risks of disability and unemployment are highly correlated, the causal 
effect of job opportunities on disability insurance enrollment is difficult to identify based on 
observational data alone. Our empirical strategy is to exploit exogenous sources of variation in 
individual employment opportunities, generated by variation in employers’ economic performance 
– including profitability, downsizing, and firm closure – and fluctuations in local industry-spec if ic 
labor market tightness, to identify causal impacts. The empirical basis is Norwegian administra t ive 
employer-employee registers, merged with firms’ audited accounts and information collected from 
bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy data make it possible to distinguish genuine mass layoffs from 
organizational restructuring, demergers, and takeovers.  
A broad international literature has analyzed adverse consequences of job displacement 
(see, e.g., Hamermesh, 1987; Ruhm, 1991; Neal, 1995; Kletzer, 1998; Kuhn, 2002; and Hallock, 
2009), including two studies based on Norwegian employer-employee data (Rege et al., 2009; 
Huttunen et al., 2011).7 The present paper adds to the literature in several directions. It is, to our 
knowledge, the first study exploiting data on mass layoffs measured by recorded bankruptcies 
which allow us to distinguish between different kind of closures; closure due to bankruptcy, closure 
due to voluntary liquidation, and takeovers (with or without bankruptcy). Based on estimates of 
the overall number of involuntary job losses in the economy – including those from stable and 
growing firms – it is also the first study to assess the total impact of job loss on the frequency of 
disability insurance claims. In addition, we add to the literature by examining more specifically the 
influences of firms’ economic performance and of alternative (local) employment opportunities on 
workers’ probability of entering disability insurance programs. And, finally, we examine the 
interaction between these various measures of employment opportunity to test whether the 
                                                                 
7 Since this paper was published, additional studies have found adverse health consequences of job loss (Browning 




probability that job loss leads to a disability insurance claim declines with local labor market 
tightness.  
We find that exogenous changes in employment opportunities, measured by closure or 
downsizing of a firm, affect the risk of being dependent of disability insurance and non-
participation, and the effects are more pronounced for men. In support of the hypothesis that 
disability and unemployment are substitutable, we also identify significant interaction effects 
between job loss and local labor market conditions. The more difficult it is to find a new job, the 
higher is the probability that displacement leads to disability retirement. 
Taken together, the results in this paper points to a considerable element of substitutability 
between unemployment and disability insurance. Our findings suggest that the process of 
reallocating redundant workers from old to new employers is far from seamless, and that many 
displaced workers permanently change status from supporting the welfare state to becoming 
supported by it. Significant human capital resources are squandered in this process. The finding 
that loss of employment is among the major causes of disability program entry – whether it stems 
from genuine health effects or from adverse shocks to the expected value of labor market 
participation for given health levels – suggests that appropriate solutions to the “disability problem” 
should address strategies for improving the employment opportunities of potential claimants rather 
than focus exclusively on income insurance. If job loss and unemployment are among the root 
causes of the rising disability problem, it is probable that provision of employment opportunit ies 
is among its remedies. 
 
Paper IV “Vulnerable groups and labor market performance. Towards more sorting in the 
labor market? 
In Norway, as well as in other OECD-countries, policy makers seek to promote a high labor market 
participation rate and an ‘inclusive labor market’. According to the European Commision (2017) 
“Labor markets are inclusive when everyone of working age can participate in paid work, 
especially vulnerable and disadvantaged people”. At the same time many would argue that the 
labor market has become tougher because of increased focus on reorganizations and productivity. 
Empirical studies have detected that mass layoffs and organizational changes raise the probability 
of permanent exclusion from the labor market, (Rege et al., 2009; Bratsberg et al., 2013) and it 




However, there is no clear evidence that these events have become more prevalent over time, or 
that these are implemented in a less inclusive fashion. Moreover, there have also been changes that 
have improved working conditions for many employees, for instance access to better physical aids, 
less manual work and more flexible work schedules.   
The aim of this paper is to investigate how employment propensities and earnings of 
vulnerable groups have developed relative to the population at large. Vulnerable groups are defined 
as individuals having either poor health, low cognitive ability or a disadvantaged family 
background. My main indicator of poor health is low birth weight, which is observed for both men 
and women. In addition I use information about height, Body Mass Index (BMI) and cognitive 
ability measured at age 18-19 for men entering the military service. Family background is described 
in terms of socioeconomic class, which is defined by parents’ earnings rank during their age 50-
54. 
A large literature documents that there has been increasing returns to skills as technologica l 
changes have increased the demand for high-skilled workers (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Juhn et 
al., 1993; Acemoglu and Author, 2011). After 2000 there has been little or no growth in cognitive 
skill-intensive occupations (Acemoglu and Author, 2011; Beaudry et al. 2014), but there has been 
a strong growth in jobs requiring high social skills (Deming, 2017; Edin et al., 2017). The research 
suggests that the main explanation behind the findings is that technology to an increasing extent 
substitute for cognitive skills while social skills are more difficult to replace (Deming, 2017). 
Empirical evidence on whether the impact of health and social background has changed 
over time, is limited. Markussen and Røed (2017) show that being born into the poorest families 
have become a stronger predictor of non-employment and lower earnings. Comparing twin pairs 
born in different decades, Bharadwaj et al. (2018) does not find any evidence of changing impact 
of birth weight on earnings and high school completion.  
A key finding in my study is that the labor market has become gradually more sorted with 
respect to socioeconomic status (SES); and being born into a low SES family has become an ever 
stronger predictor for poor labor market performance as young adult, both in terms of non-
employment and low earnings. This is the case for both men and women. Although the social 
gradient in labor market performance becomes slightly weaker when birth weight, height, BMI and 
cognitive ability are controlled for, such controls do not alter the conclusion with respect to the 




respect to health. Although this relationship is not as robust as that for social background, most of 
the results point in the direction that men with poor health have experienced a steady decline in 
relative employment prospects. In particular, men with low birth weight and underweight at age 
18-19 are to an increasing extent non-employed at prime age. For women, where birth weight is 
the only available health-measure, I do not find any changing impact on employment.  
Consistent with earlier research, I find that the impact of cognitive skills on labor market 
performance has diminished over time. This finding is primarily driven by decreasing returns to 
very high ability; the influence of having low – relative to medium – ability has been more stable. 
Given that my indicators for social background, health, and ability are all noisy, and at the same 
time highly interrelated, it is clear that I cannot provide a complete decomposition of how these 
different factors affect adult labor market performance. In particular, it is probable that my health 
indicators are too crude to fully account for the relationship between social background and health. 
Another challenge for the identification of health effects is that the correlation between the various 
health indicator and actual health in adulthood may have changed over time. This is particular ly 
the case for low birth weight, as huge improvements in neonatal health care  both has raised the 
probability of surviving with poor health (implying a stronger relationship between low birth 
weight and poor adult health) and limited the adverse consequences of low birth weight, given 
survival (implying a weaker relationship). To assess this challenge, I return to an analysis of the 
relationship between birth weight and alternative adult health measures after having presented the 
main results. It essentially fails to identify significant changes in the relationship between birth 
weight and adult health, although it cannot rule out such changes either. 
1.4 Possible explanations of the high rate on health-related benefits 
The four papers in the thesis are concerned about three different explanations of why there is a high 
rate of individuals on health-related benefits. These are economic incentives (including substitut ion 
between unemployment insurance and health-related benefits), a hidden unemployment problem 
and changes in the labor market. In light of our results and related literature I will discuss the 
different explanations more generally. I will also briefly mention other possible explanations such 







Except for some high-earnings workers in private sector, all employees in Norway are fully insured 
against income loss due to sickness absence. A large body of research have found that employees 
respond to economic incentives by being more likely to call in sick when replacement rate is higher. 
However, although workers receive 100% compensation, workers have incentives to be present at 
work during period of illness since sickness absence may generate lower subsequent earnings and 
employment (Hansen, 2000; Ichino and Moretti, 2009; Markussen, 2012).  
In case of illness, there are also many non-pecuniary incentives influencing the propensity 
to be absent from work, f. ex. loyalty to the company and how absenteeism will influence 
colleagues and customers (see Morken et al., 2012). Furthermore, social norms at the workplace 
(Godøy and Dale-Olsen, 2018) and attitudes towards possible reasons for sickness absence (Hauge 
and Ulvestad, 2017) may play an essential role.8  
The importance of economic incentives on sickness absence are not restricted to employees. 
Based on findings from paper II we suggest that employers also contribute to the high rate of 
sickness absence we observe in Norway, since employers are not financially responsible for 
absence lasting more than 16 days. Furthermore, we show that the system of pay liability may 
create a sick pay trap where employees may put little effort in facilitating return to work for long-
term absent employees since a possible new period of absence will involve financial cost for the 
firms. It may also be that employees take this system into account when (together with the 
physician) deciding the length of absenteeism. Workers may evaluate how their health problems 
influence own work capacity which in turn affects his/her colleagues and possible 
customers/patients/students. If, for instance, the sick worker can be replaced by a (healthy) 
substitute worker, it might be that the length of absenteeism will be set to ensure that the worker is 
(again) fully productive and/or a possible risk of new absence spell is minimized.  
If workers have not recovered after one year of sickness absence, they may apply for 
temporary disability insurance, where the replacement rate is typically lower than sick pay (around 
67%). We do find that economic incentives affect the duration and outcome for the claimants; 
higher replacement rate implies longer duration of the benefit and lower transition rate to 
                                                                 
8 Hauge and Ulvestad (2017) find an association between sickness absence and attitudes, but it was mainly due to 




employment, other benefits (permanent disability insurance and unemployment insurance) and 
non-participation without benefits.  
Our research suggests that some labor supply among temporary disabled individuals may 
be realized by financial means.  Note, that the temporary disabled individuals in Norway typically 
do not have a job.9 In general, a period out of work is typically associated with substantia l 
subsequent earnings losses as this may influence future career opportunities and wage growth, 
meaning that the long-term economic loss of periods on benefits are often larger than what is 
reflected in the replacement level. On the other hand, for individuals being out of work, available 
jobs may involve lower earnings compared to what they received in previous jobs. And in some 
cases it may be that claimants do not benefit from working.   
Based on information about benefits and potential full-time income after tax, Nordberg 
(2007) constructs total tax rates for benefit receivers in Norway, which are measured as “the 
fraction of the employers wage cost not gaining the employee, as fraction of total wage costs”. He  
finds that the great majority receives a substantial higher income when working, but approximate ly 
4% of the benefit claimants face total tax rates above 100%, meaning that they are better off if they 
continue to be recipients instead of working.10 Another 24% face total tax rates between 80 and 
100%. For some (potential) employees it will also be additional costs associated with working, 
f.ex. travel costs and daycare expenses, indicating that even more recipients are better off when not 
working.  
 Changes in the replacement level do not affect transition to employment only. We do 
observe that it also affects transition to other benefits as well as non-participation without benefits. 
Whether a transition out of temporary disability insurance is a transition to employment is 
influenced by local labor market conditions. That employment opportunities play an essential role 
is further confirmed by findings in paper III, where we find that the probability of entering a 
disability insurance programme after job loss is affected by available jobs11 Hence, when 
evaluating potential success of different reforms of social insurance it is not obvious whether a 
                                                                 
9 Individuals on full temporary disability insurance typically do not have a job. Some claimants are, however, classified 
as partly disabled and probably have a part-time job. 14% of the claimants in the dataset used in paper I are partially  
disabled.  
10 Fevang et al. (2005) and Hernæs et al. (2016), making similar calculations for benefit claimants in Norway, also 
find that around 4% of the recipients are economically better if they continue to receive claimants instead of working.     
11 Significance of local labor market conditions on take up of disability insurance is also find in Black et al. (2002) 




reduction in take-up of social insurance is accompanied by a corresponding rise in employment 
rates. 
As described earlier, there has not been any general increase in the take up of social security 
benefits in Norway during the last decades. However, a higher replacement level of health-related 
benefits in combination with a tightening of the criteria for being eligible for unemployment 
insurance may explain the rising significance of health-related benefits. Some non-employed 
individuals, such as youths without working experience, are not entitled to unemployment 
insurance, meaning that temporary disability insurance may be the only alternative for income 
support for this group.12 
Does the combination of high rates on health-related benefits and low rates on 
unemployment insurance affect labor supply? Some kind of activity aimed at returning to work is 
required both as recipients of unemployment benefits and temporary disability insurance. 
Recipients of unemployment insurance are obliged to search for jobs, while individuals on 
temporary disability insurance must participate in agreed activities – f.ex. courses, education, 
employment scheme or medical treatment. The group of non-employed individuals is a 
heterogeneous group, with different needs and health status. For some persons it may be benefic ia l 
both for health and future earnings to receive temporary disability insurance while taking part in 
activities (courses, education, etc) while others will not benefit from it. Actually, being diagnosed 
by a physician, as all individuals receiving disability insurance are, may imply that both case 
workers and potential employees, as well as the recipients themselves, focus more on their 
problems than their actual resources. 
Utilizing different practices between Norwegian municipalities regarding the leniency of 
granting temporary disability insurance instead of unemployment insurance to youths, Schreiner 
(2017) shows that that being granted temporary disability as opposed to unemployment insurance 
significantly reduces future earnings and increase subsequent welfare dependency. This probably 
illustrates that too many youths are granted health-related benefits. Whether this result can be 
transferred to the whole group of non-employed individuals is not clear. As a consequence of the 
earnings requirement to be entitled for unemployment insurance, the potential for overuse of 
temporary disability insurance is particularly high in this group.  
                                                                 
12 Non-employed individuals may also be granted social assistance, but only if there is no other possibilities for 
income/support (including own savings). Social assistance is means -tested, but the payments are typically lower than 




Economic incentives may also imply that sickness absence is used as a substitute for 
unemployment insurance. For example, in case of downsizing, both employers and employees may 
have mutual interest in using sickness absence instead of unemployment insurance since the 
compensation level of sickness absence is substantially higher and the employer is not financia l ly 
responsible for long-term absence.      
 
Hidden unemployment problem 
As described in paper III there is a grey area between unemployment and disability and in this 
paper we show that negative shifts in employment opportunities explain part of the disability 
insurance dependency in Norway. 
Negative shift in labor supply following displacement can be described within the context 
of job search theory (see section 3 in paper III). Job loss can be viewed as a negative shock to the 
value of continued labor market participation. There may be some costs associated with searching 
for a new job, job-specific human capital is lost, a new job may be hard to find and is likely to pay 
less than the current job. This implies that for some groups, inactivity (with or without disability 
insurance) may be preferred to searching for new jobs.  
Being eligible for disability benefits requires minimum 50% reduced work capacity due to 
illness or injury. As described in section 1.2, some people work despite having some kind of 
disability, which probably means that within the group of workers there are many potential 
claimants of disability insurance. A given disability/health problem is likely to reduce the offers of 
new jobs and job search is considered to be less valuable. And since work capacity is evaluated 
relative to available job opportunities a job loss may trigger take-up of disability insurance.  
In reality, few workers go directly from job displacement to permanent disability. It 
depends on age, health, labor market opportunities, etc. The replacement rate may also be essential.  
In addition, the social security administration try to minimize the effect of job loss by offering 
courses, educations and other measures in order to help non-employed back to work. However, the 
implication from job search theory is confirmed by the empirical results in paper III in the sense 






Changes in labor demand and in the competition for jobs  
Another possible explanation of higher utilization of health-related benefits is changes in the 
demand for labor and in the competitive environment. Recent technological change has raised the 
demand for non-routine and high-skilled labor (see f.ex. Deming, 2017), while an opening up of a 
common European labor market has put a pressure on employment opportunities, particular ly 
among low-skilled workers. Competition in several sectors has intensified, with increased 
emphasis on outsourcing, reorganisations and productivity. The pace of structural change has 
increased also within the public sector, f.ex all government agencies are required to save a given 
per cent of their budget each year. A more turbulent labor market may increase the risk of 
developing health problems, and also make it more difficult to be employed with given health 
problems. In addition, increased job insecurity and job loss may in itself induce health problems. 
On the other hand, there have also been changes having improved working conditions for many 
employees, for instance access to better physical aids, less manual work and more flexible work 
schedules.   
 In paper III, we have not focused on plant closure only - we also investigate the effects of 
downsizing and find that the probability of subsequent disability rise with the downsizing level. 
This effect can, be explained by increased risk of job loss or reduced probability of being rehired 
by a new employer, especially if indications of health limitations are present, but may also be 
attributed to health-changes of retained workers. A large epidemiological literature indicate that 
downsizing affect health of the retained workers by imposing stress due to increased workload 
and/or increased perception of job insecurity (see e.g. Ferrie 2001). Additionally, Røed and Fevang 
(2007) show that downsizing process among Norwegian nurses raised the level of non-employment 
and sickness absence, even when layoffs are not part of the downsizing strategy. Furthermore, Rege 
et al. (2009) show that downsizing increase the risk of take-up of disability insurance. This effect 
was attributed both to a decrease in subsequent earnings and employment opportunities, and to an 
adverse effect on health. Among individuals being granted disability insurance, downsizing 
increases the risk of being diagnosed with psychological conditions which is likely to be related to 
distress in connection with the downsizing process.   
In general, work seems to be good for health, particularly for workers already having a 
long-standing illnesses or disability (Waddell, 2004; Waddell and Burton, 2006; OECD, 2008). 




Switzerland and the UK, OECD (2007) confirm that workers mental health is negatively associated 
with unemployment. When investigating the revers change (from non-employment to employment) 
the authors find improvements in mental health for those finding a job with standard working-
conditions. On the other hand, for non-employed individuals with mental illness who get a job with 
non-permanent contract, work may not be beneficial for health. Furthermore, Markussen et al. 
(2012) show that partial work during periods of sickness absence decrease the length of absence 
spells and induce higher subsequent employment rate. 
The literature described above, shows that both adverse employment conditions and loss of 
employment may affect health. In chapter 2 in paper IV, I show that a large body of research has 
documented that health also is important for earnings and the probability to be employed. The aim 
of paper IV is to investigate how employment propensities and earnings of vulnerable groups, such 
as individuals with poor health, have developed relative to the population at large. The findings 
from paper IV indicate that poor health, to some extent, has become a stronger predictor of non-
employment for young adults (age 27-31). However, the results are sensitive to what kind of 
indicator I use. For men, I find that low birth weight and underweight at age 18-19 affect the 
probability of being employed, and even to a greater extent over time, while there is quite constant 
impact of low height and obesity. For women, where birth weight is the only health measure I have, 
there is no evidence of changing impact.  
When it comes to the impact of social background I find clear evidence of steadily 
increasing negative impact on employment of growing up in the very poorest families, which is in 
line with findings by Markussen and Røed (2017).13 All the health indicators I use, as well as the 
measure for cognitive ability, are correlated with social background. However, the health indicators 
are imprecise measures of health. , meaning that I am not able to separate out how much of the 
social gradient is explained by health 
The multidimensional aspects of health suggest that my results from paper IV may imply 
that some dimensions of health has become more important in order to enter and/or remain in the 
labor market, while other aspects have become less important. The finding that underweight has 
become a stronger predictor of earnings and non-employment, while there is quite constant effect 
of height and obesity may indicate that it has become more difficult for young adults to be 
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employed when having mental health problems. One possible explanation is that underweight 
individuals to a greater degree face common mental health problems, such as anxiety and 
depression.14 With more emphasize on reorganizations and efficiency it is reasonable to assume 
that good mental health is more strongly rewarded in the labor market.  
One limitations of paper IV is that I focus on labor market outcomes among young adults 
only, which may imply that I describe more of the process of sorting into jobs than out of jobs. At 
older ages, individuals tend to experience physical health problems to a greater degree, which may 
also influence the generalizability of the results.  
If the pressure on efficiency and productivity has increased, it is likely that both employer 
and employees exploit the social insurance system to a greater degree than before. Workers who 
are, for shorter or longer periods, not able to perform optimally may be encouraged to claim 
sickness benefits or more long-lasting benefits. Since the social security costs (except the first 16 
days of sickness absence) are covered by payroll taxes without experience rating, there are weak 
incentives for exerting reintegration efforts.   
 
Other explanations 
There may be other explanations of the high fraction of individuals receiving health-related benefits 
in Norway. First, the age composition may play an essential role since older individuals are more 
likely to be on sickness absence and disability insurance. Kann and Sutterud (2017) suggest that 
this was part of the explanation of increasing fraction of health-related benefits during the period 
1992-2016. Second, the rate of family support has decreased (Terum and Hatland, 2014) which 
may imply that some individuals earlier supported by family members, for shorter or longer 
periods, are now supported by the welfare state.  
Third, there may be changes in health having contributed to the rise in use of health-related 
benefit. Improvements in medical technology has decreased infant mortality rates and probably 
                                                                 
14 Both underweight, overweight and obesity is associated with increased risk of dying. Whether underweight, in itself, 
is a risk factor or whether there is a reverse causation in the sense that underweight is a result of preexisting illness and 
smoking is not clear (see f.ex. Aune et al; 2016, Roh et al; 2014). Based on data from Switzerland, Roh et al. (2016) 
find that higher mortality risk among underweight individuals are mainly caused by a higher risk of external causes of 
deaths (e.g. accidents, suicides). Using survey-data from England, Kelly et al. (2010) show that underweight 
individuals are more likely to smoke, to be alcohol obtainers and inactive. In addition, the study find that both 
underweight and overweight/obesity are associated with a higher prevalence of respiratory disease, less physical 





had a positive effect of most of the survivors (Bharadwaj et al., 2013), but it may also have caused 
serious health problems for those who were on the margin of survival as babies. Brage and Thune 
(2015) show that people granted permanent disability insurance before age 25 are dominated by 
persons with mental retardation and congenital malformations, and part of the recent rice of young 
benefit receivers is attributed to an increasing fraction of the adult population with severe and 
chronic health impairments.15 In general, how better medical treatment affect health for the whole 
population is not obvious. Some will recover faster and live better with a given diagnosis, but 
decreased mortality rates may also imply that a larger fraction is living with chronical conditions.     
Musculoskeletal pain and mental disorders account for the majority of the disability 
claimants. Among the youngest, were the disability rates have increased most, more than 50% of 
the benefit receivers are suffering from mental illness. According to a Norwegian report about 
mental health in Norway, there is no evidence of increasing rates of mental illness in the population 
in general. However, they observe an increase in the fraction of young women reporting mental 
health problems, such as anxiety or depression.16 
A widening of the conception of disease may have contributed to rising disability rates. One 
commonly used example of medicalization is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
were diagnosis and treatment started in the US in the 1960’s. Since the early 1990’s the disease has 
become a more global phenomenon and many western countries document an expansion of the 
diagnosis (Conrad and Bergey, 2014). A growing number of children diagnosed with ADHD is 
also seen in Norway, and the prevalence of children age 6-17 receiving medical treatment for 
ADHD is now 3.0% for boys and 1.2% for girls.17 The diagnosis is set early, normally before age 
12, but often continue to persist into adulthood. Thus, we also observe a growing number of adults 
with ADHD (Conrad and Bergey, 2014).   
1.5 Policy implications 
The high rates of health-related benefits has been a matter of concern for policy makers during the 
recent decades. In light of the four papers in this thesis and relevant literature I will discuss different 
                                                                 
15 The fraction of individuals age 18-25 receiving permanent disability insurance increased from 0.8% in 1992 to 1.6% 
in 2017. Mean age at death for persons with Down syndrome has increased from 16 years in 1969 to 53 years in 2009 , 
which is related to an increasing infant survival rates (Brage and Thune, 2015). 
16 See https://www.fhi.no/publ/2018/psykisk-helse-i-norge/ 




strategies to reduce the use of health-related benefits; changes in the compensation level, larger 
copayment for the employers and activity requirements.  
 
Changes in the compensation level of different benefits  
The compensation rate of sickness benefits has been cut in many western countries and it has been 
well documented that this is an effective way to reduce absenteeism. In Norway, the replacement 
rate has been 100% since 1978.  The literature has focused on the incentives of the employees when 
explaining the sensitivity of the compensation rate. But as we have shown in paper II also 
employers respond to economic incentives. Hence, a reduction in the compensation level of 
sickness benefits may also affect how employers will prevent absenteeism.  
The impact on workers of a reduction in sick pay is well-known; when absence become 
more costly, the employees will tend to be less absent. For employers, short-term absence (absence 
less than 16 days) will become less costly, meaning that employers will have less incentives to 
prevent short-term absenteeism. On the other hand, long-term absenteeism will become more costly 
since they will no longer receive full wage-compensation for the absent workers. This may, in turn, 
reduce transition into disability insurance. However, not every case of sickness absence is 
undesirable and being present at work when ill may adversely affect others, f.ex. when having a 
contagious condition or when the illness make the worker more prone to do fatal errors.18 
Sometimes, periods out of work may also be beneficial for health and might prevent future 
absences.  
Although experiences from other countries show that cutting benefits reduce sickness 
absenteeism, studies have also found that groups of individuals may respond differently. Ziebarth 
(2013) exploits a reform of the sickness absences system in Germany, were the replacement level 
of short-term sickness absence (absence shorter than six weeks) was reduced from 100 to 80% 
while the compensation level of long-term absence spells was cut from 80 to 70%.  He finds that 
benefit cuts reduce short-term absenteeism, but it has no significant effect on long- term 
absenteeism. There was, however, some exceptions when focusing on subgroups. The lack of an 
overall effect on long-term absenteeism may be related to the already strict follow-up regime for 
long-term absent workers in Germany. Using the discontinuity in public sick pay in Norway, Dale-
                                                                 




Olsen (2014) investigates how high earnings workers respond to economic incentives, and shows 
that higher compensation level reduces absenteeism for male workers, but not for female workers.    
The findings illustrate that it is not obvious whether, and to what extent, different groups 
will respond to changes in the replacement level. Dale-Olsen (2018) also points out that a reduction 
may be offset by supplementary compensation from some employers since part of the firms already 
provide additional benefits for their high-earnings workers. The replacement level of other benefits 
is much lower compared to sickness benefits, meaning that the long-term costs of being absent 
from work is much higher than the short-term cost. However, individuals already receiving long-
term benefits do not have a job, and as explained above, around 3-5% is estimated to be better off 
if they continue to be benefit-receivers instead of working. During recent years, policy makers have 
tried to overcome this problem, f.ex by making it easier to combine work and benefits.   
Despite the relatively generous benefit level of social security in Norway, it does not 
necessarily imply that cutting benefit level is the desired policy from a welfare perspective. 
Generous benefits protect those who are unable to work, as well as their dependents, from poverty. 
In addition, it also provides claimants who ultimately have the capacity returning to work with 
more time in which to find a suitable and viable job match.       
 The recent restrictions of the unemployment insurance scheme have excluded a substantia l 
fraction of job seekers from claiming benefits. Both the earnings requirement for being entitled to 
unemployment insurance have become stricter during the last decades and maximum duration of 
an unemployment spell has been shortened. Apart from social assistance, temporary disability 
insurance, which requires that the individuals are being certified by a diagnosis, is the only 
alternative income support for some non-employed individuals. This has contribute to more 
substitution away from unemployment insurance, particularly among the youths with no work 
experience. A way to reduce medicalization and overuse of disability insurance may be to lessen 
the earnings criteria for being eligible for unemployment insurance (Schreiner, 2017).  
 
Increased copayment of employers 
A copayment system of sickness absence, where employers cover the first days of absence and the 
public insurer covers the rest, is the case in many industrialized countries – and the results from 
paper II show that it may create a sick pay trap. Firms have strong incentives of preventing short-




little incentive of encouraging a quick return to work since the employers will (again) be 
responsible for the first days of an eventually new period of absence.  
The series of reforms in the Netherlands, also involving higher copayments of sickness 
absence and disability insurance, have reduced the inflow into disability insurance substantia l ly 
(Koning and Lindebom, 2015). Although the reforms have been successful in order to reduce the 
fraction of individuals receiving health-related benefits, the side effects may be prominent. The 
study of Koning and Lindebom (2015) indicates that the reforms have increased the share of 
unhealthy non-working individuals without benefits. In addition, firms may be less willing to hire 
workers with health limitations. Policy makers in the Netherlands are now discussing other ways 
of organizing the system of social security system which provide strong incentives of preventing 
sickness and disability insurance, but with less financial risks for the firms.    
Taken together, the experiences from the Netherlands and results from paper II illustrate 
that employers substantially influence absence from work. The design of firm incentives with 
respect to prevention of sickness absence also involves a potential trade-off between sick leave and 
labor market exclusion: A higher fraction of copayment for employers trigger financial incentives 
to prevent absenteeism, but it may reduce the incentives of employing persons with high risk of 
sickness absence. A possible solution to circumvent this problem is to reorganize the system for 
pay liability in the sense that firms cover a smaller fraction of costs associated with short-term 
absence and a larger fraction of long-term absence.  
 
Activity requirements 
In July 2004, the social security administration introduced new rules for sickness absence in 
Norway. The new rules include stricter activity requirements, f.ex. (more) use of graded 
absenteeism and compulsory dialogue meeting for long-term absent workers.  
 Since the introduction of the new rules, employers are obliged to arrange a meeting for 
workers during the first seven weeks of sickness absence. The aim of the meeting is to agree on a 
plan to facilitate a quick return back to work, f.ex by graded absenteeism. If the absent worker has 
not recovered within 26 weeks the local social security administration is obliged to arrange a second 
meeting with the absent employees, the employer and the physician having certified the absence. 
How this second meeting is followed-up varies between counties and Markussen et al., (2017) use 




absence spells. Markussen et al. (2012) evaluate how more use of graded absenteeism as opposed 
to full absenteeism by utilizing different leniency among physicians to grade sickness absenteeism. 
Their estimates suggest that grading an absence spell shortens the length of absence spell and raises 
subsequent employment propensity.   
The results associated with grading and dialogue meetings may justify a more intense usage 
of those measures, but it is not necessarily the case that more involvement of the physician is the 
way to go. The physician plays a key role in case of medical interventions, but the physician may 
have less information about how a given illness will influence work capacity. A more fruitful way 
to prevent long-term absenteeism may be to arrange for a tighter dialogue between the employer 
and the absent worker.    
One example of decreased involvement by the physician and increased follow-up by the 
employers is a reform being introduced in a Norwegian municipality in 2003. The employees 
working in the municipality were given the right to self-certify themselves for sickness absence for 
the entire benefit period (365 days). The project involves frequent meetings with the employer and 
the employer’s follow-up of the absent employee is more intensive than elsewhere. Torsvik and 
Vaage (2015) have evaluated this reform and they find that sickness absence is reduced by more 
than 20%. Whether this reduction in sickness absence is due to reduced control or increased trust 
is not obvious since intensified follow-up of absent employees (which is a part of the reform) could 
be interpreted either as increased concern for the worker or increased monitor ing (see Torsvik and 
Vaage, 2015).19 
The introduction of the Gatekeeper protocol in 2002 has contributed to reduce inflow into 
disability insurance in the Netherlands (Koning and Lindebom, 2015). This protocol focuses on 
early interventions, and within the first eight weeks of absence the employers and workers is 
obliged to make a return-to-work plan including several dates to modify and evaluate the plan. The 
plan should make a first assessment of functional limitations and possible need for medical 
interventions as well as a date for work-resumption. If planned work-resumption has not taken 
place, the employers have to attach a new assessment to explain the non-fulfillment of the origina l 
                                                                 
19 In lab experiments, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) find that a majority of the agents reduce their performance when they 
are controlled compared to a situation when the principal trust their agents. The reason is tha t most of the agents in the 
experiment are intrinsically motivated to perform well and the agents perceive control as a sign of distrust and a 
limitation of own choices, which in turn reduce their motivation. Opportunistic agents, however, perform more (i.e. 




plan. The social security administration could then be responsible for sick pay, but only if they 
approve the return-to-work plan.  
In the Netherlands, they have also tried to reduce disability rates by increasing outflow from 
disability insurance. These reforms have more uncertain effects (Sonsbeek and Gradus, 2012) 
which may be related to restricted job opportunities for individuals being out of work for a couple 
of years.  
1.6 Concluding remarks 
In Norway, the employment rates are high and the unemployment level is low. However, the 
fraction receiving health-related benefits is high, which to a large extent, hide an unemployment 
problem. The rules for being eligible to unemployment benefits have become stricter during the 
last decades, which may have contributed to more substitution away from unemployment insurance 
to health-related benefits. A way to reduce medicalization and overuse of disability insurance may 
be to lessen the criteria for being eligible for unemployment insurance. 
Experiences from the Netherlands show that employers play a key role in order to reduce 
the inflow rate to disability insurance, but large financial cost associated with sickness and 
disability has probably made the employers more reluctant to hire presumably unhealthy workers. 
Anyway, the copayment system we have in Norway, where the employer is financial responsible 
for short-term absence and the public insurers covers the rest, undermine the firms’ incentives to 
prevent long-term absenteeism. A better solution may be to let the firms cover a smaller fraction 
of costs associated with short-term absence and a larger fraction of long-term absence. Some 
measures, such as grading of absenteeism and dialogue meetings, have already been implemented 
in Norway and seems to have the intended effect. These activity requirements have primary focused 
on the role of the physician, it may be that subsequent measures should emphasize increased 
follow-up from the employers. By extending the financial responsibility of the employers, their 
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The Sick Pay TrapElisabeth Fevang, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
Simen Markussen, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
Knut Røed, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research
In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick
pay during an initial period of a worker’s absence spell, after which
the public insurance system covers the bill. Based on an empirical
evaluation of a quasi-natural experiment in Norway, where pay lia-
bility was removed for pregnancy-related absences, we show that
the system of short-term pay liability creates a sick pay trap: firms
are discouraged from letting long-term sick workers back into work
since they then face the financial risk associated with subsequent
relapses. We present evidence indicating that this disincentive effect
is both statistically and economically significant.
I. Introduction
Based on extensive reviews of disability prevention experiences in 13
countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment ðOECD 2010, 125Þ argues that “employers are key players in pre-
venting health problems at work and facilitating a swift return to work for
people absent from work due to sickness.” But, while there is ample em-
This article is part of the project “Absenteeism in Norway—Causes, Con-
sequences, and Policy Implications” and is financed by the Norwegian Research
Council ðgrant no. 187924Þ. Data made available by Statistics Norway have been
essential for the research project. Thanks to Christian Brinch, Oddbjørn Raaum,
and Christopher Taber for useful comments and to Simen Gaure and Tao Zhang
for programming assistance. Contact the corresponding author Knut Røed at knut
.roed@frisch.uio.no. A note regarding access to data and programs is available as
supplementary material online.
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pirical evidence regarding the responsiveness of absenteeism with re-
spect to worker incentives ðHenreksson and Persson 2004; Johansson and
Palme 2005; Ziebarth 2009; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2009; D’Amuri 2011Þ,
306 Fevang et al.there is little evidence regarding the impact of firm incentives. OECD
ð2010, 133Þ notes that countries where employers are responsible for a
large share of their employees’ sick pay costs tend to have much lower
absence rates than countries where employers can pass the costs on to the
public purse and also that absenteeism has dropped significantly in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom after a shift of financial responsi-
bility toward employers. Yet, to our knowledge, scientific evidence estab-
lishing a causal relationship between firm incentives and worker absentee-
ism is nonexistent. The design of firm incentives with respect to sick leave
prevention also involves a potential trade-off between sick leave and labor-
market exclusion: while more extensive pay liability ðor experience ratingÞ
improves incentives for absence prevention, it may at the same time under-
mine incentives for employing persons perceived to have a high risk of ab-
sence in the first place.
Although the extent of employer co-payment differs sharply across dif-
ferent countries, the incentive structure faced by employers in most indus-
trialized economies typically implies that the firm is responsible for sick pay
expenditures during an initial stage of a workers’ sick leave but that the
national insurance scheme ðor another insurerÞ covers the costs accruing
after some duration threshold ðOECD 2010, table 5.1Þ.1 This means that
firms do have strong financial incentives to prevent short-term absences.
However, in cases where absence spells stretch beyond the co-payment
period, employers may ðrightlyÞ think that it is not in their interest to fa-
cilitate a quick return to work, since the return to work also entails the risk
of new short-term absences for which the employers are again financially
responsible. Hence, current incentive structures may have the unintended
side effect of discouraging employers from exerting appropriate effort to
curb long-term absenteeism.
In the present article, we examine empirically the impacts of employers’
pay liability by exploiting a reform in the Norwegian sick leave insurance
scheme, whereby pay liability for pregnant workers’ short-term sick leaves
was removed for absences caused by pregnancy-related illnesses ðin the
1 While most European countries have public insurance programs for short-term
sick leave, typically with replacement rates ranging from 50% to 100% and maxi-
mum durations exceeding 1 year ðPetterson-Lidbom and Thoursie 2013Þ, there are
no federal legal requirements for paid sick leave in the United States. For compa-
nies subject to the Family and Medical Leave Act ðFMLAÞ, i.e., firms with at least
50 employees, the act does require unpaid sick leave, however. And many US em-
ployers offer sick leave pay on a voluntary basis. Also, some states, including Cal-
ifornia, New Jersey, and New York, have public programs that partially protect
workers against the loss of income due to nonoccupational disability.
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period prior to transition to maternity leave benefitsÞ. The motivation for
this reform was that it was feared that the elevated risk of sickness ab-
sence associated with pregnancies made employers reluctant toward hiring
The Sick Pay Trap 307young women. Markussen et al. ð2011Þ show that the increased risk of
absenteeism associated with pregnancies is indeed substantial; the hazard
rate of entering into a sick leave spell with a diagnosis predicting full ex-
ploitation of the employer’s pay liability—often related to back pain, nau-
sea, or anxiety—is raised by a factor of 5 at the onset of a pregnancy and
further to a factor of 15 during the last 2–3 months before delivery. The
reform thus clearly removed a potentially important disincentive with re-
spect to hiring young female labor, but at the same time it also changed
employers’ incentives to prevent sick leave among pregnant workers, for
example, by reducing productivity expectations/requirements, modifying
regular duties, encouraging colleagues to help out with physically demand-
ing tasks, allowing more flexible and less strenuous hours, or investing in
technical ðstrain-reducingÞ equipment.
On the one hand, the reform made short-term absence—absence spells
with durations up to 16 days—less costly for the firms. On the other hand,
it also made it less risky to let long-term absent pregnant workers return
to work, since the firms no longer were responsible for the sick pay costs
associated with subsequent relapses. Hence, the reform offers a neat set-
ting for identifying the impacts of firm incentives. Based on a combination
of regression discontinuity ðRDÞ and difference-in-difference ðDiDÞmeth-
odologies, we show that the reform had significant impacts on the affected
employees’ absence behavior. Using a bivariate hazard rate model ðwith
nonparametric modeling of unobserved heterogeneityÞ, we find that short-
term absenteeism originally covered by firms’ pay liability rose signifi-
cantly, while the duration of noncovered long-term spells declined. For
example, we estimate that the reform led to a 10% rise in the entry rate
into absenteeism but also in a 12% rise in the rate of work resumption at
durations exceeding 16 days. Extrapolating our findings to the economy as
a whole, we estimate that the 16-day pay liability system reduces the over-
all number of covered absence days by 11%, while actually raising the
number of noncovered days ðdays exceeding 16 days durationÞ by 1.6%,
compared to a system with no pay liability at all. Our results are exactly
as one would expect on the basis of simple economic theory, provided
that firms do have some influence on their employees’ sick leave behavior.
Our findings thus indicate that policy makers indeed may have good rea-
sons to focus on improving employer incentives in their efforts to curb
absenteeism.
We also find some evidence indicating that the removal of pay liability
for pregnant workers made the school-to-work transition easier for young
women. According to our estimates, the reform raised the employment
propensity 1 year after graduation by around 1.5 percentage points forThis content downloaded from 
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young women in general and by 3.0 percentage points for those who were
pregnant at the time of graduation. This suggests that policy makers may
have to trade off incentives for sick leave prevention against incentives for
308 Fevang et al.employing workers with high expected absenteeism.
II. Related Literature
When an insurance scheme is troubled by moral hazard problems, ef-
ficiency considerations suggest that coverage should decrease with dura-
tion. This is studied extensively in relation to the design of optimal un-
employment insurance, starting from the seminal paper by Shavell and
Weiss ð1979Þ. The argument is simple. In the presence of moral hazard,
there is an inevitable trade-off between insurance and incentives. By re-
shuffling the benefit schedule to provide lower payments tomorrow and
higher payments today, such that expected utility remains constant, agents
are given stronger incentives to search for jobs.
Many countries have adopted declining benefit schedules for the unem-
ployed, most often in the form of a single drop after some time in addition
to an overall duration limitation ðCahuc and Zylberberg 2004, 143Þ. Max-
imum duration limitations are also typically in place for sickness insurance
payments. However, there are also historical examples of sickness benefits
that increase with duration. Johansson and Palme ð2005Þ study a reform in
Sweden, where a time-constant replacement rate of 90% was replaced by
a time-increasing payment schedule with 65% replacement rate the first
3 days, 80% the next 77 days, and then 90% from day 80. Johansson and
Palme ð2005Þ found that the reform changed workers’ behavior exactly as
the altered incentives would imply. As the cost of short-term absence in-
creased, short-term absenteeism dropped. For long-term absences, how-
ever, the return-to-work hazard declined as the risk of relapse raised the
expected cost of returning to work. This example illustrates a potential
benefit trap: having reached the highest level of replacement, it is not par-
ticularly tempting to risk a return to the bottom of the replacement ladder.
In the present article, we focus on the employers’ incentives rather than
those of the employees. But, provided that employers influence their em-
ployees’ sick leave behavior, the story is basically the same. If the employer
is financially responsible for short-term absence only, the firm obviously
has incentives to prefer a single long absence spell over many short ones.
And when employees have been on sick leave long enough to have ex-
hausted the firms’ pay liability, the financial risk associated with possible
relapses may convince the employer not to accommodate a quick return
to work.
While it has long been recognized in the literature that incomplete ex-
perience rating in unemployment insurance systems incites firms to lay off
too many workers ðe.g., Topel 1983Þ, we have not been able to find anyThis content downloaded from 
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empirical evidence regarding the causal relationship between firms’ sick
leave insurance costs and their workers’ absenteeism. One of the closest
pieces of evidence we have found is Burkhauser, Schmeiser, and Weath-
The Sick Pay Trap 309ers ð2012Þ, which shows that disabled workers in the United States whose
work limitations were caused by an accident on the job, and who were,
hence, more likely to be covered by the experience-rated workers’ com-
pensation program than workers whose injuries were not work related,
also were more likely to be offered accommodation by their employer.
Our article also relates to a literature on the labor-demand effects of
mandated employer provision of employee benefits in general ðsee Burk-
hauser and Daly ½2011 for a recent discussionÞ. A contribution to this lit-
erature with particular resemblance to our own is Gruber ð1994Þ, which
found that mandates that raised the costs of insuring female employees of
childbearing age in the United States ðby including childbirth in health
insurance plansÞ did not adversely affect young women’s employment
rates, as wages adjusted to compensate for the value of the mandated ben-
efits. It is conceivable, however, that this finding could be reversed in la-
bor markets with less individual wage flexibility—like the Norwegian
one.
III. Institutions and Mechanisms
All Norwegian workers are fully insured against sickness absence for up
to 1 year, with a 100% replacement ratio.2 Norway also has a high level of
absenteeism. On a typical working day, around 7% of all workers are ab-
sent due to sickness. This places Norway among the countries with the
world’s highest sickness absence rates ðsee, e.g., Bonato and Lusinyan 2007;
Edwards and Greasley 2010Þ. Standard regulations imply that absence
spells exceeding 3 days ðincluding weekends, holidays, etc.Þ need to be cer-
tified by a physician. Certification is not formally required until the ninth
day for employees in firms participating in a tripartite “inclusive workplace
agreement” ðIWAÞ between employers, employees, and the state, although
it is common to adhere to the 3-day rule even in these firms.3 Approxi-
mately half of the employees are covered by IWA. In total, around 90% of
all absence days in Norway are certified by a physician. The sick pay costs
are shared between the employer and the tax payers. The general rule is that
2 There is a ceiling on annual earnings ðin 2012Þ ofNOK 500,000 ð ≈US$85,000Þ.
Eligibility requires that the employee have been at work for 4 weeks.
3 Based on an in-depth study of a large Norwegian IWA-company, Bergsvik,
Markussen, and Raaum ð2010Þ show that more than 90% of all self-reported ab-
sence spells are 1–3 days long ðless than 1% are longer than 5 daysÞ, despite the
possibility of self-reporting up to 8 days. Statistics reported by the Norwegian
Welfare Administration also indicate that the level of physician-certified absence is
higher in IWA-firms than in non-IWA-firms.
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the first 16 days of each absence spell is paid for directly by the employer,
whereas the social security administration pays for the remaining days and
also for subsequent rehabilitation or disability benefits.4 If a new absence
310 Fevang et al.spell starts within 16 days after a previous spell was completed, it is counted
as a continuation of the previous spell. This implies that a new pay liability
period for the firm is not triggered until the worker has been present for
at least 16 days. The social security costs are covered through uniform pay-
roll taxes; hence, there is no experience rating. On average, the pay liability
system implies that firms’ cover around 34% of the overall sick pay costs
for Norwegian workers ðsee Bjerkedal and Thune 2003Þ. In addition, they
bear the administrative costs associated with finding replacements and/or
reorganizing the work. Although Norwegian firms are not allowed to cut
wages in direct response to an employee’s absence behavior, existing em-
pirical evidence indicates that some of the costs are passed on to the em-
ployees through an impact on subsequent wage growth ðsee Markussen
2012Þ.
In April 2002, a reform was implemented implying that firms were en-
titled to exemption from the 16-days pay liability for pregnancy-related
absences. Common symptoms associated with pregnancy-related dis-
eases are nausea, bleeding, anxiety, infections, reduced functional level ðe.g.,
due to back painÞ, and various psychological reactions. The term “preg-
nancy related” obviously entails an element of subjective judgment, since
pregnant workers also may develop illnesses that have little or nothing to do
with their pregnancies. Based on the observed differences in absenteeism be-
tween pregnant workers and a comparison group of female nonpregnant col-
leagues that we present in the next section of this article, we estimate that
approximately 73% of the absence among pregnant workers is pregnancy re-
lated. We do not observe whether a particular pregnant worker’s absence
spell is really pregnancy related or not.
During periods of sickness absence, Norwegian workers enjoy a special
protection against dismissals, implying that they cannot be dismissed on
grounds that are related to their sickness.5 After the 1-year absence period,
however, the firm is allowed to lay off the absent worker with direct
reference to the sickness. Hence, if an employer for some reason wishes
to lay off a worker—but is prevented from doing so due to the general
employment protection regulations—the incentives for facilitating that
worker’s return to work from a long-term absence spell are particularly
weak.
4 Workers who have exhausted their sick pay entitlements but who are still not
able to take up work due to sickness are eligible for rehabilitation or disability
benefits, depending on the prospects for future recovery/rehabilitation. The re-
placement ratio for these benefits is around 66%.
5 The burden of proof lies with the firm. In practice, this implies that absent
workers can only be laid off as part of a mass displacement.
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Although absence decisions are formally taken by workers and/or phy-
sicians, the employer can affect absenteeism in several ways, for example,
by ðiÞmonitoring employees ðto prevent shirkingÞ, ðiiÞ investing in healthy
The Sick Pay Trap 311work environments and equipment that can prevent afflictions caused by
strain, ðiiiÞ offering sick workers modified tasks or changes in the require-
ments of their jobs, and ðivÞ allowing the workers more flexible hours and
less shift work. These activities obviously involve costs; hence, we may ex-
pect employer efforts to depend on the extent to which they bear the di-
rect costs of absenteeism in the first place.
Norway has a generous public program for parental leave benefits. In the
period covered by our analysis, there was a paid leave period for 42 weeks
with 100% replacement ratio ðor 52 weeks with 80% replacementÞ, which
has later been raised to 47 weeks ð57 weeks with 80% replacementÞ.6 The
leave starts no later than 3 weeks before expected delivery, removing the
pregnant workers from the risk of sick leave at this point. It is possible
to start the leave period as early as 12 weeks before expected delivery, but
this is rarely done in practice.
IV. Data and Empirical Analysis
The data we use in the present article comprise complete longitudinal
administrative records on employment and absence for the period 2001–6,
merged with information on firms and workers on the basis of encrypted
identification numbers.7 All absence spells are recorded insofar as they are
certified by a physician ðregardless of recorded symptoms/diagnosisÞ, typi-
cally when they exceed 3 days. This implies that the occurrence of very
short absence spells is underreported in our data. There is little that we can
do about that. To the extent that the removal of pay liability for short-term
absenteeism increased the frequency of short absence spells among preg-
nant workers, we therefore run the risk of underestimating this effect. We
return to this issue below. As explained in the previous section, there is also
a possibility of self-certifying absence spells as long as 8 days in firms par-
ticipating in the IWA. Although this option is rarely used in practice
ðBergsvik et al. 2010Þ, we deal with the potential difference in certification
patterns by always comparing workers who are subject to the same self-
certification regulations.
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. We first examine the extent
towhich the removal of firms’ pay liability for pregnant workers’ sick leaves
affected these workers absence behavior. We then investigate whether the
reform affected young women’s employment opportunities. Given that
some of the reform effects we seek to evaluate presuppose employers with
6 These replacement ratios apply for annual earnings up to a ceiling of around
500,000 NOK ðin 2012 value, approximately US$85,000Þ.
7 Individual-level absence data before 2001 are not available.
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a forward-looking behavior, an appropriate structural model would con-
tain elements of dynamic programming. Our empirical approach is con-
fined to a more reduced-form setting, however, reflecting the more modest
312 Fevang et al.aim of evaluating the empirical relevance of direct ðmyopicÞ and indirect
ðforward-lookingÞ responses to changes in firm incentives.
A. Absence Behavior during Pregnancies
To examine the impact of employer incentives on absenteeism we con-
struct the following data set. We start out with all employees who became
pregnant between May 2001 and May 2005 and did not make a transition
to unemployment, rehabilitation benefits, or disability during the preg-
nancy. We then follow each pregnant employee for 37 weeks through work
presence and sickness absence, that is, until she takes maternity leave and
thus is no longer at risk of being absent due to sickness.8 These records
constitute our potential treatment group. Given the rather subtle and po-
tentially conflicting ways in which employer incentives were affected by
the removal of pay liability, with likely effects on the incidence as well as
the duration of absence spells, we set up a bivariate hazard rate model for
transitions between the states of presence and absence to identify the re-
form effects. But before we turn to that model, we take a closer look at
what happened at the exact time of the reform implementation by means
of a RD analysis. In both these analyses, we also incorporate a control
group of nonpregnant workers; that is, for each pregnancy spell, we pick a
female nonpregnant worker from exactly the same workplace, at exactly
the same point in time, of approximately the same age, and with a similar
earnings level ðbased on a one-to-one nearest neighbor matching proce-
dureÞ.9 In the bivariate hazard rate model, the control group plays the es-
sential role of representing the counterfactual trend in absence behavior
within a DiD modeling framework. In the RD analysis, we primarily use
the control group to perform a placebo analysis.
1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 and figures 1 and 2 first offer some descriptive statistics. There
are 90,898 pregnancy spells included in our data set and an equally large
8 We assume that the pregnancy started 37 weeks before an observed transition
to maternity leave. Transition to maternity leave almost always occurs 3 weeks
prior to expected delivery. Only in 1.6% of the cases does the actual delivery take
place more than 6 weeks after transition to maternity leave, and these few cases
have been deleted from our sample.
9 We select the coworker with the closest income level, provided that the age
difference is less than 3 years. If we cannot find a female coworker with fewer than
3 years of age difference, the pair is not included in our analysis.
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number of controls.10 While our matching procedure is aimed at making
the control group as similar as possible to the treatment group, it is evident
that some small compositional differences remain. In particular, the preg-
Table 1













Number of spells 20,845 70,053 20,845 70,053
Characteristics ðmeansÞ:
Age 30.4 30.7 30.5 30.9
Education:
Compulsory or lower secondary 11.5 13.1 12.9 15.4
Upper secondary 34.0 34.8 37.7 38.4
College/university 54.6 52.1 49.4 46.2
Earnings ðdeflated US$, 2012Þ 69,130 69,691 66,727 67,467
Non-European background ð%Þ 4.8 4.6 3.8 4.4
The Sick Pay Trap 313nant women tend to earn slightly more than their nonpregnant colleagues.
This difference can either be attributed to positive selection into pregnan-
cies or to the strong earnings incentives that pregnant workers face, given
that their subsequent maternity leave benefits are calculated on the basis
of their earnings in the 10-month period just prior to expected delivery.
The “pregnancy wage premium” is almost the same before and after the
reform, however, approximately 3.5%.
Figure 1 illustrates that the rate of sickness absence has been fairly stable
throughout our observation window for both pregnant and nonpregnant
female workers, except for seasonal fluctuations. The timing of the reform
is marked in the figure as a vertical line. Based on a visual inspection of the
figure, it is not easy to spot any reform effect. A closer comparison of ab-
sence rates by pregnancy duration before and after the reform is provided
in figure 2. Panel a clearly illustrates the sharp rise in absence rates that
typically occur as the pregnancy progresses, with absence rates as high
as 40%–70% the last few months before transition to maternity leave.
Panel b reports the changes in absence rates from before to after the re-
form at different stages of the pregnancy for the members of the treatment
group minus the corresponding changes for the members of the control
group. According to these descriptive DiD estimators, the reform appar-
ently raised absenteeism somewhat, with a possible exception for the later
stages of the pregnancy. The overall absence rate for pregnant women rose
10 In total, there were 120,089 pregnancies among employed workers in our data
period. We lose 29,191 spells ð24.3%Þ due to lack of appropriate controls.This content downloaded from 
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from 32.9% before the reform to 33.8% after the reform, while it dropped
from 7.5% to 7.3% for the members of the control group. A simple de-
scriptive DiD estimate for the overall reform effect measured by this
316 Fevang et al.outcome is thus a modest increase of 1.1 percentage points, or 3.4% ð100 
1.1/32.9Þ.
2. Regression Discontinuity Analysis
Figure 3 illustrates the basic idea of a RD analysis. Panel a shows how
the daily sick leave entry rates among pregnant workers evolved from 90
days before to 90 days after the reform.11 Due to the seasonal pattern in
absence behavior ðrecall that the reform was implemented on April 1Þ,
there is a declining time trend in this period. Imposing a linear calendar
time function to control for this development yields a reform effect cor-
responding to the small upward shift illustrated in the graph. Panel c
shows how the size of this estimated reform effect varies as we change
the bandwidth ðthe number of days before/after the reform included in
the analysisÞ. The shorter the time window, the larger the estimated ef-
fects, suggesting ðperhapsÞ that there was a scope for firms/employees to
“postpone” the starting date a few days just around the implementation
of the reform. The effect is statistically significant, however, regardless of
bandwidth. If we rely on the more conservative estimates, that is, those
based on the longest time windows, we conclude ðfrom the size of the
jump in panel aÞ that the reform raised the daily entry rate to sick leave
among pregnant workers by 0.21 percentage points. Since the expected
daily entry rate was estimated to be 1.12% just prior to the jump, this
corresponds to an increase of 18.8%. As a sort of “placebo test,” we ex-
amine in panel e how the effect estimate changes if we assume alternative
false implementation dates. The graph shows that the effect estimates be-
come smaller the further we move away from the true implementation
date. Additional placebo tests can be obtained by repeating the whole es-
timation procedure on the control group. The results are illustrated in
panels b, d, and f. The message coming out of these graphs is clear: there is
no reform effect whatsoever in the control group.
A natural objection to the regression discontinuity results presented so
far is that they may depend heavily on the linearity assumption for cal-
endar time effects. Table 2 shows, however, that the finding of a positive
reform effect is highly robust with respect to the specification of the
underlying time function. The table presents results for models with from
one to four degree polynomials in a time function assumed to be the same
before and after the reform and also with from one to four degree poly-
nomials in time functions estimated separately before and after the reform
11 Daily entry rates are adjusted for weekdays, public holidays, and the first day
after holidays.This content downloaded from 
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FIG. 3.—Regression discontinuity analysis. Estimated impact on absence inci-
dence of removing firms’ pay liability ðwith 95% confidence intervalsÞ. Bandwidth
in panels e and f is 180 days around the true timing of the reform. Reform effects
are estimated using a simple linear trend and a reform dummy.
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ðin the latter case the reported reform effect is the shift that occurred at
the time of reform implementationÞ. All the results are presented for three
alternative bandwidths and for both treatments and controls. We interpret
Table 2
Regression Discontinuity Analysis: Estimated Impact on Absence Incidence
of Removing Firms’ Pay Liability by Bandwidth and Time Function




Polynomial Degree 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Treatment group:
Bandwidth ðdaysÞ:
½230, 30 .46 .45 .38 .37 .44 .36 .57 .89
ð4.59Þ ð4.48Þ ð2.59Þ ð2.48Þ ð4.43Þ ð2.16Þ ð2.52Þ ð2.70Þ
½260, 60 .24 .25 .36 .35 .24 .38 .54 .37
ð3.85Þ ð3.87Þ ð4.01Þ ð3.95Þ ð3.81Þ ð3.81Þ ð3.78Þ ð2.02Þ
½290, 90 .21 .21 .20 .20 .21 .23 .56 .46
ð3.79Þ ð3.75Þ ð2.55Þ ð2.55Þ ð3.72Þ ð2.50Þ ð4.49Þ ð2.87Þ
Control group:
Bandwidth ðdaysÞ:
½230, 30 .00 2.00 2.02 2.01 .00 2.01 .11 .19
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð2.32Þ ð2.18Þ ð.01Þ ð2.15Þ ð1.08Þ ð1.20Þ
½60, 60 2.03 2.03 .00 .00 2.03 .10 2.00 .05
ð21.10Þ ð-1.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.04Þ ð21.07Þ ð.22Þ ð2.01Þ ð.62Þ
½290, 90 2.03 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.03 2.02 .01 .01
ð21.39Þ ð21.33Þ ð2.80Þ ð2.83Þ ð21.31Þ ð2.56Þ ð.30Þ ð.16Þ
NOTE.—Values in parentheses are t-values.
318 Fevang et al.the results as convincing evidence that the reform indeed raised the fre-
quency of absence spells among pregnant women. All the 24 alternative
specifications produce significant positive reform effects for the treatment
group. None of them produce significant results for the control group of
nonpregnant colleagues.
Taken at face value, the RD analysis indicates that pregnant workers’
entry rate to sick leave was raised 18.8% as a direct result of the reform. If
this was the only effect of the reform, the overall level of absenteeism
would also increase by 18.8%. This is a huge effect compared to the 3.4%
increase suggested by the descriptive DiD calculations referred to above.
One possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that a higher
entry rate was not the only effect but that the reform also triggered sig-
nificant changes in the duration distribution and recurrence pattern of
absence spells and consequently also in the composition of present and
absent workers. This is what we examine in the next subsections.
3. A Bivariate Hazard Rate Model
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the reform effects based on a
bivariate hazard rate model where we simultaneously model the transi-This content downloaded from 
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tions to and from sick leave. This simultaneity may be empirically im-
portant, since we suspect that the reform affected both transitions, po-
tentially changing the composition of the two risk groups of present and
The Sick Pay Trap 319absent workers. Based on economic theory, we hypothesize that four dif-
ferent reform effects may have been at work, all operating through firm
incentives:
1. A positive direct effect on absence incidence for workers who had
not completed a long-term absence recently ðfewer than 16 days
agoÞ. This follows directly from the fact that the removal of pay
liability made new absence spells less costly for the firm.
2. A negative indirect effect on absence incidence for workers who
had completed a long-term absence recently. The reason for this is
that the prereform pay liability system entailed a firm incentive to
advance any expected ðor potentialÞ relapses such that they occurred
before a new pay liability period was triggered. The removal of pay
liability thus eliminated the incentive to push workers at high risk of
relapse into sick leave within 16 days.
3. A negative direct effect on work resumption ðpositive effect on ab-
senteeismÞ for absent workers who had been sick-listed fewer than
16 days. This follows directly from the fact that the removal pay
liability made absence continuation less costly for the firm within
this period.
4. A positive indirect effect on work resumption ðnegative effect on
absenteeismÞ for absent workers who had been sick-listed more
than 16 days. The reason for this is that since the reform removed
the pay liability associated with subsequent relapses, it also removed
an essential part of the firm’s economic risk associated with early
work resumption.
An important point to note here is that the indirect effects are not
necessarily smaller or less important than the direct effects. We use the
term “indirect” to emphasize that the effects in question require an ele-
ment of forward-looking behavior, not that they are of second order. To
the contrary, we expect the indirect work resumption effect ðitem 4 aboveÞ
to be particularly significant, as the costs associated with frequent relapses
could be very large prior to the reform. Whether the direct or the indirect
effects dominate the actual reform responses is an empirical question to
which our hazard rate model is designed to provide an answer. Note that
the second and third effects listed above are likely to be of minor quanti-
tative importance for overall absenteeism, since they are at work only the
first 16 days after or during absence spells, respectively. They are never-
theless of scientific interest, since they convey information about employ-
ers’ ability to affect the pattern of the employees’ absenteeism.This content downloaded from 
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In this exercise, we exploit a much larger time window ð2001.5–2005.5Þ
and base our inference on differences in the differences between the treat-
ment and the control groups before and after the reform. Hence, it is the
320 Fevang et al.interaction of being pregnant and being in the postreform period that iden-
tifies the causal effects of the reform. However, since we are interested in
both the direct and indirect effects, the pregnancy-reform interaction needs
to be further interacted with variables indicating whether pay liability ap-
plied or not in the prereform period, which again depended on the dura-
tion of ongoing and past ðrecentÞ spells. Since the duration of ongoing and
past spells obviously may have autonomous effects on absence behavior in
ways that differ between pregnant and nonpregnant workers, we need a full
set of controls for these factors to identify the reform effects. Let P be an
indicator variable denoting potential treatment ðpregnancyÞ, let R be an
indicator denoting that the reform has been implemented ðafter April 1,
2002Þ, let D be an indicator denoting that the current state ðpresence or
absenceÞ has lasted fewer than 16 days, and let I be an indicator denoting
that the last absence spell ðif anyÞ also lasted fewer than 16 days.12 Fur-
thermore, let Pj, j5 9, 8, . . . , 1 be indicator variables denoting the number
of months until expected delivery for those who are pregnant. We write the
hazard rate of moving from presence to absence as
v1it 5 exp½xitb1k 1 v1i 1 j1t 1 d1jPj
1 f11D1 f12D  R1 f13D  P
1 f14D  I1 f15D  R  I1 f16D  P  I
1 a11P  R  ð12D1D  IÞ
1 a12P  R  ðD2D  IÞ;
ð1Þ
where ð12D1D  IÞ is for “pay liability did apply” and ðD2D  IÞ is
for “pay liability did not apply.” The hazard rate of moving back to
presence ðwork resumptionÞ is
v2it 5 exp½xitb2k 1 v2i 1 j2t 1 d2jPj
1 f21D1 f22D  R1 f23D  P
1 a21P  R D1 a22P  R  ð12DÞ;
ð2Þ
where D is for “pay liability did apply” and ð12DÞ is for “pay liability
did not apply.” In equations ð1Þ and ð2Þ, xit is a vector of observed time-
12 The duration of absence spells is measured inclusive of days belonging to
previous absence spells that were terminated fewer than 16 days prior to the start
of a current spell.This content downloaded from 
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variant covariates and ðv1i, v2iÞ are unobserved person-specific, time-
invariant covariates subject to a joint, but unknown, distribution.13 The
coefficients of interest appear in the last rows of these expressions ða ;
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a12;a22;a21Þ. If employer incentives do affect employees’ absence behavior,
we expect that a11 > 0 ðeffect 1 listed aboveÞ, a12 < 0 ðeffect 2Þ, a21 < 0 ðef-
fect 3Þ, and a22 > 0 ðeffect 4Þ. The first rows of equations ð1Þ and ð2Þ con-
tain controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, for pregnan-
cies ðtreatmentÞ, and for calendar time. Note that calendar time effects
ðj1t; j2tÞ are estimated separately for eachmonth, implying that any general
differences between the prereform and postreform periods are absorbed
by these effects. The second and third of rows of equation ð1Þ and the
second row of equation ð2Þ contain controls for the factors that deter-
mined initial pay liability, and to ensure that it is the interaction of treat-
ment and reform ðP  RÞ that identifies the causal effects, these determi-
nants are interacted with P and R separately. This implies that we allow
the effects of spell duration ðfewer than/more than 16 daysÞ and the ef-
fects of recent absenteeism ðfewer than/more than 16 daysÞ to vary between
the treatment and the control groups and between the prereform and post-
reform periods.
To avoid setting up a model for the initial state, we condition on work-
ers having been present for at least 32 days to start with.14 To derive
the likelihood function for observed data, we split each individual’s event
history into parts characterized by constant explanatory variables and
unchanged state. Let Ski, k 5 1, 2, be the set of observed spell parts under
risk of event k ðsickness, work-resumptionÞ for individual i. Let lkis de-
note the observed length of each of the spell parts, and let the indicator
variables ykis denote whether a spell part at risk of transition k actually
ended in such a transition or was right-censored. Conditional on unob-
served heterogeneity, the likelihood function for individual i can then be
written as
Lðv1i; v2iÞ5Ps∈S1i v1itðv1iÞ½ y1isexpf2l1is½v1itðv1iÞg
Ps∈S2i v2itðv2iÞ½ y2isexpf2l2is½v2itðv2iÞg: ð3Þ
13 Note that if a person is observed with multiple pregnancies during our ob-
servation window, she is treated as multiple persons ðwith a separate unobserved
heterogeneity vector for each pregnancyÞ. The same practice applies if a control
person is matched to more than one pregnant colleague. The vector of observed co-
variates includes age ð27 dummy variables, corresponding to ages 19–45Þ, calendar
month ð56 dummy variablesÞ, county ð19 dummy variablesÞ, income ð15 dummy
variablesÞ, education/industry ð15 dummy variablesÞ, and the local unemployment
rate.
14 This restriction implies that we drop 2,245 treatment-control pairs ð2.5%Þ.
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Since the likelihood contribution in equation ð3Þ contains unobserved
variables, it cannot be used directly for estimation purposes. This problem
may be solved by formulating a model for the distribution of unobserved
322 Fevang et al.variables and then replacing equation ð3Þ with its expectation. In the pres-
ent context, it is probable that the unobserved characteristic affecting ab-
sence incidence is correlated to that affecting work resumption, implying
that manipulation of the inflow is also likely to change the distribution of
unobserved work-resumption propensities in the stock of absentees ðand
vice versaÞ. We thus model unobserved heterogeneity nonparametrically.
Under mild technical assumptions, results in Lindsay ð1983, theorem 3.1Þ
and Heckman and Singer ð1984, theorem 3.5Þ ensure that for the purpose
of maximizing the likelihood, unobserved heterogeneity may be approxi-
mated by a discrete distribution with a finite number of support points.
Since only a subset of the analysis population actually experiences an ab-
sence spell within our observation window, there is potentially a selection
problem involved in estimating the work-resumption hazard. This is sim-
ilar to the problem arising in the timing-of-events evaluation literature
when treatment effects are heterogeneous and only a selected subset of po-
tential participants actually receives treatment. Based on a set of regularity
conditions, Abbring and Van den Berg ð2003, proposition 4Þ prove non-
parametric identification of the multivariate mixed proportional hazard
rate model in this context. To ensure identification in our case, we have
performed a Monte Carlo analysis based on artificial data of similar sample
sizes and with similar selection challenges that we have in the actual appli-
cation, that is, data where only a selected portion of the sample comes un-
der the risk of one of the hazard rates during the observation window and
with a significant correlation between the two unobserved covariates. The
exercise is documented in the appendix, available online. It demonstrates
that the sequential hazard rate model we use is indeed identified and that
it can be accurately estimated with the algorithm used in this article ðwith
correct standard errorsÞ. In our actual application, the foundation for iden-
tification is further strengthened by the presence of time-varying covari-
ates as reflected in independent calendar time variation ðsee McCall 1994;
Brinch 2007; Gaure, Røed, and Zhang 2007Þ.
The causal effects of the reform are identified by the shift in pregnant
workers’ absence behavior from before the reform to after the reform,
relative to that of the control group members. An important assumption
underlying this identification strategy is that the calendar time effects are
the same for the treatment and the control groups. If pregnant workers
have been subject to different time trends than nonpregnant workers for
reasons that are not related to the reform, the estimated reform effects may
be biased. Since we have selected control workers from the pregnant work-
ers’ own workplaces, the reform effects may also be biased if colleagues
affect each other’s absenteeism. Existing evidence indicates that peer ef-This content downloaded from 
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fects in absenteeism are empirically relevant ðsee, e.g., Ichino and Maggi
2000; Bradley, Green, and Leeves 2007; Hesselius, Nilsson, and Johansson
2009Þ.15 We return to a number of robustness exercises below, with respect
The Sick Pay Trap 323to the composition of the control group, with respect to the assumption of
a common trend, and with respect to the modeling of unobserved het-
erogeneity.
Let Q be the ða priori unknownÞ number of support points in the
unobserved heterogeneity distribution and let fðv1l , v2lÞ, plg, l 5 1, 2, . . .
Q, be the associated location vectors and probabilities. In terms of ob-
served variables, we write the likelihood function as
L5PNi51Evi ½Liðv1i; v2iÞ5PNi51oQl51plLiðv1l; v2lÞ; oQl51pl 5 1; ð4Þ
where Liðv1i , v2iÞ is given in equation ð3Þ. Our estimation procedure is to
maximize the likelihood function ð4Þ with respect to all model and het-
erogeneity parameters repeatedly for alternative values of Q. The nonpa-
rametric maximum likelihood estimators ðNPMLEÞ are obtained by start-
ing out withQ5 1 and then expanding the model with new support points
until the model is “saturated” in the sense that we are no longer able to in-
crease the likelihood function by adding more points. The preferred model
is then selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion ðAICÞ.
Monte Carlo evidence presented in Gaure et al. ð2007Þ indicates that pa-
rameter estimates obtained this way are consistent and approximately nor-
mally distributed. They also indicate that the standard errors conditional
on the optimal number of support points are valid for the unconditional
model as well and hence can be used for standard inference purposes.16
Table 3 presents the estimated reform effects and the effects of the key
control variables.17 The two direct effects of the reform contributed to
higher absenteeism: the rate of entry into sick leave spells that used to
be subject to pay liability rose by around 10% ða11Þ, while the work-
resumption rate during the first 16 days of the spells dropped by around
6% ða21Þ: The two indirect effects pulled in the other direction, however:
the rate of entry into sick leave spells that were exempted from pay liabil-
ity already before the reform dropped by as much as 19% ða12Þ, whereas
15 It is also possible that there are peer effects in fertility decisions ðsee Hensvik
and Nilsson 2010Þ. Note, however, that we have removed from the control group
all women who themselves become pregnant during the treatment group’s preg-
nancies.
16 Note that the standard errors do not take any within-group correlation in
absenteeism into account, which may be present due to our sampling of control
persons within firms. We perform a robustness exercise below, where we have
sampled control persons from other firms instead.
17 A complete listing of estimated coefficients is available from the authors.
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the work-resumption hazard from long-term absences rose by 13% ða22Þ.18
All these results are exactly as one would expect on the basis of economic
theory. Firms responded to the new incentives by reducing efforts to pre-
Table 3
Selected Estimation Results from Hazard Rate Model
Reform Effect Coefficient
Reform effect on incidence with initial pay liability ða11Þ .100***
ð.016Þ
Reform effect on incidence without initial pay liability ða12Þ 2.215**
ð.119Þ
Reform effect on work resumption with initial pay liability ða21Þ 2.057**
ð.024Þ
Reform effect on work-resumption without initial pay liability ða22Þ .123***
ð.034Þ
Effects of duration and past absence:
Effect on incidence of current presence spell lasted fewer than 16 days:
For allðf11Þ 2.096***
ð.035Þ
Interacted with reform ðf12Þ .017
ð.030Þ
Interacted with pregnancy ðf13Þ 21.259***
ð.026Þ
Additional effect when last absence spell lasted fewer than 16 days:
For all ðf14Þ .420***
ð.104Þ
Interacted with reform ðf15Þ 2.147
ð.111Þ
Interacted with pregnancy ðf16Þ .470***
ð.113Þ
Effect on work resumption of current absence spell lasted fewer than
16 days:
For all ðf21Þ .978***
ð.031Þ
Interacted with reform ðf22Þ .108***
ð.032Þ
Interacted with pregnancy ðf23Þ .253***
ð.037Þ
NOTE.—Number of observations 5 177,306. Standard errors are in parentheses. Additional controls
include age ð34 dummy variablesÞ, calendar time ð64 dummy variablesÞ, county ð19 dummy variablesÞ,
income ð15 dummy variablesÞ, education/industry ð15 dummy variablesÞ, and local unemployment ðin the
municipalityÞ. The model also includes six support points for the two-dimensional unobserved hetero-
geneity distribution and the estimated correlation coefficient between expðv1iÞ and expðv2iÞ is .30. In total,
the model contains 348 estimated parameters.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
324 Fevang et al.vent short-term absence, for which they no longer faced any direct costs.
At the same time, they apparently became less skeptical toward allowing
18 The estimated percentage shift in the hazard rates caused by a given variable is
given as 100  ðexpðestimateÞ 21Þ, which for small estimates is approximately
qual to the estimate multiplied by 100.eThis content downloaded from 
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long-term absentees back into work and becamemore willing to let “risky”
presence spells exceed the limit of 16 days, knowing that they no longer
were responsible for the sick pay costs associated with relapses.
The Sick Pay Trap 325In order to examine the quantitative importance of short-term pay lia-
bility, we have performed a simulation exercise based on the estimated
model; that is, we have simulated a large number of spells for typical
pregnant workers with and without the direct and indirect effects re-
ported in table 3 “turned on.”19 When we only allow the two direct effects
ða11;a21Þ to enter the model ði.e., disregard the indirect effectsÞ, it predicts
that pay liability reduces the overall expected number of absence days
during pregnancies from 85.5 to 79.3, or by 7.3%. However, when we also
allow the two indirect effects ða12;a22Þ to enter the model, the predicted
number of absence days again rise to 82.8, reducing the overall effect of
pay liability to a 3.2% reduction. It is instructive to decompose the pre-
dicted effects of short-term pay liability into absence days subject to and
absence days exempted from pay liability. Based on our simulations, we
find that while pay liability for short-term absences reduces the number
of absence days directly covered by pay liability by around 6.8%, it re-
duces the number of noncovered days by 3.5% only. If we extrapolate our
findings to nonpregnant workers, we find that pay liability on short-term
absenteeism reduces short-term absenteeism by as much as 11.1%, while
it actually increases long-term absenteeism by around 1.6%. The reason
why we predict that the effects of pay liability are relatively more impor-
tant for nonpregnant than for pregnant workers is that a disproportion-
ally large fraction of pregnant workers are “stuck” in long-term absen-
teeism anyway, with return-to-work rates return so low that the negative
proportional shift caused by pay liability ða22Þ is of moderate quantitative
importance. Consequently, they also become removed from the risk of
incidence.
It is important to bear in mind that all the effect estimates reported here
are likely to underestimate the true causal effect of pay liability for the
reason that the reform did not really affect all absences among pregnant
workers—only those that were “pregnancy related.” In Section IV.A.3
above, we estimated that only 73% of pregnant workers’ absence spells
are pregnancy related, implying that our coefficients are estimated with a
significant attenuation bias.
4. Robustness
As discussed above, the results in table 3 are based on the assumption
that young, nonpregnant, female colleagues constitute an appropriate con-
19 Simulations were made for an agent starting a pregnancy with “representa-
tive” entry and exit rates, based on the point estimates reported in table 3. We
made 177,176 simulations for each set of assumptions regarding the reform effects
ðcorresponding to the actual number of observationsÞ.
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trol group for pregnant workers, in the sense that they were subject to the
same time variation in absence behavior apart from the reform and also
were not affected by the reform through peer effects. Yet, while it is con-
326 Fevang et al.ceivable that violations of these assumptions could disturb attempts to
identify overall reform effects, it is hard to see why they should yield the
particular twist in the work-resumption profiles captured by our estimates.
We interpret the finding that the work-resumption rate declined during the
first 16 days of absence ðfor which there used to be a pay liability periodÞ
while at the same time it rose at longer durations as convincing evidence of a
reform effect.
Table 4 reports the results from a number of robustness exercises. We
first examine sensitivity with respect to the common trend assumption.
Column 2 reports the estimated reform effects when the time window is
reduced to include 22 months only ðdropping the last 42 monthsÞ, while
columns 3 and 4 report the results when instead a separate linear or qua-
dratic time trend for pregnant workers is included in the model, respec-
tively. While these modifications do change the estimated effects some-
what—in the direction of weaker direct effects and ðin some casesÞ stronger
indirect effects—they do not alter any of the main conclusions. The sensi-
tivity of the point estimates with respect to the common trend assumption
may suggest, however, that there was an increasing trend in pregnancy-
related absences for reasons not related to the reform. Alternatively, it may
have been the case that the full reform effects materialized gradually, as it
took some time before employers learned about the new rules. Second,
we assess the potential problem that the absence behavior in the control
group is causally affected by the absence behavior in the treatment group.
Since our control persons are chosen from the same workplaces as the
treatment population ðto ensure maximum similarity in terms of shocks to
the work environmentÞ, such a causal relationship could arise due to peer
effects or changes in work pressure resulting from colleagues’ absence.
Column 5 reports the results from a model where we have drawn the con-
trol group members from other workplaces instead; that is, for each treat-
ment, we have selected a control person from a different firm within the
same industry and with the same IWA status but have otherwise followed
the same one-to-one nearest neighbor matching strategy as described
above.20 It is clear that the estimated direct incidence effect as well as the
indirect effect on work resumption then become larger. This pattern is
consistent with the existence of a significant peer effect, in line with exist-
ing empirical evidence. Again, the main conclusions go through, however.
In our baseline model, we have imposed rather restrictive assumptions
regarding duration dependence in the return-to-work hazard by allowing
20 Industries are categorized on the basis of the International Standard Industrial
Classification ðISICÞ at a three-digit level.This content downloaded from 
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only a two-step function in the form of a shift after 16 days of absence. To
assess whether this may have influenced our results, we report in column 6
estimates based on a much more flexible nine-step function ðallowing a
328 Fevang et al.shift every thirtieth dayÞ. Again, we find that the results are robust, al-
though we estimate a somewhat stronger reform response during the
first 16 days and correspondingly weaker response afterward. Finally, we
examine robustness with respect to the modeling of unobserved hetero-
geneity. Column 7 reports the results from a model without unobserved
heterogeneity, while column 8 reports the results from a model where
the unobserved heterogeneity vector is allowed to change each time a
person has returned to work from a completed absence spell ðand been at
work for at least 16 daysÞ. The latter specification is included to allow
distinct work-absence cycles to be associated with different unobserved
transition propensities, generated, for example, by different diseases. The
results change only marginally, indicating that the exact way in which
unobserved heterogeneity is modeled is empirically unimportant in this
case.
5. Comparison with RD Findings and Descriptive Statistics
While the purely descriptive DiD estimate for the overall reform effect
was a 3.4% rise in absenteeism ðsee Sec. IV.A.1Þ, the simulation exercise
based on the hazard rate model indicates a rise around 3.2%. These two
very different empirical approaches thus yield more or less the same con-
clusion regarding the overall effects of the reform. The RD analysis, on
the other hand, indicated a shift of the incidence rate alone of 18.8%. This
is not necessarily in conflict with the results from the DiD and the hazard
rate approaches, since the latter also incorporate effects on spell duration.
But even for the incidence effect, the hazard rate model and the RD analy-
sis seem to come up with different results. While the RD analysis indicated
a shift in the incidence rate 18.8%, the hazard rate model indicates a shift
around 10%. This difference can be explained, however, by endogenous sort-
ing into the risk set of present workers, which is appropriately accounted
for in the bivariate hazard rate model but not in the RD analysis. To show
this, we reestimated the hazard rate model without including controls for
pregnancy-month ðand other individual characteristicsÞ in the model, mak-
ing it more directly comparable to the RD analysis ðnot shown in tablesÞ.
We then obtained an entry effect ða11Þ of 0.18 ðSE5 .01Þ, which is basically
in line with the RD estimates with the longest bandwidths. Hence, what
apparently happened was that the reform caused entry rates to rise for two
very different reasons: ðiÞ because transition to absenteeism for each pres-
ent worker became less costly for the firm and ðiiÞ because the composition
of the population of present workers changed toward individuals with
higher absence risks ðas long-term absentees to a larger extent returned toThis content downloaded from 
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workÞ. While the bivariate hazard rate model is designed to disentangle
these two effects, the RD analysis lumps them together. This illustrates a
potential limitation associated with using RD in settings were the source of
The Sick Pay Trap 329the discontinuity affects behavior such that the composition of the agents
under study also changes; the method may be a reliable and robust strategy
for ascertaining that behavior really has changed yet be a poor strategy for
quantifying these effects at the level of agents.
B. Employment Opportunities for Young Females
The firms’ pay liability for pregnant workers’ absences was removed for
the purpose of making individuals conceived to have a high risk of becom-
ing pregnant more employable. In this subsection, we evaluate whether the
reform had this intended effect or not. Employers’ scope for discriminat-
ing against pregnant or pregnancy-prone workers is limited insofar as work-
ers already are employed. Hence, to the extent that the higher expected ab-
sence costs associated with pregnancies affect employment opportunities
at all, they are likely to do so primarily through the hiring decision. We
therefore start out with the population of labor-market entrants, that is,
personswhocompleted their educational career ðupper secondaryorhigherÞ
in the period from 2000 to 2004, and we investigate transitions to a first
job.21 It is not obvious how a treatment group should be defined in this
case, and it is even less obvious how an appropriate control group can be
established. Loosely speaking, the treatment group consists of women at
risk of becoming pregnant, which from the employers’ point of view ba-
sically includes all young women. In a more narrow sense, it consists of
already-pregnant job seekers. As our primary strategy, we thus define all
young, female labor-market entrants ðaged 19–34Þ to be in the treatment
group, whereas we use men in the same age group as controls. In addition,
we examine in particular the employment prospects of pregnant graduates.
We first show some descriptive statistics illustrating the school-to-work
transitions for males and females prior to and after the reform. We then set
up a multivariate regression model accounting for the transition to the
first job and investigate whether the reform coincided with a relative
improvement in employment chances for female labor-market entrants in
general and for pregnant entrants in particular.
1. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups are provided
in figure 4 and in table 5. We focus on groups who either completed their
21 A person is considered to have completed education in a particular quarter if
he or she studied in that quarter but was not registered in any formal education the
subsequent two quarters.
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education well before ð June 2000–March 2001Þ or well after ð June 2002–
March 2003Þ the reform to avoid cohorts that were only partly affected by
the reform. Looking first at the cumulative employment propensities by
FIG. 4.—Cumulative employment fractions by months since graduation. Before
reform, solid gray line with circles; after reform, dashed black line with triangles.
330 Fevang et al.time since graduation in figure 4, we note that both women and men
experienced a significant drop in employment from the former to the
latter period but that the drop was largest for men, implying a relative
improvement for women ðsee panels a and bÞ.22 Moreover, women who
were pregnant at the time of graduation did not experience a drop in em-
ployment propensity at all, thus experiencing a quite substantial relative
improvement. The descriptive DiD estimator for the reform’s effect on
young women’s overall probability of having found some form of em-
ployment within 6 or 12 months after graduation is 2.4 and 3.2 percentage
points, respectively ðsee the numbers reported at the bottom of table 5Þ.
Table 5 also reveals that men and women tend to chose very different
educations, as reflected in the much higher level of college and university
education for women than for men. In addition, it reveals that a much
larger fraction of men than of women has obtained employment well be-
fore the time of graduation. An important reason for this is that many
secondary educations involve the possibility of a final apprentice year,
which implies employment.
2. A Probability Model for Subsequent Employment
Given the large differences in men’s and women’s educational choices,
it is also probable that their school-to-work transitions have been subject
to correspondingly different cyclical and seasonal fluctuations around the
time of the reform. To avoid this from biasing our results, we set up a
22 Employment is defined on the basis of the Norwegian Employer-Employee
register. A person is defined to have been employed in a particular month if he or
she had a registered job paying amonthly salary of at least NOK20,500 ð2012 valueÞ.This content downloaded from 
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multivariate regressionmodel for the school-to-work transition, where we
control for all possible combinations of education types and graduation
times; that is, we define 49 different education categories and interact them
Table 5

















Number of graduates 19,589 18,843 19,674 18,462
Age 25.5 25.3 25.1 24.7
Education
Upper secondary 44.7 46.8 64.0 65.7
College ðlow levelÞ 43.6 41.0 22.2 20.7
University ðhigh levelÞ 11.7 12.2 13.9 13.6
Non-European
background ð%Þ 5.2 6.1 5.4 5.7
Cumulative fraction
employed ð%Þ:
6 months before graduation 14.7 13.9 35.9 33.2
At graduation 19.6 19.4 39.9 38.3
6 months after 60.0 56.8 67.0 61.4
12 months after 72.1 69.8 76.2 70.7
The Sick Pay Trap 331with dummy variables for the before/after reform period.23
We focus on the two discrete outcomes of having obtained some form
of employment within 6 or 12 months after graduation. For ease of in-
terpretation, we specify the school-to-work transition with a linear prob-
ability model, that is,
E yi½ 5 xib3 1 f31EDUCi 1 f32EDUCi  R1 f33W 1 f34P
1 a31W  R1 a32P  R;
ð5Þ
where yi is an indicator for employment within 6 or 12 months, W is a
dummy for women, and EDUCi is a vector with 49 education dummy
variables. The pregnancy dummy P is equal to one if a woman was preg-
nant at the time of graduation or within the first 3 months after gradua-
tion. The covariate vector xi includes the month of graduation ð17 dummy
variablesÞ, age ð16 dummy variablesÞ, and the local ðmunicipalityÞ rate of
youth unemployment ðaged 19–34Þ at the time of graduation. The coeffi-
cients of main interest are a31 and a32.
23 Educations are classified on the basis of the International Standard Classifi-
cation of Education ðISCED97Þ.
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The main regression results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 6.
For the 12-month outcome, we find a small positive reform effect on
young women’s employment propensity equal to 1.6 percentage points.
332 Fevang et al.The effect is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. For women
who were pregnant at the time of graduation, we find an additional effect
of 2.9 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. The effects are im-
precisely estimated, however. When we focus on a 6-month period rather
than a 12-month period, the estimated effect for women as a whole de-
clines ðand become statistically insignificantÞ, whereas the additional ef-
fect for pregnant women becomes stronger.
As shown in table 5, many students—particularly men—have obtained
some employment long before graduation. Since it is difficult to interpret
the school-to-work transition for these graduates, we have also estimated
the model without including those who had a job as long as 6 months
before graduation. The results from this exercise are displayed in columns
3 and 4 of table 6. While the reform effects for women as a whole are
virtually unaffected by this sample restriction, the estimated effects for
pregnant women become somewhat smaller. To sum up, it seems that the
removal of pay liability for pregnancy-related absences had the intended
Table 6
Estimated Reform Effects on Employment PropensityWhole Sample
Reduced Sample:



















women ða31Þ 1.59** 1.00 1.62* 1.08
ð.70Þ ð.76Þ ð.84Þ ð.89Þ
Effect for pregnant
ða32Þ 2.84* 4.13** 2.03 3.50*
ð1.51Þ ð1.65Þ ð1.80Þ ð1.91Þ
Women ðf33Þ 2.35 23.00*** 2.29*** .02
ð.49Þ ð.53Þ ð.59Þ ð.63Þ
Pregnant ðf34Þ 219.87*** 212.09*** 222.48*** 213.98***
ð1.04Þ ð1.14Þ ð1.24Þ ð1.32Þ
Local youth unem-
ployment rate
ðages 19–34Þ 26.89*** 27.65*** 26.78*** 27.24***
ð.05Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ ð.07Þ
Observations 76,568 76,568 57,864 57,864
NOTE.—Additional controls include age ð16 dummy variablesÞ, graduation month/year ð17 dummy
variablesÞ, and education type/level before/after reform ð97 dummy variablesÞ.
* Significant at the the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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effect of making young women more employable. Our best guess is that it
raised the probability of having experienced some form of employment 1
year after graduation by 1–2 percentage points for women in general and
The Sick Pay Trap 333by 4–6 percentage points for pregnant graduates. To put these estimates
into perspective, it may be of interest to examine the sizes of the expected
sick pay costs that were effectively removed by the reform. Based on the
simulation exercise described in the previous subsection, we compute that
being pregnant implies approximately 12 extra sick pay days directly
covered by pay liability. The reform’s removal of this cost corresponds to
a 5% reduction of the total wage bill during a typical pregnancy. On
average, female graduates aged 23–27 experienced 0.4 pregnancies during
the first 3-year period after graduation. Hence, the reform did have a
small, but noticeable, effect on expected wage costs for new female em-
ployees.
V. Conclusion
The findings reported in this article show that employees’ sick leave
behavior is responsive toward the employer’s wage costs during their ab-
sence. If a significant part of the costs can be passed on to a public insurer,
employees tend to be absent more than if the costs are paid for by their
own employer. In most countries, the employer is responsible for the
costs associated with short-term absence, while the public insurer covers
the direct sick pay costs arising from long-term absence. We have shown
that an insurance system with these properties reduces the incidence of
absence spells and also raises the probability of quick work resumption. At
the same time, however, it also reduces the work-resumption rate at du-
rations exceeding the pay liability period. We conclude that responsibil-
ity for short-term sick pay only undermines the firms’ incentives to prevent
long-term absenteeism, not only because they have too little pecuniary in-
centive to avoid long-term absence per se but also because a long-term ab-
sent worker’s return to work entails the risk of costly short-term relapses
ðfor which the employer is again financially responsibleÞ. As a result, em-
ployers may exert too little effort to prevent long-term absence. Although
we must be careful generalizing the quantitative results obtained for preg-
nant workers to workers at large, we see no reason why the phenomenon
discovered in this article should be restricted to pregnant employees. The
evidence presented in this article then indicates that the unintended side
effect of restricting pay liability to short-term absence spells only—in terms
of raising longer-term absenteeism—may be sufficiently large to almost
nullify the favorable impacts of a 16-day pay liability period for short-term
absenteeism. Extrapolating our findings to the work force at large, we es-
timate that by making the employers responsible for around one-third of
overall sick pay costs in Norway, policy makers achieve a mere 2.7% re-
duction in overall absence and even a slight increase in long-term absence.This content downloaded from 
            193.157.136.153 on Wed, 23 Jan 2019 07:07:20 UTC             
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Given that long-term absence is the typical gateway to permanent disability
benefits ðwhich are fully covered by taxpayersÞ, insufficient employer in-
centives to prevent long-term absenteeism may be very costly from a social
334 Fevang et al.point of view.
Why, then, have so many countries designed their sickness insurance
systems such that employers do not face the direct sick pay costs associ-
ated with long-term absenteeism? We see two possible explanations. The
first is that absence behavior has typically been considered to be deter-
mined by the worker—not the firm. Hence, the focus has been placed on
worker incentives rather than firm incentives. The results presented in this
article show that this argument is not valid; firms do influence their em-
ployees’ absence behavior, and they respond to economic incentives. Sec-
ond, there may be significant administrative costs associated with reim-
bursing firms for the large number of short-term absences, implying that
even a modest pay liability for longer absence spells is difficult to imple-
ment without at the same time raising the overall sick leave costs for firms.
While this may be a desirable outcome from the perspective of absence
prevention, it has been argued that it also undermines employment pros-
pects for job seekers with high expected absence propensity. Our findings
indicate that, to some extent, this argument is valid; firms do respond to
sick pay liability by being less willing to employ workers expected to be
absent a lot. Hence, by raising pay liability for long-term absences without
at the same time reducing it for shorter spells, policy makers may under-
mine incentives to employ marginal workers. A possible solution to this
dilemma may be to restructure firms’ pay liability so that firms cover a
smaller fraction of the short-term absence costs and a larger fraction of the
long-term absence costs. This solution requires, however, that the admin-
istrative challenges associated with high numbers of reimbursement trans-
actions can be overcome.
We conclude this article with a caveat. Since our data include physician-
certified absences only, we obviously cannot evaluate the impacts of pay
liability on self-reported absenteeism. While we see no particular reason to
expect significant differences in the responses of self-certified and physician-
certified sick leave to changes in firm incentives, we cannot rule out that
such differences exist.
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Employment opportunitiesBased on administrative register data matched with firms' financial statements and closure data collected from
bankruptcy proceedings, we show that a large fraction of Norwegian disability insurance claims can be directly
attributed to job displacement and other adverse shocks to employment opportunities. For men, we estimate
that job loss more than doubles the risk of permanent disability retirement and accounts for one quarter of
new disability insurance claims. Firm profitability and tightness of the local labor market also significantly affect
employees' likelihood of disability program entry, and the adverse effects of displacement grow stronger when
local labor market conditions deteriorate.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In welfare states, the lines between unemployment and disability
insurance are blurred. In this paper, we provide new insights on the
causal relationships between individual employment opportunities
and disability programenrollment. The study ismotivated by the obser-
vations that the recent rise in disability benefit recipiency has not been
paralleled by any deterioration of health conditions, and that countries
with comprehensive disability insurance programs also tend to have
very low unemployment rates (OECD, 2010; Røed, 2012). Building on
job search theory and existing empirical evidence (Autor and Duggan,
2003; Black et al., 2002), we frame our empirical analyses on the notion
that there is a gray area between unemployment and disability insur-
ance, and that shocks to individual employment opportunities may, Norway. Tel.: +47 2295 8813.
tsberg),
ch.uio.no (K. Røed).
ghts reserved.trigger disability insurance claims even when health status remains
unchanged.
Because the risks of disability and unemployment will be highly
correlated at the individual level, the causal effect of employment op-
portunities on disability program enrollment will be difficult to identify
on the basis of observational data alone. Our empirical strategy is to
exploit exogenous sources of variation in individual employment oppor-
tunities, generated by variation in employers' economic performance –
including profitability, downsizing, and firm closure – and idiosyncratic
fluctuations in local industry-specific labor market tightness, to
identify causal impacts. The empirical basis is Norwegian adminis-
trative employer–employee registers, augmented with firms' audited
accounts and information collected from bankruptcy courts. The
bankruptcy data make it possible to distinguish genuine mass lay-
offs from organizational restructuring, demergers, and takeovers.
The adverse consequences of job displacement is the focus of a broad
international literature (see, e.g., Hamermesh, 1987; Ruhm, 1991; Neal,
1995; Kletzer, 1998; Kuhn, 2002; Hallock, 2009), including two recent
138 B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150studies relying on Norwegian employer–employee data (Rege et al.,
2009; Huttunen et al., 2011).1 The present paper extends this literature
in several directions. It is, to our knowledge, the first study to exploit
data on mass layoffs resulting from recorded bankruptcies in order to
identify the impacts of exogenous displacement on the subsequent dis-
ability program and non-participation propensities of affected workers.
Based on estimates of the overall number of involuntary job loss in the
economy – including those from stable and growing firms – it is also
the first study to assess the total impact of job loss on the frequency of
disability insurance claims.We further add to the literature by examining
more specifically the influences of firms' economic performance and of
alternative (local) employment opportunities on employees' likelihood
of entering disability insurance programs. And, finally, we examine the
interaction between these various measures of employment opportunity
to test whether the probability that job loss leads to a disability insurance
claim declines with local labor market tightness.
In contrast to the existing literature, the paper also explicitly ad-
dresses the problem that the root cause of disability program enrollment
may be hidden in events that took placemany years prior to actual entry
into permanent disability insurance.We show that social security careers
ending in permanent disability retirement are often extremely long and
intricate. Identification of the triggering causes therefore requires long
and detailed labor market histories for the population at risk. In order
to assess the impact of, e.g., job loss on the subsequent probability of be-
coming a disability pensioner, we either have to take into account that
the outcomemaymaterialize long after its cause, or we have to examine
outcomes that materialize closer in time to their cause, but are highly
correlated with the subsequent risk of receiving a permanent disability
benefit. In this paper we pursue both these strategies; the former by ex-
amining entry into permanent disability insurance up to six years after
displacement, and the latter by examining entry into temporary disabil-
ity programs and withdrawal from the labor market.
Our results show that disability insurance and non-participation risks
are indeed significantly affected by exogenous change in employment
opportunities. Some of the estimated effects are large from an
economic viewpoint, particularly for men. Our most reliable indicator
for individual displacement is full-time employment in a firm which
will go bankrupt within four years. Holding such a job raises, on average,
the risk of entering permanent disability retirement during the upcoming
six-year period by 2.0 percentage points formale employees and 1.2 per-
centage points for female employees, when compared to holding a job in
a stable firm. Taking into account that the risk of job loss is present even
in stable firms, we estimate that displacement raises the risk of perma-
nent disability retirement by as much as 2.6 percentage points (121%)
for men and 1.6 percentage points (48%) for women, ceteris paribus. Ex-
trapolating these effects to all job losses in Norway, we infer that job loss
accounts for around 28% of all new disability benefit claims amongmales
and for 13% among females in our data. Not surprisingly, we also find
strong impacts on the propensity for non-participation. For men, the
probability of being outside the labor force after four years increases by
9.0 percentage points (123%) as a result of exogenous job loss. For
women, the probability rises by 12.1 percentage points (98%). Disability
insurance and non-participation propensities are also affected by more
moderate downsizing processes and even by reductions in firm profit-
ability without any observed downsizing. In addition, employment
opportunities outside the current workplace play a significant role. A
one standard deviation deterioration in local education/industry-specific
labor market tightness (conditional on aggregate labor market tight-
ness) raises the probability of permanent disability retirement by
around 0.4 percentage points (14%) for men and 0.5 percentage points
(also 14%) for women. In support of the hypothesis that disability and
unemployment statuses are substitutable, we also identify significant1 For previous Norwegian evidence that unemployment is among the key drivers of la-
bor market detachment processes leading to permanent disability retirement, see also
Bratberg (1999), Dahl et al. (2000), and Bratsberg et al. (2010).interaction effects between job loss and local labor market conditions.
The more difficult it is to find a new job, the higher is the probability
that displacement leads to disability retirement.
The causal relationship between employment opportunity and
disability insurance propensity will of course also reflect that job loss
and unemployment entail adverse health consequences; see Kasl and
Jones (2002) for a survey. In particular, our results show that, for male
employees, job loss raises the mortality rate over a six-year period by
34 percent. For men, our data therefore support recent evidence from
Sweden and the United States showing adverse effects of displacement
onmortality risk (Eliason and Storrie, 2009b; Sullivan and vonWachter,
2009). However, we fail to find evidence that displacement has adverse
health effects for female workers.
The estimates of causal effects of displacement on the propensities
for disability insurance and non-participation presented in this paper
are an order of magnitude larger than comparable estimates reported
in prior studies, such as Rege et al. (2009) and Huttunen et al. (2011).
We find that this disparity largely stems from differences in the opera-
tional definition of “displacement.”While the findings of the prior stud-
ies are based on mass layoffs identified from employment registers
alone (with, as noted by the authors, the risk of misclassification in
cases of reorganizations, demergers, and takeovers), the mass layoffs
exploited in this paper are identified on the basis of auxiliary informa-
tion taken from bankruptcy proceedings. We demonstrate that this
approach reduces attenuation bias otherwise associatedwith the purely
register-basedmethod. The revised effect estimates show that job loss is
a major factor behind disability program participation in Norway.
2. Institutional background
Workers in Norway are insured against loss of work capacity from
health impairment. Social insurance is compulsory and comprises
sickness absence benefits, rehabilitation benefits, and disability pension.
During sickness absences, the benefit replacement rate is 100%. Sickness
absence benefits cannot be paid out for more than 12 months, however.
Beyond 12 months, workers are eligible for rehabilitation or disability
benefits provided that their work capacity is reduced by at least 50%
due to sickness or injury. The replacement ratio associated with rehabili-
tation benefits or disability pension is typically around 66%. Rehabilitation
benefits are temporary (normally 1–3 years), and are paid out during
medical and/or vocational rehabilitation attempts. Disability pension is
in practice a permanent benefit (lasting until the normal retirement age
of 67), as the outflow from disability pension to self-supporting employ-
ment is negligible. Except for very short sickness absence spells (three
days or less), all social insurance payments require that a physician cer-
tifies the health impairment. In more serious cases, the application may
also be assessed by independent physicians appointed by the social secu-
rity administration. Itmust be certified that health impairment is themain
cause for the loss of work capacity. If this requirement ismet, the law text
explicitly states that the social security administration may consider the
employment opportunities of the applicant when ruling whether or not
the loss of work capacity is sufficiently large to qualify for benefits.
The economic incentives embedded in the social insurance replace-
ment ratios were stable during the time period covered by this paper
(1993–2006), although the period covers some attempts at tightening
gate-keeping, particularly for disability pensions. For example, the re-
quirement that the certified health impairment must be the main cause
of the claimant's inability to work was introduced in 1995. Prior to
1995, it was sufficient that health impairment was among the causes. In
2000, the rehabilitation requirement was tightened such that disability
benefit applicantswere required to go through a vocational rehabilitation
attempt, unless deemed obviously futile.2 In 2004, the rules regulating the2 Apparently, vocational rehabilitation is deemed “obviously futile” quite often.
According to our data, as many as 62% of the 2005 disability entrants had never been re-
ferred to vocational rehabilitation.
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ened, leaving less room for extensions beyond one year. The same year
saw the introduction of a time-limiteddisability benefit (with amaximum
duration of four years). This new benefit effectively substituted for per-
manent disability pension for younger claimants. However, experiences
so far indicate that return to employment from the time-limited disability
benefit is modest, and that the arrangement essentially only has post-
poned entry into the permanent disability program.3
The employer is responsible for covering sickness insurancepayments
during the first 16 days of the sickness absence spell. For longer spells
and for permanent disability insurance claims, the costs are covered in
full by the public purse. There is no experience rating; hence there are
limited pecuniary costs for firms associated with their employees utiliz-
ing long-term sickness or disability programs. In fact, when a firm has re-
dundant labor, but finds it difficult to lay off workers due to employment
protection regulations, an employee's transition to long-term sickness
absence or disability insurance may be profitable for the firm.
Identifying and quantifying the roles of job loss and disemployment
in explaining disability insurance claims is especially pertinent to recent
developments in Norway. Over the past decades, Norway experienced a
staggering rise in temporary and permanent disability program partici-
pation. Based on the data used in the present paper, we find that, over
the 1993–2006 period, dependency on broadly defined health benefits
increased by 34%, from 15.2 to 20.4% of the working-age population,
with the ratio of those claiming permanent disability insurance to the
number of unemployed rising from 1.2 to 4.0. The growth in disability
rolls occurredwithout any corresponding deterioration in health condi-
tions. To the contrary, subjective health indicators improved, with the
proportion of the adult population reporting good or very good health
rising from 79% in 1995 to 81% in 2005, and the share reporting bad
or very bad health declining from 8 to 6%.43. Theoretical considerations
Although disability insurance eligibility requires at least 50% reduced
work capacity due to sickness or injury, it is plausible that individual pref-
erences and labor market opportunities affect application and approval
decisions. Job search theory provides a useful framework for thinking
about the process of entry into the disability insurance program in this
context; see, e.g., Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), Autor and Duggan
(2003), and Rege et al. (2009). Individuals are assumed to have prefer-
ences over the alternative labormarket states of employment, job search,
and inactivity (with orwithout disability benefits); and job displacement
can be viewed as a negative shock to the value of continued labormarket
participation. It follows directly that there potentially is a group of indi-
viduals who prefer employment over inactivity, but nonetheless prefer
disability benefit application over search for new employment. Autor
and Duggan (2003) label this group “conditional disability insurance ap-
plicants,” as they will apply for disability benefits only in the event of job
loss. The intuition behind the conditional application strategy is that job
loss shifts the discounted value of labor market participation below that
of inactivity. This may happen both because obtaining a new job will
incur search costs and because a new job is hard to find and likely to
pay less than the prior job. Barth (1997) shows that there is a significant
tenure component in Norwegian wage setting partly generated by a de-
layed compensation strategy (Lazear, 1981). And, as stressed by Bound
and Burkhauser (1999), displacement nullifies the value of job-specific
human capital and thus reduces the value of continued labormarket par-
ticipation. Recent empirical evidence fromNorway also confirms that dis-
placement leads to significant earnings losses (Huttunen et al., 2011).3 Our data show that, by the end of 2004, 8412 persons received a time-limited disabil-
ity pension. Three years later only 2% had returned to work. As many as 65% remained on
time-limited disability and 29% had entered permanent disability.
4 These numbers are collected from Statistics Norway's level of living sample surveys,
and can be downloaded from www.norgeshelsa.no.Given the relatively strong protection against selective dismissals in
Norway, it is probable that many existing employment relationships
will continue despite loss of productivity caused by reduced health. In
the event of job loss triggered by downsizing or closure, however, the
same health problem is likely to reduce the arrival rate of new job offers
and shift the distribution of wage offers downwards, and hence make
job search less attractive. At the same time, the likelihood of being
considered eligible for disability benefits may increase following dis-
placement, since work capacity is assessed relative to realistic employ-
ment opportunities. This obviously entails elements of discretionary
judgment by the social security administration. Røed and Westlie
(2012) present empirical evidence showing that the probability of
making a direct transition from unemployed job search to temporary
or permanent disability enrollment rises significantly with past unem-
ployment experience, indicating that a long and unsuccessful job search
is interpreted as evidence of reduced work capacity.
Employment protection legislation does of course not provide full in-
surance against selective dismissals. Individual workers may legally be
laid off in continuing firms if there is a factual foundation for downsizing
or reorganization based on the firm's economic performance. Manage-
ment may further encourage employees to quit the job, perhaps with
some severance payment as a carrot, in order to achieve a desired reorga-
nization without triggering labor conflicts. If the probability of disability
program entry rises upon job loss, we would expect the future risk of
disability retirement to relate negatively to firm profitability, as high
profits reduce the likelihood of dismissals and employer-initiated quits.
Extending the job search model with the option of applying for dis-
ability benefits further yields the prediction that the probability of being
a conditional disability insurance applicant declines with labor market
tightness, as the value of unemployment rises, while the value of inac-
tivity declines, with improved employment opportunities. In particular,
an important implication of such a model is that the impact of job loss
on the rate of disability program entry is larger the more difficult it is
to find a new job. We therefore expect to find a negative interaction
effect between job loss and labor market tightness in empirical models
designed to explain disability program entry.4. Data and identification challenges
The data we use in this paper consist of three parts. The first part
covers a detailed account of individual labor market and social security
event histories from 1992 to 2007, linked with comprehensive informa-
tion about each individual. The second part includes a description
of firms in terms of their employee composition and economic
performance. Indicators for economic performance are constructed
from annual audited accounting data, which all limited liability firms in
Norway are required tomake public. The third part contains information
about the nature of firm closures. These data are collected from the Nor-
wegian bankruptcy court system. A generic problem facing research
based on administrative employer–employee data is to distinguish gen-
uine mass layoffs from “spurious” layoffs, whereby a firm appears to
downsize or close down while in reality it splits into smaller entities,
merges with another company, or reorganizes in other ways, perhaps
without laying off workers at all. A strategy pursued in the existing liter-
ature (Fevang and Røed, 2006; Henningsen and Hægeland, 2008; Rege
et al., 2009) is to interpret a mass layoff as spurious when a relatively
large fraction of the workers make a transition to the same new firm.
But this strategy obviously fails to identify a spurious layoff that splits
the workforce, e.g., when a large firm is reorganized into several smaller
entities. Defining thresholds for the fraction of workers moving together
may also be awkward and result inmeasurement error for small firms. In
the present paper, we exploit additional information thatwe collect from
bankruptcy court proceedings and that allows us to distinguish explicitly
between closures due to bankruptcy, closures due to voluntary liquida-
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Fig. 1. Past labormarket states of 2005 permanent disability program entrants. Note: States are notmutually exclusive, as disability and unemploymentmay be partial and combinedwith
some employment. Populations consist of 13,194 men and 15,993 women of age 30 or above who entered the permanent disability program in 2005.
5 The apparent decline in temporary disability just before entry into permanent disabil-
ity displayed in Fig. 1mirrors the occurrence of a “benefit vacuum” period after temporary
disability insurance options are exhausted, but before the application for permanent dis-
ability benefits has been approved.
6 A key to interpretation of our results is that workplace events can be considered exog-
enouswith respect to the behavior of the individual employee. Since this assumptionmay
be questionable for small workplaces, below we also present results based on samples of
workers in large firms (more than 50 employees) to examine the robustness of our find-
ings. The reason why we restrict attention to single-plant firms is that accounting
and closure/takeover data are available at the company level. Hence, the accounting
and closure data can be directly matched to workplace data for single-plant firms on-
ly. Finally, by focusing on single-plant firms we avoid complications caused by
within-firm job transfers following plant closures (Huttunen et al., 2011).
140 B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150A particular problem arising in attempts to identify the causal
effect of employment opportunities on subsequent disability insur-
ance claims is the long and variable time lags between the presumed
cause and its observed effect. When granting a new disability pen-
sion, the social security administration also sets a “disablement
date.” This date is meant to reflect the occurrence of the health
impairment behind the loss of at least 50% of work capacity. Because
benefits are based on earnings up to the time of disablement, the date
becomes important for the level of benefits; hence its determination
is likely to involve some considerate judgment by the case worker. On
the basis of disablement dates recorded in our data, we find that the
disablement on average occurs three years before entry into the per-
manent disability program. The variation across individuals is large,
however, and for almost 20% of claimants the duration from disable-
ment until disability retirement is more than five years. The typical
duration from disablement to disability pension uptake also varies
over time, primarily reflecting the various attempts (referred to
above) at curbing the inflow to the permanent disability rolls. To il-
lustrate, in our data the average “waiting time” fell from 38 months
for 1997 entrants to 32 months for 2000 entrants, after which it rose
to 36 months for 2003 entrants to the permanent disability program
(we do not have comparable disablement date statistics for later
entrants).
Many disability program entrants have long histories of labor
market difficulties, often with combinations of unemployment and
health problems. In these cases, it is difficult to identify a particular
triggering event. Fig. 1 displays the employment and social security
histories –month by month – during the 12-year period prior to per-
manent disability enrollment for men and women age 30 or older
who entered the program in 2005. Almost one quarter of this group
received social security transfers such as unemployment benefits as
long as 12 years prior to obtaining the permanent disability status.
Visible signs of health problems in the group as a whole, in the
form of declining employment rates and corresponding increases in
the proportion claiming temporary health benefits (rehabilitation
or long-term sickness benefits), appeared around six years before
disability program entry. Three years before entry into permanent
disability, around 40% of the men and 50% of the women claimed
temporary disability benefits. These patterns show that the road to
permanent disability retirement can be long and winding – often in-
volving unemployment spells as well as periods on temporary healthbenefits – and that very few cases are straightforward in that there is
a once-and-for-all health shock leading quickly and directly to disability
retirement.55. The effect of employment opportunities on disability
program entry
5.1. Methodology
To allow for long time lags between employment opportunity
shocks (the presumed cause) and entry into the permanent disability
program (the possible effect), we have structured our dataset into
three four-year time periods, starting at the end of the base years of
1993, 1997, and 2001, respectively. We condition the analysis on
workers holding a full-time job on January 1st following the base year.
In addition, we exclude workers with recent social insurance spells
and drop from the samples those who received social security benefits
for more than six months during the prior two years. We then examine
the probability of permanent disability retirement as well as of transi-
tions to states that involve a high risk of subsequent entry into the
permanent disability program, as functions of, inter alia, exogenous
change in employment opportunities. We limit the analysis to em-
ployees in private sector single-plant firms with more than 10 em-
ployees and for which we have access to audited accounting data
(which includes all limited liabilityfirms).6 We also limit attention to in-
dividualswhowere between 20 and63 years of age in the base year and
who resided in Norway throughout the analysis period. All analyses are
conducted separately for men and women.
Table 1
Analysis populations and the distribution of outcomes.
Men Women
Base year: 1993 1997 2001 1993 1997 2001
Observations 130,786 189,703 203,781 44,549 59,272 70,373
Disability insurance (temporary or permanent) during next 4 years (%) 9.2 12.6 13.9 14.4 19.2 21.3
Out of labor force 4 years later (%) 7.8 10.6 11.1 14.2 16.8 17.1
Permanent disability program within 6 years (%) 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.9 4.1 3.4
141B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150We focus on three alternative outcomemeasures for the individual:
1. Whether claiming disability insurance – temporary or permanent –
during the four-year period following the base year.7
2. Whether outside the labor force four years after the base year.8
3. Whether entered the permanent disability program within six years
of the base year.9
Table 1 lists the sizes of the analysis populations and the distribution
of outcomes. Comparing the three periods, we note that the incidence of
permanent disability program participation rose somewhat between
the first and the second period, after which it declined to a level below
that of the first period. The incidence of temporary (and permanent)
disability program participation rose sharply throughout the three
periods; for women it increased quite dramatically, from 14.4% in the
1994–97 period to 21.3% in the 2002–5 period. We interpret the shift
from permanent to temporary disability program participation in the
third period as reflecting attempts by the social security administration
of curbing inflows into permanent disability retirement through more
ambitious rehabilitation attempts; see Section 2.
Empirical analysis of the causal impact of employment opportu-
nities on the likelihood of claiming disability benefits requires ob-
served variation in employment opportunities that is exogenous to
each individual's disability program propensity. Our data give three
potential sources of such variation. Two of these operate at the work-
place level and consist ofmass layoffs and variation in firm profitability,
respectively. The third operates primarily at the region-by-occupation
level and consists of fluctuations in demand for the type of labor that
the worker has to offer outside the present employer.While amass lay-
off will have a very direct effect on the displaced workers' employment
opportunities, a prediction from the theoretical framework of Section 3
is that poor (or deteriorating) firm performance may involve small-
scale layoffs that place pressure on employees to quit “voluntarily”
and/or to claim disability benefits of some kind. Fluctuations in local
labor demand impinge on the employment opportunities for anyone
searching for a new job.
In this setting, true exogeneity of workplace-specific employment
opportunities might be questioned as the quality of a firm's workforce
also will affect its economic performance and, hence, the likelihood of
laying off workers. Moreover, firm-specific employment opportunities
may correlate with other disability risk factors related to, e.g., occupa-
tion and work practices. We address these possible problems by apply-
ing extensive controls for potentially confounding factors, by examining7 Temporary disability is measured as having spells of medical or vocational rehabilita-
tion or at least six months of long-term sickness leaves during the four-year interval.
8 Being outside the labor force after four years is defined on the basis of social security
and annual earnings data as either 1) having annual earnings or self-employment income
below144,000NOK (2009 currency; approx 18,000 €) during the last calendar year, 2) re-
ceiving permanent disability or rehabilitation benefits in the month of December that
year, or 3) receiving long-term sickness benefits in December and for at least six months
out of four-year period ending thatmonth. This definition ensures that individualswho ei-
ther have earnings that are incompatible with self-sufficiency or are observed to rely on
long-term social security transfers are classified as being outside the labor force.
9 Ourmeasure of permanent disability also includes the formally time-limited disability
benefit introduced in 2004.differences in employee composition between different types of firms,
and through extensive robustness checks of our findings with respect
to the composition of the analysis population. These checks include
analyses where we focus on large firms only, as reverse causality is
more likely to be a concern for small firms.
Formass layoffs, we have chosen a forward-looking setup and assess
the impacts of closure and downsizing events over a four-year period
after the base year. This is motivated by the idea that “early leavers”
may have started the search for a new job in response to information
about an impending mass layoff, leaving remaining workers at the
time of mass displacement a selected subset of the original workforce;
see Kuhn (2002) for a discussion. The downsizing indicators are
computed in a similar fashion as in Rege et al. (2009, p. 764), i.e., as
the percent change in the number of full-time equivalent workers
between the start of each period and the date exactly four years
later.10 When a workplace is downsized by 100%, we have – in con-
trast to prior studies – collected direct information on the reason behind
the closure, i.e., whether it resulted from a bankruptcy, a voluntary
liquidation, or a takeover. Firms' profitability is measured by the annual
rate of return on invested capital. We include both initial profitability
(in the base year) and the change in profitability over the next four
years as explanatory variables in our models.
In order to extract and isolate exogenous variation in local labor
market tightness, we start out by constructing two individual and
time-specific tightness indices; one reflecting the probability of becom-
ing unemployed, the other reflecting the probability of finding a new job
given unemployment. Gaure and Røed (2007) show that the transition
rates between unemployment and employment capture the cyclical
fluctuations in labor demand better than the corresponding rates of un-
employment. Both indices are computed on the basis of auxiliary (logit)
regression models. To be precise, let uit = 1 if person i becomes unem-
ployed in period t and let eit = 1 if the unemployed person finds new
work within one year. We then set up the following models:
Pr uit ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ l ϕt þ xitφtð Þ;
Prðeit ¼ 1 uit ¼ 1j Þ ¼ l ψt þ xitπtð Þ;
t ¼ 1994−1996;1998−2000;2002−2004;
ð1Þ
where xit includes a large set of individual characteristics (to be
explained below) including type of work (educational attainment and
industry) and region (travel-to-work area) of residence, and l(.) de-
notes the logit function, l(a) = exp(a)[1 + exp(a)]−1. Based on these
regressionswe compute for all individuals and each of the three periods
the predicted linear unemployment and reemployment propensity in-
dices, bϕt þ xitbφt and bψt þ xitbπt .11 The two indices are by construction
functions of individual covariates andwill, at face value, not be indepen-
dent of the error term in statistical models of individual disability pro-
gram or labor market withdrawal propensities. As we explain below,10 Note that we do not exploit information on individual layoffs in order to avoid compli-
cations from selection bias in cases where some workers are retained by the firm
(Henningsen and Hægeland, 2008).
11 The two indices are designed tomeasure labormarket tightness in thefirst three years
of each four-year period.We do not include the fourth year for the reason that labor mar-
ket tightness is likely to affect the three outcome measures with some time lag.
Table 2
Employment opportunities — descriptive statistics.
Men Women
Base year: All 1993 1997 2001 All 1993 1997 2001
Observations 524,270 130,786 189,703 203,781 174,194 44,549 59,272 70,373
Age 39.4 39.3 39.1 39.9 38.7 37.9 38.6 39.3
Education
Compulsory 24.3 26.8 24.8 22.2 24.4 27.9 24.9 21.7
Secondary 56.1 55.2 56.6 56.3 54.1 56.7 55.4 51.4
College/University 19.1 17.6 18.2 20.9 21.0 14.9 19.3 26.3
Earnings in base year (1000 NOK, 2009-value) 402 373 389 434 297 262 287 327
Percent subject to
Closure w/ bankruptcy 2.6 1.4 2.6 3.2 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.3
10–20% downsizing 9.3 6.9 10.4 9.8 9.9 8.6 10.2 10.5
20–35% downsizing 8.9 5.3 10.5 9.6 10.1 7.4 11.5 10.6
35–99% downsizing 14.0 9.8 15.5 15.4 15.6 12.7 18.3 15.0
Liquidation 5.0 4.7 5.7 4.5 5.6 5.1 6.6 5.2
Takeover 10.0 9.3 12.7 7.9 10.9 10.6 13.5 9.0
Return on capital 0.072 0.079 0.091 0.055 0.072 0.087 0.086 0.050
Change return on capital −0.008 −0.001 −0.047 0.023 −0.007 −0.012 −0.042 0.026
Risk of unemployment 14.9 14.9 13.2 16.4 15.9 16.7 14.1 17.0
Prob. of reemployment 68.8 73.8 70.8 64.5 58.1 57.0 61.8 56.2
Note: Individual characteristics (age, education, earnings) are measured in base year, while firm downsizing and closure indicators refer to four-year period following the base year.
142 B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150we deal with this endogeneity problem by controlling for xit in all anal-
yses where the indices appear as explanatory variables, in essence iso-
lating the variation in labor market opportunities that arise from
time-varying effects of individual characteristics bφt ; bπt  , in particular
those driven by differences in cyclical conditions related to education,
industry, and region.
Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of our analysis populations
and the variables designed to represent change in individual employ-
ment opportunities. Males are strongly overrepresented in the dataset,
reflecting our focus on full-time employees in the private sector. Work-
place turbulence (in the form of downsizing, closure, or takeover) gen-
erally increased from thefirst to the secondperiod, and declined slightly
in the third period. An important exception to this pattern is the bank-
ruptcy rate, which rose significantly over the full data period. Another
important pattern to emerge from Table 2 is that takeovers make up a
majority of thefirm closures in the data. Around 18% ofmale and female
full-time employees in our dataset work in a firm that “disappears” over
the next four years,12 but almost 60% of these jobs are subject to a firm
takeover or acquisition and are therefore less likely to entail displace-
ment than jobs in firms that go bankrupt. Note that while we, in cases
of firm closure, can use the bankruptcy data to distinguish genuine
mass layoffs from, e.g., takeovers and demergers, we are not able
to make this distinction for more moderate downsizings. Hence,
our downsizing indicators are likely to be “inflated” by organiza-
tional changes that do not really involve collective layoffs.
For our three ultimate outcomemeasures, we estimate the following
models:
Pr yijt ¼ 1
 
¼ l αjt þ zitδ j þ xitβ j þ γ j bϕt þ xitbφt
 









¼ αjt þ γ jbϕt þ λ jbψt ;
ð2Þ
where yijt(j = 1,2,3) denote the three dichotomous outcome indicators
described in Table 1, observed for individual i in time period t. The
vector zit contains all workplace-specific covariates such as initial firm12 In addition, there are some jobs in our dataset that seemingly disappear because of
mismatches between firm identifiers in the two main data sources. Specifically, 1.16% of
males and 1.25%of femaleswork infirms that disappear from the employer–employee da-
ta during theupcoming four years but donot close down according to the accounting data;
and 0.98 and 1.36% work in firms that vanish from the accounting data but not from the
employer–employee data. We include these jobs in our analyses, but mark the observa-
tions as firm-identifier mismatches.size, downsizing, closure, turnover, and profitability.13 As explained
above, the vector of individual characteristics (xit) contains information
about the (initial) type of work and region of residence. Since we do not
have direct information about occupations, the type of work is proxied
by a combination of educational attainment and industry (resulting in
21 different job type categories). In addition, we include information
about age (i.e., 44 age dummies), nationality (eight classes), actual
work experience (six classes), base year log earnings and the change
in log earnings from the year prior to the base year, initial family situa-
tion (i.e., marital status, number of children and labor market status of
the spouse; 10 categories), travel-to-work area (90 categories), and,
for older workers, entitlement to early retirement. A complete listing
of the explanatory variables (xit, zit) is provided in Appendix A.
A key point to note is that the coefficient vector {βj,γj,λj} in Eq. (2)
can be separately identified only because there is time variation in
the parameter estimates bφt and bπt . Without the t-subscript on these
parameters, the regressors xit ; xitbφt ; and xitbπt would be perfectly
collinear. We have deliberately constructed the model this way in
order to ensure that it is only the idiosyncratic changes in labor market
tightness over time that identify the effects of employment opportuni-
ties on the risk of disability program entry and non-participation. In
practice, the key source of identification is that different industries
and economic regions were subject to different cyclical fluctuations
during the three observation periods. For example, while employment
opportunities in themanufacturing industries and in agriculture declined
over time, particularly for workers with low educational attainment, the
employment opportunities in retail, restaurants, and tourism improved.
Since an important aim of this paper is to assess the extent to
which individual displacement affects the risk of subsequent dis-
ability insurance uptake, we place considerable emphasis on the
effects of working in a firm that is going to close down due to bank-
ruptcy over the upcoming four-year period. As Table 2 showed, in
any of the three four-year intervals only between 1.0 and 3.2% of
workers in our data actually experienced a bankruptcy. This does
not imply, however, that displacements are rare. According to Salvanes
(1997), as many as 10% of Norwegian jobs are eliminated in a typical
year. We therefore expect displacement to be relatively common even13 For firms that close down during the period,we set the change in profitability equal to
the sample mean in order to keep the observation in the analysis. Since we have separate
dummyvariables for firms that close down, this does not affect the estimated effects of the
change in profitability, but it does imply that closure effects aremeasured relative to firms
with mean change in profitability.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics by firm closure and downsizing status.
Closure w/ bankruptcy Liquidation or takeover Downsizing No downsizing(b10%)
Outcome (%)
Temporary or permanent disability (4 yrs) 19.9 14.1 15.3 12.8
Out of labor force (4 yrs) 20.5 12.7 13.7 9.9
Permanent disability (6 yrs) 4.8 3.3 3.7 2.8
Sickness absence in base year (%) 11.9 10.7 11.5 10.4
Sickness absence yr before base yr (%) 9.6 9.1 9.7 9.0
Female (%) 18.9 26.8 26.5 23.9
Age 38.1 38.8 39.6 39.3
Education
Compulsory 28.4 24.2 25.1 23.8
Secondary 56.7 54.5 55.1 56.1
College/University 14.1 20.9 19.3 19.6
Earnings in base yr (1000 NOK, 2009) 346 379 374 378
Plant size 61.6 109.4 146.5 110.9
Number of workers (all three periods) 16,462 107,409 195,047 379,546
Note: Sickness absence is recorded in a certain year if the person had at least one absence spell exceeding 16 days.
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Closure w/ bankruptcy 56.5 18.8 18.8 4.9 62.2 24.7 27.9 4.3
No downsizing (b10%) 12.4 11.3 8.5 2.6 13.1 17.6 14.0 3.4
10–20% downsizing 17.9 13.1 11.3 3.4 19.1 20.1 16.9 4.0
20–35% downsizing 21.9 13.7 11.6 3.3 23.7 20.5 18.1 4.3
35–99% downsizing 26.5 14.0 13.0 3.7 29.5 19.9 19.8 4.3
Liquidation 19.6 10.5 10.4 2.6 25.3 18.5 17.6 3.5
Takeover 20.0 11.6 10.9 2.7 21.6 19.8 16.5 4.4
15 The assumption that the propensity for unemployment registration is the same for all
types of job loss is of course questionable. On the one hand, one could argue that themar-
ginal employee in a stable firm has weaker labor market prospects than the average em-
ployee displaced from a bankrupt firm. Moreover, selective layoffs may carry a stigma
and serve as an adverse signal about an employee's productivity; see Gibbons and Katz
(1991). These factors imply higher unemployment registration propensities for job losses
in stable firms, and thus fewer actual job losses behind a given number of registered un-
employed. On the other hand, job losses in continuing firms are typically announced well
143B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150in stable or growing firms. Table 3 shows how the downsizing and clo-
sure indicators correlate with subsequent incidences of registered un-
employment (within the corresponding four-year downsizing/closure
period) in our data. With unemployment incidence rates of 57% for
men and 62% forwomen, entry into registered unemployment is indeed
much higher among workers exposed to a bankruptcy-driven closure
than among other workers.14 It is nonetheless clear from the table
that unemployment is relatively frequent regardless of the type of
downsizing event. The table also reveals that the prevalence of our dis-
ability and non-participation outcomemeasures are higher for workers
that faced workplace restructuring than for workers in stable or grow-
ing firms, and that, at least for men, the bankruptcy category stands
out with high future incidence rates of disability program entry and
labor force withdrawal.
To obtain a rough estimate of the overall level of displacements in
our own data, we use the unemployment frequencies reported in
Table 3 as a starting point. If we assume that all employees in the
“closure with bankruptcy” category are actually displaced, we can
infer that 56.5% of displaced male workers and 62.2% of displaced
female workers register as unemployed during the four-year period
in question. If we assume that these same propensities to register
for unemployment also apply to workers who lose their job in
other (non-bankruptcy) firms, we can use the numbers listed in
Table 3 to back out the total number of job losses in our data. Doing14 It is of interest to note that liquidations seem to involve unemployment entries at the
same level as relatively small downsizings. This suggests that liquidations lead to fewer
displacements than bankruptcies, although both events involve firm closure. Probable
reasons for this pattern is that the classification “liquidated firms” contains some false clo-
sures and that an organized liquidation givesmore room formaintaining viable economic
activities within new firm structures compared to an outright bankruptcy.this exercise separately for men and women, we estimate that
around 31% of both male and female employees in our dataset lose
their job over a four-year period.15 Even in the no-downsizing bracket
(b10%), we find that the four-year job-loss rate is 22% for men and
21% for women. To the extent that we interpret the effects of working
in a bankruptcy-exposed firm – as opposed to working in a firm
with no downsizing – as representing the causal effect of displace-
ment, our estimates will thus clearly be subject to contamination bias
(Heckman and Robb, 1985). We return to the issue of contamination
bias in Section 5.2 below.
As stressed by Rege et al. (2009), the estimated impact of firm clo-
sure may be affected by selection bias if workers in closing firms differ
systematically from workers in continuing firms. Table 4 provides de-
scriptive statistics for the workforces of firms in the various downsizing
categories. These statistics show that there are in fact large differences
in worker composition across categories. In particular, bankruptcyin advance of the event, leaving displaced workers with more time to search for new jobs
and hence avoid being registered as unemployed. And congestion effects in local labor
marketsmay imply that mass layoffs have larger adverse consequences than other layoffs.
Such factors suggest higher registration frequencies for job losses in closing firms. It is also
worth noting that our 31% estimate is only slightly below what would be expected on the
basis of the 10% annual job elimination rate reported by Salvanes (1997), which – provid-
ed that the risk is independently distributed across individuals over time – yields a 35% cu-
mulative displacement rate over a four-year period (1 − 0.94).
Table 5
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on disability program entry and non-participation.
Average marginal effects (robust standard errors in parentheses).
Men Women
Temp. or permanent disability
4 yrs




Temp. or permanent disability
4 yrs





























































































































Percent with outcome = 1 12.22 10.10 2.96 18.81 16.23 3.77
Number of observations: 524,270 (men) and 174,194 (women). Standard errors are clustered within 34,620 (men) and 29,700 (women) firm-by-period cells. The following controls are
included in the regressions (number of categories for categorical variables in parentheses): Education/industry (21), age (44), nationality (8), actual work experience (6), initial level and
change in log earnings, family situation (10), region of residence (90), size of municipality (5), firm size (4), employee turnover in base year (5), time period (3), firm-identifiermismatch
(3), and, for old workers, entitlement to early retirement programs (2).
a The variables are standardized, such that they are centered on zero and have a unit standard deviation. Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change
in the explanatory variable.
16 In order to account for any covariance between employeesworking at the same estab-
lishment (and to correct forMoulton (1986) bias), we cluster standard errorswithin firm-
by-period cells. Were we instead to cluster at the establishment level (to also account for
any serial correlation across periods), standard errors would be slightly larger than those
reported in the tables. To illustrate, the standard error of the coefficient of the bankruptcy
variable in themale permanent disability logit equation becomes 0.06118 (21,332 cluster
units) as opposed to 0.06082 (34,620 clusters). Note also that the three periods will con-
tain multiple observations of some of the workers in our sample (the baseline samples
consist of 524,270 observations of 347,748males and 174,194 observations of 128,391 fe-
males). Using clustering to account for serially correlated errors among individuals with
multiple observations raises standard errors by an even smaller amount than clustering
within firms.
144 B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150firms have fewer female employees, lower fractions of highly educated
workers, and lower average earnings than stable firms. Bankruptcy
firms also tend to be smaller than other firms. Given the sample sizes re-
ported at the bottom of the table, these differences cannot be attributed
to randomness alone; hence theymust be accounted for in the empirical
analysis. For the analysis, it would be of concern if workers' reliance on
health-related benefits in bankruptcy firms deviated from that in other
firms even prior to the start of the analysis period. As our analysis sam-
ples are conditioned on not having received any long-term health bene-
fits prior to the outcome period, such sorting problems should primarily
show up in observed short-term benefits, i.e., sick pay. The numbers in
Table 4 indicate that the rate of sickness absence during the base year
indeed is somewhat higher in bankruptcy firms than in other firms.
The year before the base year, however, there are onlyminor differences
between the different firm types. A possible interpretation of these
patterns is that the higher absence rate in soon-to-go-bankrupt firms
reflects that the downsizing process has already started in some of
these firms.
To formally test for whether employees in closing firms, conditional
on our explanatory variables, have higher initial absence rates than em-
ployees in stable or growing firms, we estimate separate models with
indicators for sickness absence in the base year and in the year before
the base year, respectively, as the dependent variable. The models are
formulated exactly as the models we use for other outcome variables
and include the same control variables (see Eq. (2)). Results (not report-
ed in tables) show that the estimated average marginal effect of work-
ing in a closing (bankruptcy) firm on absenteeism in the base year is
equal to 0.86 percentage points for men (t-value = 2.69) and −0.19
percentage points for women (t-value = −0.80). For the year before
the base year, however, we fail to uncover significant differences across
firm types; 0.29 percentage points (t-value = 1.28) for men and 0.26
percentage points (t-value = 0.33) for women. We interpret these
findings as supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the higher ab-
sence rate in the base year in soon-to-go-bankrupt firms captures an
early causal effect of the turbulence and stress associated with theforthcoming closure; see Røed and Fevang (2007). The failure to identify
significant differences in the year prior to the base year indicates that
compositional differences by closure status is not driven by sorting of
employees across firms. We nevertheless return to the issue of sorting
in terms of past sickness absence in the robustness exercises below.5.2. Results from the baseline model
Table 5 presents our key results regarding the impacts of employ-
ment opportunity on subsequent disability program entry and non-
participation for men and women, respectively. For ease of interpreta-
tion, we report average marginal effects (multiplied by 100); i.e., the
mean percentage point impact of the explanatory variable on each of
the three outcome probabilities. Averagemarginal effects are computed
on the basis of relevant comparisons only; for dummy variable sets with
more than two categories, each category's average marginal effect is
calculated for observations belonging to the category in question and
the reference category only (see Bartus, 2005). A complete listing of
estimated coefficients is available from the authors.16
As Table 5 shows, employment opportunities have large and
statistically significant effects on disability program entry and non-
employment propensity. For both men and women, the probability
of claiming permanent disability benefits after six years, and the
145B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150likelihood of being out of the labor force after four years, rise mono-
tonically with the level of workplace downsizing, ceteris paribus.
All three outcome propensities decline with the employer's economic
performance and, at least for men, with improvements in local labor
market tightness as captured by the risk of unemployment and re-
employment variables.
As explained above, our most reliable indicator of exogenous
displacement is the “closure with bankruptcy during the next four
years” variable. As shown in Table 5, such an event raises a male
worker's probability of claiming permanent disability benefits after
six years by 2.0 percentage points when compared to working in a
stable or growing firm with average profitability. Given the large and
variable time lags in entry into permanent disability status described
in Section 2, and because virtually all permanent disability benefit
claims are preceded by extended periods on temporary disability bene-
fits and/or by self-supported periods outside the labor force, it is
of interest to examine the impacts on these outcomes aswell. According
to the estimates in Table 5, a bankruptcy raises amale full-timeworker's
probability of claiming either temporary or permanent disability
benefits by 4.7 percentage points and the probability of labor force
withdrawal (measured four years after the base year) by 7.0 percentage
points. These large additional flows into temporary disability and non-
participation show that the 2.0 percentage point rise in the permanent
disability program participation rate identified after six years does not
capture the full effect of displacement.
The effects of job loss on disability insurance claims and non-
participation are large for women as well, though generally smaller
than those for men when measured relative to the average outcome
within gender. For a female full-time worker, bankruptcy raises the
risk of permanent disability program entry by around 1.2 percentage
points. The risk of temporary or permanent disability rises by around
4.3 percentage points. One reason why the effects tend to be smaller
for women than for men, may relate to gender differences in mental
distress associated with unemployment – and perhaps not being
able to fulfill the traditional breadwinner role – a point to which
we return in Section 5.5 below. It is worth noting that the overall
impact of bankruptcy on the probability of non-participation is larger
for women than for men; the likelihood of non-participation following
bankruptcy goes up by 9.6 percentage points for women (compared to
7.0 for men). But, because our analysis covers private sector employees
only – leading to a huge overrepresentation of men – some caution is
warranted when interpreting gender differences in effect estimates.
The estimates listed in Table 5 show the effect of working in a bank-
ruptcy firm as opposed to a stable or growing firm, and not the effect of
displacement per se. We can nevertheless use the estimated effects to
evaluate the underlying causal impacts of displacement. As we argued
in Section 5.1, displacement is relatively common even in stable and
moderately downsizing firms. This implies that the estimated effects
of closure with bankruptcy reported in Table 5 in fact understate the
causal effects of displacement. Adjusting the point estimates for con-
tamination bias caused by inclusion of treated (i.e., displaced) em-
ployees in the non-treatment (no downsizing) group, we find that
displacement on average raises the permanent disability program pro-
pensity for men by 2.6 percentage points (121%) and by 1.6 percentage
points (48%) forwomen.17 Likewise, the risk of temporary or permanent17 We adjust for contamination bias by dividing the estimated average marginal effect
of “closure with bankruptcy” by the estimated fraction of non-displaced workers in non-
downsizing firms. To illustrate, for men the adjusted effect is calculated as 2.02/
(1 − 0.22) = 2.59, where 0.22 is the estimated fraction of displacement over the four-
year interval among males in non-downsizing firms; see Section 5.1. We compute the
counterfactual disability entry rate – the rate that would have prevailed in the absence
of any displacements – as the actual entry rateminus the product of the estimated average
effect of displacement and the computed overall rate of displacements. In the example giv-
en formen, this yields a counterfactual non-displacement disability rate of 2.14. As the ob-
served rate in the data is 2.96 (see the bottom row of Table 5), we estimate the fraction of
overall disability entries that can be attributed to displacements to be (2.96 − 2.14)/
2.96 = 0.28.disability following job loss rises by 6.0 percentage points (60%) formen
and by 5.5 percentage points (32%) for women. Finally, accounting for
contamination bias, displacement raises the non-participation propen-
sity by 9.0 percentage points (123%) for men and by 12.1 percentage
points (98%) for women. Based on the (admittedly questionable)
assumptions that these effects are representative for all displaced
workers in our dataset and that our estimate of the overall number of
job losses is correct (see Section 5.1), we estimate that displacements
account for fully 28% of all new permanent disability benefit claims
among males and for 13% among females (see footnote 17 for the
exact calculations). Similarly, we find that for men (women), displace-
ments account for 28 (23) percent of transitions to non-employment
and for 16 (9) percent of transitions to temporary or permanent disabil-
ity programs.
The economic performance of surviving firms – as measured by the
annual return on their capital base – also has statistically significant
effects on transitions into disability programs and non-participation
(conditional on the observed level of downsizing). Although the effects
on disability benefit claims are moderate in size, they are far from
negligible. For example, a one-standard-deviation deterioration in ini-
tial profitability and its four-year change will raise the female entry
rate into temporary or permanent disability by 0.9 percentage point
(0.6+0.3). Our interpretation of this finding is that poor economic
performance of the employer does entail small-scale displacement
and places pressures on employees with poor health.
Local industry-specific labor market conditions significantly affect
transitions into disability programs and non-participation. For example,
a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment incidence index
raises the likelihood of entering a temporary or permanent disability
program by 1.7 percentage points for both men and women (around
14% for men and 9% for women). A negative shock to the local labor
market resulting in higher unemployment risk and reduced likelihood
of reemployment (both of a magnitude of one standard deviation) is
predicted to raise the inflow rate to permanent disability by 0.4
percentage point (i.e., by 14%) for men and 0.5 percentage point
(also 14 percent) for women.
Our estimated displacement effects are considerably larger than
those reported in two recent studies also based on Norwegian register
data. Rege et al. (2009) find that workers originally employed in plants
that downsized by more than 60% between 1995 and 2000, were 24%
more likely to utilize disability pensions in 2001 than comparable
workers in non-downsizing plants. And Huttunen et al. (2011), who
define displaced individuals as workers who separate from plants
that reduce employment by 30% or more, report that the probability
of being outside the labor force is 3.4 percentage points higher
seven years after displacement than for otherwise similar, but non-
displaced, workers. When we replicate the definition of downsizing
used by Rege et al, we also replicate their main result.18 The implication
is that the conventional definition of downsizing and closure based
on employer–employee data imparts attenuation bias in estimates.
Although both studies take steps to eliminate false downsizings and/
or focus on high-seniority workers, register-based downsizing indica-
tors will invariably capture some false downsizings and closures related
to outsourcing, demergers, and other forms of organizational change.
Moreover, some separations are voluntary, even when they occur in
downsizing firms. In fact, the authors point out themselves that their
strategies for identifying displacement will involve some misclassifica-
tions. Our results, showing much larger effects of displacement on
disability benefit uptake and labor market withdrawal, suggest that
this indeed is the case.18 Rege et al. (2009) report an estimated odds-ratio associatedwith 60–100% downsizing
of 1.30. Our own corresponding estimate is 1.31.
Table 6
Heterogeneous effects of bankruptcy.
Average marginal effects (robust standard errors in parentheses).
Men Women
Temp. or permanent disability
4 yrs




Temp. or permanent disability
4 yrs




Bankruptcy 4.33 9.69 0.49 7.35 12.44 −0.13
(1.98) (2.25) (0.36) (4.97) (5.71) (0.85)
Reemployment indexa −0.90 −0.97 0.00 −0.56 −2.07 −0.11
(0.21) (0.17) (0.03) (0.45) (0.39) (0.07)
Bankruptcy ∗ reemploymenta −1.19 −0.75 −0.13 −3.13 −3.77 −0.23
(0.52) (0.38) (0.06) (1.43) (1.35) (0.18)
Bankruptcy ∗ (age N 50) 0.62 1.85 0.05 −2.27 0.61 0.01
(0.80) (0.74) (1.17) (2.14) (2.24) (0.37)
Early retirement elig. −3.12 5.92 −0.42 −3.23 9.26 −0.57
(0.25) (0.48) (0.02) (0.71) (1.01) (0.06)
Bankruptcy ∗ early retire't elig −2.62 −1.02 −0.42 −5.59 1.36 −0.56
(1.25) (0.96) (0.10) (4.56) (6.39) (0.41)
Log earnings base yr −3.68 −4.53 −0.62 −1.39 −7.20 −0.52
(0.20) (0.16) (0.04) (0.39) (0.34) (0.07)
Bankruptcy ∗ log earn base yr 4.09 2.44 0.50 5.55 5.29 0.71
(0.67) (0.47) (0.14) (1.74) (1.39) (0.38)
Control variables include the downsizing, closure, and firm characteristics listed in Table 5 aswell as all controls listed in note to Table 5. In addition, the regressions control for interactions
between bankruptcy and education/industry, nationality, work region,municipality, firm size and turnover, and time period. The baseline bankruptcy effect is evaluated for a native-born,
low-educated manufacturing worker in Oslo and employed in a small firm with low turnover during the first observation period of the study. See also notes to Table 5.
a Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable.
19 The attempts at tightening gate-keeping referred to in Section 2might be expected to
have affected caseworkers' scopes for considering applicants' employment prospects and
thus reduced the effect of job loss over time; see Gruber and Kubik (1997), Campolieti
(2004), and de Jong et al. (2011). Although not statistically significant, results indicate
somewhat lower bankruptcy effects for men towards the end of our sample period. For
women, we do not uncover any systematic differences in estimated bankruptcy effects
across the three periods.
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According to the theory outlined in Section 3, substitutability
between unemployment and disability insurance schemes implies
that there is an interaction effect between displacement and local
industry-specific labor market tightness. In particular, a prediction from
the framework is that the risk of disability benefit uptake following dis-
placementwill be higherwhen it is difficult tofind a new job. To examine
this possibility – and also investigate the existence of other potential
heterogeneous effects – we have estimated models that allow for
interactions between the bankruptcy variable and labor market and
individual characteristics. Table 6 presents some key results (the full
set of results is available from the authors). As predicted, disability
benefit uptake depends on local labor market conditions, and poor em-
ployment prospects aggravate the adverse effect of displacement.
In fact, the coefficient of the interaction term between closure with
bankruptcy and the reemployment index is negative for all outcome
measures and for both genders. To illustrate, a one standard deviation
increase in the reemployment index reduces the probability that a
bankruptcy-affected male worker receives temporary or permanent
disability benefits by a statistically significant 1.2 percentage point
and that of a female worker by as much as 3.1 percentage points. The
evidence is thus consistent with the conclusion of Couch and Placzek
(2010) that the adverse consequences of job loss are greater during
economic downturns.
The table further shows that transition rates to disability programs
and out of the labor force following displacement are slightly higher
for older workers. This conclusion is turned upside down, however,
for workers eligible for early retirement. For the latter group of workers,
there does not seem to be any effect of displacement on disability
program entry at all, indicating a strong element of yet another social
program substitutability, this time between early (state subsidized)
retirement and disability pensions. This interpretation is reinforced by
the coefficient estimates showing that, among displaced workers,
those eligible for early retirement are less likely to enter disability
programs, but much more likely to leave the labor force than workers
not eligible for early retirement. Another point to note from Table 6 is
that there is a tendency for “the social gradient” in disability program
entry to be weaker for the flows generated by mass layoffs. This is
illustrated by the impacts of prior earnings. In general, there is a strong
negative relation between prior earnings and the likelihood of disabilitybenefit uptake, particularly for men. The relation likely reflects het-
erogeneity in health – in that poor health causes both low earnings
and disability – and that the opportunity costs of disability program
enrollment are larger for workers with high earnings. Interestingly,
this relationship vanishes in bankruptcy firms. Upon job loss, the local
labormarket opportunities apparently becomemore important relative
to individual background characteristics, again supporting the notion
of unemployment-disability substitution.19
5.4. Robustness analyses
Even though the results presented in Table 5 account for a rich set
of control variables, we cannot a priori rule out that employees in
downsizing and closing firms differ systematically from employees in
stable or growing firms. For example, the layoff process in closing
firmsmay have started during or before the base year, leaving a selected
group of employees in terms of unobserved disability risk. Moreover,
there is the concern of reverse causality: If many workers in a small
firm become disabled, this may have detrimental effect on the firm's
economic performance, and can – at least for small firms – even cause
bankruptcy.
Tables 7 and 8 report the estimated average marginal effects of our
key explanatory variables from a number of robustness exercises for
men and women, respectively. To ease comparisons, in column I we
first list the estimates from the baseline model. In column II, we exam-
ine whether the estimated effects of bankruptcy are impacted by inclu-
sion of the firm profitability and local labor market tightness measures
in the empirical model. The results show that this is not the case — if
anything, dropping thesemeasures raises the estimated impact of bank-
ruptcy. Column III lists the estimated effects based on employees in the
restricted sample of firms that did not downsize at all during the two
years prior to the outcome period. If our results were driven by early
sorting caused by an ongoing downsizing process, we would expect es-
timates to be sensitive to this sample condition. As it turns out, they are
20 A number of studies adopt the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of displace-
ment and limit samples to workers with at least three years of seniority (Fallick, 1996).
See also the discussions of high vs. low tenure workers and the implications for measure-
ment of displacement effects in Jacobson et al. (1993) and von Wachter et al. (2009).
Table 7
Robustness analysis for men. Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on temporary or permanent disability program entry and non-participation.

































Observations 524 270 524 270 489 368 232 684 388 592 524 270 1 137 749 524 270 208 311
A) Temporary or permanent disability program after 4 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 4.72 4.90 4.55 4.30 4.45 4.44 4.35 4.68 6.68
Return on capital −0.12 −0.14 0.00 −0.07 −0.11 −0.19 −0.12 −0.21
Change in ret. capital −0.21 −0.24 −0.06 −0.15 −0.22 −0.19 −0.18 −0.13
Risk of unempl. index 1.67 1.65 2.09 1.42 1.62 1.15 1.97 1.69
Prob. of reempl. index −0.72 −0.77 −0.28 −0.59 −0.55 −0.74 −0.81 −0.71
Percent w/ outcome = 1 12.22 12.22 12.18 12.49 8.44 12.22 11.46 12.22 12.87
B) Out of labor force after 4 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 6.99 7.82 6.95 7.26 6.28 6.80 6.75 7.01 9.17
Return on capital −0.58 −0.42 −1.08 −0.59 −0.58 −0.34 −0.52 −0.97
Change in ret. capital −0.41 −0.33 −0.69 −0.40 −0.42 −0.22 −0.35 −0.59
Risk of unempl. index −0.07 0.08 −0.60 −0.16 −0.10 −0.43 −0.18 −1.41
Prob. of reempl. index −1.52 −1.58 −1.61 −1.36 −1.42 −1.66 −1.60 −1.56
Percent w/ outcome = 1 10.10 10.10 9.98 10.71 7.63 10.10 9.82 10.10 10.15
C) Permanent disability program after 6 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 2.02 2.15 1.83 2.50 1.76 1.95 1.86 2.01 3.55
Return on capital −0.09 −0.08 −0.11 −0.06 −0.09 −0.08 −0.08 −0.09
Change in ret. capital −0.06 −0.07 −0.03 −0.05 −0.07 −0.10 −0.05 −0.06
Risk of unempl. index 0.47 0.44 0.65 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.53 0.75
Prob. of reempl. index 0.10 0.10 0.22 −0.02 0.13 −0.03 0.12 0.26
Percent w/ outcome = 1 2.96 2.96 2.90 3.22 2.03 2.96 2.94 2.96 4.23
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(more than 50 employees). If our results reflected reverse causality,
the estimated impacts should drop significantly when we restrict the
sample to employees in large firms. They do not.
Columns V and VI report estimates based on the sample limited to
workers without welfare benefits at all during the past two years, and
estimates based on the full sample, but with additional controls includ-
ed for past absences (in the form of dummy variables indicating inci-
dences of long-term absence in the base year and in the year before
the base year), respectively. If our results were driven by systematic
sorting of employees with poor health into bankruptcy firms, the esti-
mated impacts of bankruptcy should drop in these exercises. Once
again, they do not.
Column VII presents estimates based on the extended sample of
workers employed in multi-plant as well as single-plant firms. If
workers in single-plant firms differ systematically from those in multi-
plant firms, our results might not generalize to workers at large.
Effect estimates based on the extended sample change only margin-
ally relative to the baseline, though, and the slight decline in the
estimated effect of bankruptcy is consistent with our presumption
that bankruptcies in large (multi-plant) companies often entail the
continuation of some of the plants' economic activities, and hence
that bankruptcy is a less precise indicator of job loss in multi-plant
than in single-plant firms.
ColumnVIII lists estimates from amodelwherewe have allowed the
time dummy variables to vary by region (with the country divided into
five regions). If there were regional trends in disability uptake not
caused by business cycle developments, our baseline model could con-
found such trends with business cycle effects. As it turns out, when we
allow for region-specific trends, the within-region estimates of labor
market tightness effects are, if anything, larger than the estimates of
the baselinemodel. Again, deterioration of local re-employment oppor-
tunities raise the probability of disability program entry.
Finally, column IX presents estimates based on reduced samples
conditioned on stable employment in the same firm for at least five
years. In the literature, restricting the sample to high-seniority workersis a common practice, typically for reasons of eliminating voluntary
quits and firings for cause from the group of displaced workers.20 It is
also probable that job loss is a more severe shock for high-seniority
workers with more job-specific human capital and a stronger expec-
tation of remaining in their current job than for recent hires. As
the column shows, the estimated impacts of bankruptcy rise signifi-
cantly when we impose the seniority restriction. While the pattern
to some extent is explained by much lower contamination of dis-
placements in the reference group of stable firms (not shown), the
substantial difference from the baseline nonetheless indicates that
the adverse effects of job loss increase with seniority. An implication
for the empirical job-loss literature is that studies that focus on high-
seniority workers may exaggerate the average impact of worker
displacement.
Themainmessage coming out of the robustness exercises is that the
estimated marginal effects from our baseline model are highly robust
with respect to data delimitation and model specification. If anything,
the estimated bankruptcy effects from our baseline model turn out to
be on the conservative side; most of the robustness exercises yield
stronger effects. For the other parameters of interest (i.e., the coeffi-
cients of the profitability and labor market tightness variables), there
are only minor variations across the different model specifications
and samples.
5.5. Effects on health
Our finding that employment opportunities have a strong impact
on subsequent disability benefit claims does not necessarily imply that
the disability status results directly from unemployment only. Previous
evidence from Norway suggests that job loss adversely affects em-
ployees' physical and mental health conditions (Rege et al., 2009), and
Table 8
Robustness analysis for women. Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on temporary or permanent disability program entry and non-participation.


































Observations 174 194 174 194 135 216 73 063 119 858 174 194 401 060 174 194 61 320
A) Temporary or permanent disability program after 4 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 4.30 4.98 4.10 2.47 4.75 4.21 3.59 4.34 6.09
Return on capital −0.60 −0.60 −0.78 −0.43 −0.50 −0.36 −0.54 −0.91
Change in ret. capital −0.30 −0.27 −0.50 −0.38 −0.30 −0.13 −0.25 −0.43
Risk of unempl. index 1.57 1.73 1.68 1.46 1.38 1.32 1.68 1.25
Prob. of reempl. index −0.62 −0.57 −0.56 −0.77 −0.64 −0.77 −0.96 −0.75
Percent w/ outcome = 1 18.81 18.81 18.74 19.81 13.40 18.81 18.60 18.81 18.97
B) Out of labor force after 4 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 9.57 10.22 9.27 8.99 8.69 9.52 9.28 9.62 13.89
Return on capital −0.46 −0.40 −0.88 −0.29 −0.40 −0.20 −0.41 −0.81
Change in ret. capital −0.39 −0.34 −0.56 −0.48 −0.39 −0.05 −0.33 −0.68
Risk of unempl. index −0.30 −0.16 −0.89 −0.36 −0.41 −0.06 −0.75 −1.40
Prob. of reempl. index −2.23 −2.40 −2.76 −1.91 −2.24 −2.02 −2.59 −1.58
Percent w/ outcome = 1 16.23 16.23 16.11 16.06 12.57 16.23 15.61 16.23 15.04
C) Permanent disability program after 6 years
Closure w/ bankruptcy 1.23 1.36 1.35 1.86 1.62 1.20 1.32 1.27 3.24
Return on capital −0.11 −0.07 −0.16 −0.06 −0.09 −0.02 −0.10 −0.32
Change in ret. capital −0.09 −0.09 −0.07 −0.04 −0.09 −0.01 −0.08 −0.01
Risk of unempl. index 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.24 0.07 0.33 0.44
Prob. of reempl. index −0.29 −0.29 −0.38 −0.13 −0.29 −0.18 −0.29 −0.22
Percent w/ outcome = 1 3.77 3.77 3.71 3.94 2.59 3.77 3.74 3.77 6.17
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risk of hospitalization due to alcohol-related conditions (Eliason
and Storrie, 2009a). There is also empirical evidence showing that
the mental distress associated with unemployment typically is more
severe for men than for women; see Waters and Moore (2002),
McKee-Ryan et al. (2005), or Kuhn et al. (2009). More generally, recent
empirical studies find that work tends to be a healthy activity, particu-
larly for workers with illnesses that are responsible for the majority of
disability insurance claims in advanced economies, such as musculo-
skeletal pain and mental disorder; see, e.g., Waddel (2004), WaddellTable 9
Estimated percentage point impacts of employment opportunities on mortality six years
after base year. Average marginal effects (robust standard errors in parentheses).
Men Women
Closure with bankruptcy 0.26 0.06
(0.10) (0.15)
No downsizing (b10%) Ref. Ref.
10–20% downsizing 0.11 0.13
(0.05) (0.07)
20–35% downsizing 0.09 0.09
(0.06) (0.07)






Initial rate of return on capitala 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Change in return on capitala −0.05 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Risk of unemploymenta 0.13 −0.06
(0.07) (0.08)
Probability of reemploymenta 0.02 −0.04
(0.05) (0.07)
Percent with outcome = 1 1.09 0.58
Observations 527,684 174,781
a Marginal effects are calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation change in the
explanatory variable. See also notes to Table 5.and Burton (2006), and OECD (2008). Markussen et al. (2013) show
that continued work during episodes of long-term illness in most
cases improves future labor market prospects.
To check for possible health effects of job loss, we extend our sam-
ples and include workers who otherwise satisfy initial sample criteria
(e.g., age 20–63 in the base year), but who died during the six-year
outcomeperiod.Wenext estimate the impacts of employment opportu-
nities on mortality in exactly the same manner as we have estimated
the impacts on other outcome measures. The results reported in
Table 9 show that displacement appears to raise mortality for men but
not for women. Adjusting the estimated bankruptcy effect for contami-
nation bias caused by inclusion of displaced employees in the control
group (non-downsizing firms), we find that displacement raises the
six-year mortality rate for men by 0.33 percentage points (34 percent).
This implies that around 10% of the deaths among male workers in our
data can be attributed to job displacement. A general deterioration of
local industry-specific risk of unemployment also tends to raisemortal-
ity amongmen. For women, coefficient estimates of the downsizing
variables (without closure) are similar in size to those for men. The
latter is consistent with large literature indicating that the uncertainty
associated with organizational change adversely affects the health of
retained employees; see, e.g., Ferrie (2001) and Røed and Fevang
(2007), the latter for recent Norwegian evidence. 216. Concluding remarks
We have shown in this paper that negative shifts in employment
opportunities explain significant shares of non-participation and
disability insurance dependency in Norway. The causal relationship21 The causal link between displacement andmortality risk has also been studied in oth-
er countries. For example, Eliason and Storrie (2009b) and Sullivan and von Wachter
(2009) report mortality effects among displacedmale workers in Sweden and Pennsylva-
nia that are larger than those of the present study. Martikainen et al. (2007) uncover an
association between unemployment and mortality risk in Finland, but argue that there
is no excess mortality among displaced workers.
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is particularly strong for male workers. According to our baseline
estimates, job loss more than doubles the risk of subsequent program
entry for men, while raising enrollment by approximately 50% for
women. These effects are considerably larger than those of prior studies.
We find that the conventional measures of downsizing and firm
closures used in employer–employee data impart attenuation bias
in estimates, which explains the discrepancy across studies.
For men, we have uncovered evidence that a portion of the job
loss effect can be explained by adverse health consequences. For
women, no such health effects have been identified. These findings
are in accordance with previous evidence indicating that the adverse
health impacts of job loss are indeed more severe for men than for
women. For both genders, we have found that the impacts of job
loss on subsequent disability program entry are larger the worse
are local labor market conditions. Moreover, the development of
local labor market conditions as well as of the current employer's
profitability have distinct impacts on the employees' risk of disability
program entry. A probable explanation is that management may
coerce workers to apply for disability insurance benefits as a way of
cutting costs without having to resort to layoffs, and that their incen-
tives for pursuing such strategies rise in times of low profitability and
adverse local economic conditions.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this paper points to a con-
siderable element of substitutability between unemployment and dis-
ability insurance. Our findings suggest that the process of reallocating
redundant workers from old to new employers is far from seamless,
and that many displaced workers permanently change status from
supporting the welfare state to becoming supported by it. Significant
human capital resources are squandered in this process. The finding
that loss of employment is among the major causes of disability pro-
gram entry – whether it stems from genuine health effects or from
adverse shocks to the expected value of labor market participation for
given health levels – suggests that appropriate solutions to the “disabil-
ity problem” should address strategies for improving the employment
opportunities of potential claimants rather than focus exclusively on
income insurance. If job loss and unemployment are among the root
causes of the rising disability problem, it is probable that provision of
employment opportunities is among its remedies.
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Appendix A
List of explanatory variables used in the baseline model:
Age in base year: 44 dummy variables; one for each age 20–63.
Marital status in base year: 4 dummy variable; single, married,
divorced, widow(er).
Children: 3 dummy variables; No children, 1–2 children, 3+ children.
Spouse/family situation: 3 dummy variables; spouse home, spouse
home ∗ 1–2 children, spouse home ∗ 3+ children.
Education/industry: 21 dummy variables: low/primary, low/
manufacturing, low/retail, low/hotel/restaurant, low/transport,
low/finance, low/education, low/health, low/other, medium/primary,
medium/manufacturing, medium/retail, medium/hotel/restaurant,
medium/transport, medium/finance, medium education, medium/health, medium/other, bachelor degree, graduate school, education
missing.
Work experience: 6 dummy variables; 1–5 years, 6–10 years, 11–
15 years, 16–20 years, 21–25 years, N25 years.
Earnings: Two scalar variables; log earnings in base year, difference
in log earnings from the year before the base year to the base year.
Early retirement eligibility: 2 dummy variables; eligible or not eligible
for early retirement benefits during the four-year period in question
(eligibility depends on age and on the firm's affiliation to the early
retirement program).
Immigrant status: 8 dummy variables; OECD, East Europe, Middle
East/North Africa, Other Africa, South East Asia, South America, not
immigrant.
Place of residence: 90 dummy variables; corresponding to travel-to-
work-areas defined by Statistics Norway.
Size of municipality: 5 dummy variables; b2000, 2–5000, 5–10,000,
10–50,000, N50,000.
Firm size in base year: 4 dummy variables; 11–25, 26–50, 51–
200, N200.
Firm turnover in base year: 5 dummy variables; No turnover, 0.1–
10%, 10–15%, 15–20%, N20%.
Downsizing: 4 dummy variables; No downsizing b10%, 10–20%, 20–
35%, 35–99.9%,
Closure: 5 dummy variables; No closure, closure with bankruptcy,
liquidation, takeover.
Firm profitability: 2 scalar variables; Return on capital in base year,
change in return on capital from base year (t) to year t+3.
Labor market tightness: 2 scalar variables from auxiliary regression;
risk of unemployment and probability of reemployment.
Time: 3 dummy variables, one for each of the three periods in the
dataset.
References
Autor, D., Duggan, M.G., 2003. The rise in the disability rolls and the decline in
unemployment. Q. J. Econ. 118, 157–205.
Barth, E., 1997. Firm-specific seniority and wages. J. Labor Econ. 15 (3), 495–506.
Bartus, T., 2005. Estimation of marginal effects using margeff. Stata J. 5 (3), 309–329.
Black, D., Daniel, K., Sanders, S., 2002. The impact of economic conditions on participation
in disability programs: evidence from the coal boom and bust. Am. Econ. Rev. 92,
27–50.
Bound, J., Burkhauser, R.V., 1999. Economic analysis of transfer programs for people with
disabilities. In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, 3C.
Elsevier.
Bratberg, E., 1999. Disability retirement in a welfare state. Scand. J. Econ. 101 (1),
97–114.
Bratsberg, B., Raaum, O., Røed, K., 2010. When minority labor migrants meet the welfare
state. J. Labor Econ. 28 (3), 633–676.
Campolieti, M., 2004. Disability insurance benefits and labor supply: some additional
evidence. J. Labor Econ. 22 (4), 863–889.
Couch, K.A., Placzek, D.W., 2010. Earnings losses of displaced workers revisited. Am. Econ.
Rev. 100 (1), 572–589.
Dahl, S.-Å., Nilsen, Ø.A., Vaage, K., 2000. Work or retirement? Exit routes for Norwegian
elderly. Appl. Econ. 32 (14), 1865–1876.
De Jong, P., Lindeboom, M., van der Klauw, B., 2011. Screening disability insurance
applicants. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 9 (1), 106–129.
Diamond, P., Sheshinski, E., 1995. Economic aspects of disability benefits. J. Public Econ. 57
(1), 1–23.
Eliason, M., Storrie, D., 2009a. Job loss is bad for your health — Swedish evidence on
cause-specific hospitalization following involuntary job loss. Soc. Sci. Med. 68 (8),
1396–1406.
Eliason, M., Storrie, D., 2009b. Does job loss shorten life? J. Hum. Resour. 44 (2), 277–302.
Fallick, B., 1996. A Review of the recent empirical literature on displaced workers. Ind.
Labor Relat. Rev. 50 (1), 5–16.
Ferrie, J.E., 2001. Is job insecurity harmful to health? J. R. Soc. Med. 94, 71–76.
Fevang, E., Røed, K., 2006. Veien til uføretrygd i Norge. Rapport 10/2006.Stiftelsen
Frischsenteret for samfunnsøkonomisk forskning (www.frisch.uio.no/pdf/rapp06_10.
pdf).
Gaure, S., Røed, K., 2007. How tight is the labour market? Sources of changes in the
aggregate exit rate from unemployment across the business cycle. J. Bus. Cycle
Meas. Anal 3 (2), 155–174.
Gibbons, R., Katz, L., 1991. Layoffs and lemons. J. Labor Econ. 9 (4), 351–380.
150 B. Bratsberg et al. / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 137–150Gruber, J., Kubik, J., 1997. Disability insurance rejection rates and the labor supply of older
workers. J. Public Econ. 64 (1), 1–23.
Hallock, K.F., 2009. Job loss and the fraying of the implicit employment contract. J. Econ.
Perspect. 23 (4), 69–93.
Hamermesh, D., 1987. The costs of worker displacement. Q. J. Econ. 102 (1), 51–76.
Heckman, J.J., Robb, R., 1985. Alternativemethods for evaluating the impact of interventions:
an overview. J. Econ. 30, 239–267.
Henningsen, M., Hægeland, T., 2008. Downsizing as a sorting device. Are Low-productive
Workers More Likely to Leave Downsizing Firms? Discussion Paper, 543. Statistics
Norway.
Huttunen, K., Møen, J., Salvanes, K.G., 2011. How destructive is creative destruction?
Effects of job loss on mobility, withdrawal and income. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 9 (5),
840–870.
Jacobson, L.S., Lalonde, J.T., Sullivan, D.G., 1993. Earnings losses of displaced workers. Am.
Econ. Rev. 83 (4), 685–709.
Kasl, S., Jones, B., 2002. The impact of job loss and retirement on health. In: Kawachi, B.A.
(Ed.), Social Epidemiology. Oxford University Press.
Kletzer, L.G., 1998. Job displacement. J. Econ. Perspect. 12 (1), 115–136.
Kuhn, P.J. (Ed.), 2002. LosingWork, MovingOn. International Perspectives onWorkerDis-
placement. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Kuhn, A., Lalive, R., Zweimüller, J., 2009. The public health costs of job loss. J. Heal. Econ.
28, 1099–1115.
Lazear, E.P., 1981. Agency, earnings profiles, productivity, and hours restrictions. Am.
Econ. Rev. 71, 606–620.
Markussen, S., Mykletun, A., Røed, K., 2013. The case for presenteeism — evidence from
Norway's sickness insurance program. J. Public Econ. 96, 959–972.
Martikainen, P., Maki, N., Jantti, M., 2007. The effects of unemployment on mortality
following workplace downsizing and workplace closure: a register-based follow-up
study of Finnish men and women during economic boom and recession. Am.
J. Epidemiol. 165 (9), 1070–1075.
McKee-Ryan, F.M., Song, Z., Wanberg, C.R., Kinicki, A.J., 2005. Psychological and physical
well-being during unemployment: ameta-analytic study. J. Appl. Psychol. 90 (1), 53–76.Moulton, B.R., 1986. Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates.
J. Econ. 32 (3), 385–397.
Neal, D., 1995. Industry-specific human capital: evidence from displaced workers. J. Labor
Econ. 13 (4), 653–677.
OECD, 2008. Are All Jobs Good for Your Health? The Impact of Work Status and Working
Conditions on Mental Health. Chapter 4 in OECD Employment Outlook 2008,
Paris.
OECD, 2010. Sickness, disability andwork— breaking the barriers. A Synthesis of Findings
Across OECD Countries.OECD, Paris.
Rege, M., Telle, K., Votruba, M., 2009. The effect of plant downsizing on disability pension
utilization. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 7 (5), 754–785.
Røed, K., 2012. Active social insurance. IZA J. Labor Policy 1 (8). http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/
2193-9004-1-8.
Røed, K., Fevang, E., 2007. Organizational change, absenteeism and welfare dependency.
J. Hum. Resour. 42 (1), 156–193.
Røed, K., Westlie, L., 2012. Unemployment insurance in welfare states: the impacts of soft
duration constraints. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 10 (3), 518–554.
Ruhm, C.J., 1991. Are workers permanently scarred by job displacements? Am. Econ. Rev.
81 (1), 319–324.
Salvanes, K.G., 1997. Market rigidities and labourmarket flexibility: an international com-
parison. Scand. J. Econ. 99 (2), 315–333.
Sullivan, D., von Wachter, T., 2009. Job displacement and mortality: an analysis using
administrative data. Q. J. Econ. 124 (3), 1265–1306.
von Wachter, T., Song, J., Manchester, J., 2009. Long-term earnings losses due to job
displacement during the 1982 recession: an analysis using longitudinal administrative
Data from 1974 to 2004. Mimeo, Columbia University.
Waddel, G., 2004. The Back Pain Revolution, Second edition. Elsevier Health Sciences.
Waddell, G., Burton, A.K., 2006. Is work good for your health and well-being? Report for
Department for Work and Pensions. TSO (The Stationery Office), London.
Waters, L.E. And, Moore, K.A., 2002. Predicting self-esteem during unemployment: the





Vulnerable groups and labor market performance. 


























Vulnerable groups and labor market performance.  
Towards more sorting in the labor market?   
Elisabeth Fevang, The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Oslo, Norway* 
Abstract 
Based on Norwegian register data, with information about all individuals born in the period 1967-
1984, I explore how employment propensities and labor earnings of vulnerable groups have devel-
oped relative to the population at large. Vulnerable groups are defined as individuals having either 
poor health, low cognitive ability or a disadvantaged family background. My main indicator of 
poor health is low birth weight, which is observed for both men and women. In addition, I use 
information about height, Body Mass Index (BMI) and cognitive ability measured at age 18-19 for 
men entering the military service. Family background is described in terms of socioeconomic class, 
which is defined by parents’ earnings rank during their age 50-54. For men, lower birth weight and 
underweight at age 18-19 has become a stronger predictor of non-employment and low earnings, 
while there is quite constant effect of height and obesity. For women, where birth weight is the 
only health-measure I have, I do not find any evidence of changing impact. The importance of 
cognitive skills on labor market success has diminished over time, which is due to decreasing re-
turns to high ability. The most striking finding, however, is that poor social background has become 
a steadily more important determinant of non-employment and low earnings.       
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In Norway, as well as in other OECD-countries, policy makers seek to promote a high labor market 
participation rate and an inclusive labor market. According to the European Commision (2017) 
“Labor markets are inclusive when everyone of working age can participate in paid work, espe-
cially vulnerable and disadvantaged people”. At the same time many would argue that the labor 
market has become tougher because of increased focus on reorganizations and productivity. Em-
pirical studies have shown that mass layoffs and organizational changes raise the probability of 
permanent exclusion from the labor market (Rege et al., 2009; Bratsberg et al., 2013), and it may 
also adversely affect the health of the employees (Ferrie, 2001; Kiwimäki et al., 2001). However, 
there is no clear evidence that these events have become more prevalent over time, or that they are 
implemented in a less inclusive fashion. Moreover, there have also been changes that have im-
proved working conditions for many employees, for instance access to better physical aids, less 
manual work and more flexible work schedules.   
 
Figure 1. Employment rate (panel a) and disability rate (panel b) in Norway 1992-2015. Prime-age (ages 
25-54). 
Note; Individuals are defined as employed if annual earnings exceed  NOK186,000 ( US$23,000) measured in 2017 
NOK which is 2 times the “basic-amount” (often called G) in the Norwegian public pension system. Earnings encom-
pass wages and business income, including sickness benefits and parental leave payments. The fraction with disability 
insurance is measured at the end of March each year. Disability insurance include temporary disability insurance and 
permanent disability insurance. Temporary disability insurance corresponds to work assessment allowance, which 
was introduced in 2010. Work assessment allowance replaced medical and vocational rehabilitation benefits (1992-
2010) and time-limited disability insurance (2004-2010).   



























Figure 1 illustrates the development in employment and recipients of disability insurance 
in Norway. From 1992 to 2015, the prime-age employment rate increased from 74.6 percent to 
77.9 percent, which is driven by an increasing number of women entering the labor market. During 
this period, there has been some fluctuations in the employment rate and it peaked in 2008, where 
80.6 percent were employed. Since 2008, the employment rates for both genders have decreased. 
There was a tremendous increase in the level of individuals claiming disability insurance from the 
middle of the 1990’s to the middle of 2000’s, since then the level has been quite stable around 10-
11 percent. Taken at face value, this high, and for many years rising, share of individuals receiving 
health-related benefits may indicate that the labor market has become less inclusive, and possibly 
that health problems have played an increasingly important role in limiting labor market participa-
tion in Norway. Alternatively, the rising participation in disability insurance programs simply mir-
rors that the welfare state now takes better care of those who (in any case) fall outside the labor 
market.  
The aim of this paper is to examine this question empirically. The analysis covers all chil-
dren born in Norway from 1967 to 1984, and labor market performance is evaluated during age 27-
31; i.e., between 1994 and 2015. Over this time period, I investigate whether labor market success 
has become more or less causally influenced by factors determined early in life (or even prior to 
birth), such as social background, innate health, and cognitive ability (IQ). In particular, I am in-
terested in studying the extent to which the labor market has become increasingly or decreasingly 
open for persons who got a particularly bad starting point in life along any of these dimensions. 
Have our society succeeded in facilitating labor market participation even for these vulnerable 
groups, or have we moved toward a more selective and less inclusive labor market?  
As I explain in the next section, there is already a large empirical literature on the separate 
relationships between health, ability, and social background, on the one hand, and labor market 
performance, on the other. However, there is little systematic evidence on the way the influence of 
these factors have changed over time. In particular, there is to the best of my knowledge, no existing 
evidence at all built on analyses where all these factors have been incorporated simultaneously. 
Since health, ability, and social background are likely to be highly correlated, such a simultaneous 
analysis may be important in order to understand what is going on in the labor market.  
Poor health is already known to be associated with greater risk of being outside the labor 




and to disentangle the correlation arising from other common determinants (third factors) from the 
causal mechanisms of interest. One way to identify the effect of health on employment is to use 
health indicators measured before people reach working age, and then control for any factors that 
may have affected both this measure and adult employment. The main indicator for poor health 
used in the present paper is low birth weight (<2,500 gr), which has the advantage of being indis-
putably predetermined relative to any attempts at labor market entry, but the disadvantage that it is 
a very imprecise proxy for the health status relevant for labor market success.  
To establish the social background of all newborns, I use administrative registers to collect 
information about their parents’ labor-related earnings during their age 50-54, and apply that in-
formation to obtain a rank-based socioeconomic status (SES) indicator. My main indicator for low 
SES is that the sum of the two parents’ earnings during this period belongs to the lowest vigintile 
(5 percent bin) in their generation.1  
While the indicators for low birth weight and low SES are available for all children born in 
Norway during the period covered by the analysis in this paper, data on other vulnerability indica-
tors that I use are observed only for men conscripted to military service. As additional proxies for 
health status at a time more relevant with respect to labor market performance, I utilize information 
about height and Body Mass Index (BMI), both measured at age 18-19 for men entering the military 
service. In addition, to establish a proxy for low cognitive ability, I use scores from IQ tests, also 
performed at the time of military conscription. As a result, the analyzes in this paper are largely 
divided into two main parts; one encompassing all children born between 1967 and 1984, with a 
focus on the influence of low birth-weight and low SES, and one covering boys only, with a focus 
on the influence of a wider range of health indicators, SES, and cognitive ability. 
Most of the analyzes in this paper are performed by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, with employment and log earnings at age 27-31 as the main dependent variables. Iden-
tification of causality is largely based on a control function approach, with primary focus on the 
changes over time in the estimated impacts. In addition, I estimate models based on siblings fixed 
effects, as well as twin fixed effects. However, although these models clearly solve some identifi-
cation challenges, I will argue that they raise some serious concerns related to external validity, 
and that they are poorly suited for examination of time trends in causal effects. 
                                                 




A key finding in this paper is that the labor market has become gradually more sorted with 
respect to socioeconomic status (SES); and being born into a low SES family has become an ever 
stronger predictor for poor labor market performance as adult, both in terms of non-employment 
and low earnings. This is the case for both men and women. Although the social gradient in labor 
market performance becomes slightly weaker when birth weight, height, BMI and cognitive ability 
are controlled for, such controls do not alter the conclusion with respect to the rising influence of 
social background. For men, I also find indications of increased sorting with respect to health. 
Although this relationship is not as robust as that for social background, most of the results point 
in the direction that men with poor health have experienced a steady decline in relative employment 
prospects. In particular, men with low birth weight and underweight at age 18-19 are to an increas-
ing extent non-employed at prime age. For women, where birth weight is the only available health-
measure, I do not find any changing impact on employment.  
Consistent with earlier research, I find that the impact of cognitive skills on labor market 
performance has diminished over time. This finding is primarily driven by decreasing returns to 
very high ability; the influence of having low – relative to medium – ability has been more stable. 
Given that my indicators for social background, health, and ability are all noisy, and at the same 
time highly interrelated, it is clear that I cannot provide a complete decomposition of how these 
different factors affect adult labor market performance. In particular, it is probable that my health 
indicators are too crude to fully account for the relationship between social background and health. 
Another challenge for the identification of health effects is that the correlation between the various 
health indicator and actual health in adulthood may have changed over time. This is particularly 
the case for low birth weight, as huge improvements in neonatal health care both have raised the 
probability of surviving with poor health (implying a stronger relationship between low birth 
weight and poor adult health) and limited the adverse consequences of low birth weight, given 
survival (implying a weaker relationship). To assess this challenge, I return to an analysis of the 
relationship between birth weight and alternative adult health measures after having presented the 
main results. It essentially fails to identify significant changes in the relationship between birth 
weight and adult health, although it cannot rule out such changes either. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related 
literature, section 3 describes the data and section 4 presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 




robustness checks, including comparison with family fixed effects. Finally, section 8 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2 Related literature 
The paper relates to several strands of empirical literature examining the relationships between 
health, ability, social background, and labor market outcomes. In particular, a vast literature has 
documented that neonatal health, most commonly proxied by birth weight, influences health out-
comes later in life, cognitive development, educational attainment and employment/earnings. Ac-
cording to the World health Organization (WHO), birth weight less than 2,500 grams (gr) repre-
sents a significant health disadvantage, and is therefore used as the primary threshold for low birth 
weight. Babies with low birth weight are either preterm born (gestational length less than 37 weeks) 
and/or having low fetal growth rate, both affecting children’s health. This cut-off point is often 
used in studies of neonatal health, however most of the recent studies also investigates differences 
within the normal range of birth weight. For example, children with lower birth weight are more 
likely to have behavioral problems like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Linnet et 
al., 2006) and poorer cognitive development (Figlio et al., 2014).2 Effect of birth weight on mental 
disorders and cognitive development is also observed in adulthood; see Flensborg-Madsen and 
Mortensen (2017) and Abel et al. (2010).3 Furthermore, lower birth weight is associated with 
higher risk of obesity, diabetes and coronary heart disease in adulthood (Barker, 2006).4 Although 
the positive effect of gaining weight is not restricted to low birth weight (birth weight <2,500 gr), 
the effect is less clear at the top of the weight distribution. In recent studies, there has been more 
focus on potential negative effects of high birth weight (>4,500 gr) which may be a risk factor of 
overweight, obesity and diabetes (Cnattingius et al., 2012; Harder et al., 2007). 
                                                 
2 The study of Linnet et al. (2006) includes all children (n=834) born in the period 1980-1994 registered with 
ADHD in the Danish Psychiatric Central Register. 20,100 children are used as controls. They control for socioeco-
nomic status of the parents, familial psychopathology and maternal smoking during pregnancy. Figlio et al. (2014) use 
data about all children born in Florida 1992-2002 1.3 million singletons and almost 15,000 twin pairs. Sibling and twin 
fixed effects as well as cross-sectional analysis with control for infant birth month and year, maternal age, education 
and birth order, give almost the same results 
3 The article by Flensborg-Madsen and Mortensen (2017) is based on data from individuals born in Copenhagen 
1959-1961 while Abel et al. (2010) include all children born in Sweden (1973-1984) and Denmark (1979-1986). The 
studies control for birth year, mothers age at birth, parental economic class and birth order. 




Apart from Figlio et al. (2014) all the studies described in the previous section are medical 
studies relying on cross-sectional data with control for confounding variables like social back-
ground. To identify the causal effect of birth weight, the predominant solution in economics has 
been to use sibling or twin fixed effects. A large economic literature documents that siblings/twins 
of lower birth weight have worse outcomes in terms of schooling attainment, test scores, IQ, height, 
disability insurance dependency, wages, employment (see f.ex. Bharadwaj et al., 2018; Figlio et 
al., 2014; Royer, 2009; Black et al., 2007; Currie and Moretti, 2007; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
2004).  
The papers referred to above have information about health at birth, measured by birth 
weight, but they do not have any information about health after birth. A number of recent studies 
have focused on childhood health (both physical and mental) and outcomes later in life. Based on 
data about all children born in Great Britain one week in March 1958 combined with interviews at 
different ages, Case et al. (2005) find that children with chronic conditions in childhood have lower 
educational attainment, wages, employment probabilities and poorer health as adults. Furthermore, 
they show that uterine environment (measured as mothers’ smoking habits during pregnancy and 
low birth weight) also affects adult outcomes, even when conditioning on childhood health. Using 
retrospective measures about perceived health in childhood from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID), Smith (2009) shows that siblings with poorer childhood health have lower earnings.   
There is some evidence suggesting that the adverse consequences of mental health prob-
lems experienced during adolescence is more severe than those of physical health problems. Good-
man et al. (2011) utilize the same data source from Great Britain as Case et al. (2005). Their study 
shows that mental health problems experienced by the age of 16 were associated with a 28 percent 
reduction in household income by the age of 50, while there were only minor effects of physical 
health problems. Currie et al. (2010) utilize administrative register data about children born 1979-
1987 in the Canadian province of Manitoba with information about birth weight and diagnoses 
(f.ex. asthma, major injuries, ADHD/conduct disorders) during childhood. The authors show that 
young adults having poor health in early childhood are more likely to be on social assistance and 
having lower educational attainment. This effect is present mainly because poor health in childhood 
tends to persist in adulthood. Physical health problems that disappear later on have little impact on 




adverse outcomes as adults. Finally, the study shows that lower birth weight is a significant pre-
dictor of future use of social assistance and school outcomes, also when conditioning on the other 
observed health measures.  
Evensen et al. (2016) and Evensen et al. (2017) utilize Norwegian health survey data about 
8,000 adolescents linked with register data about subsequent labor market outcomes. Using sibling 
fixed effects the studies show that externalising problems, such as attention or conduct problems, 
have a clear negative impact on later educational attainment and earnings. Internalizing problems, 
such as anxiety or depression, reduce adult earnings, but it does not seem to have any negative 
effect on educational attainment. Furthermore, Evensen et al. (2017) find that individuals in the 
bottom of the earnings distribution are more negatively affected by mental health problems. 
Adult height is partly determined by genetics, but it also serves as an indicator of an indi-
vidual’s infectious and dietary disease history during childhood, see Elo and Preston (1992).  
Height is a variable that has been used as a proxy for health in several studies, see f.ex. van den 
Berg et al. (2014) and Black et al. (2007), and being taller is associated with higher earnings in 
many studies (see f.ex. Lundborg et al., 2014; Case and Paxson, 2008; Persico et al., 2004). Possi-
ble explanations for the positive relationship between height and labor market performance are that 
height is positively correlated with cognitive and non-cognitive skills, muscular strength, and fa-
vourable family background, and that taller people are subjected to positive discrimination. In Swe-
den, all males entering the military service conduct tests to measure cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills and muscular strengths. Lundborg et al. (2014) use these test data of 450,000 Swedish men 
entering the military service at age 18-19 during the period 1984-1997, combined with register data 
on earnings in 2003, and show that the height premium is partly explained by these variables. The 
estimated height premium was further reduced when controlling for family characteristics by using 
sibling fixed effects, and the remaining effect was concentrated to the very shortest individuals 
having low earnings. The authors suggest that this remaining effect could be interpreted as a dis-
crimination of short people in the labor market.  
WHO classifies the Body Mass Index (BMI) as underweight, normal weight, overweight 
and obesity. Overweight and obesity are major risk factors for many chronic diseases, including 
diabetes, cardiovascular diseases and several types of cancer (see f.ex. Aune et al; 2016). Both 
underweight, overweight and obesity are associated with increased risk of dying, but less is known 




there is a reverse causation in the sense that underweight is a result of preexisting illness and smok-
ing is not clear (see f.ex. Aune et al.; 2016; Roh et al., 2014). Based on data from Switzerland, Roh 
et al. (2014) find that higher mortality risk among underweight individuals are mainly caused by a 
higher risk of external causes of deaths (e.g. accidents, suicides). Using survey-data from England, 
Kelly et al. (2010) find that underweight individuals are more likely to smoke, to drink alcohol, 
and to be inactive. In addition, the study find that both underweight and overweight/obesity are 
associated with a higher prevalence of respiratory disease, less physical activity and poorer mental 
health. 
Several studies have shown that obesity is associated with lower wage and increased risk 
of non-employment among women, while the effect is less pronounced among men, (see f.ex Jo-
hansson et al., 2009; Atella et al., 2008; Morris, 2007). The effect is present also after controlling 
for confounding variables, which may indicate that employers discriminate against obese individ-
uals. Less is known about underweight and outcomes in the labor market. However, a recent study 
by Hughes and Kamari (2017) find a U-formed relationship between BMI and unemployment, 
where underweight and obesity are positively correlated with unemployment and overweight is 
negatively correlated.  
Until now, I have focused on literature documenting the effect of various observed health 
measures on later outcomes and the references have typically controlled for social background in 
order to find causal effects of the different measures. Some studies have also focused on the im-
portance of social background on children’s health, which in turn affects outcomes later in life. 
Based on data from US (Case et al., 2002) and Canada (Currie and Stabile, 2003), the studies find 
that low household income is associated with poorer health among children, as measured by per-
ceived health status (reported by a parent and/or a physician) and chronic health conditions. These 
children are more likely to have poorer health in adulthood and/or lower educational attainment 
which in turn affect earnings and employment. This literature suggests that part of the intergener-
ational transmission of socioeconomic status may be related to health in childhood.5  
A large literature documents that there has been increasing returns to skills as technological 
changes have increased the demand for high-skilled workers. In US, the steadily increasing reward 
                                                 




of skills has been documented since the 1960’s (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993; Ac-
emoglu and Author, 2011). After 2000 there has been little or no growth in cognitive skill-intensive 
occupations (Acemoglu and Author, 2011; Beaudry et al., 2014). By comparing two surveys 
(NLSY79 and NLSY97) Deming (2017) shows that there has been a strong growth in social skill-
intensive jobs between 1980 and 2012, while there has been a decrease in jobs requiring high cog-
nitive skills and less social skills (STEM jobs). Similar findings are documented using Swedish 
register data. During the period 1992-2013, Edin et al. (2017) find an increase in the wage reward 
of non-cognitive skills whereas the returns to cognitive skills have been quite stable. Deming 
(2017) points out one main explanation for these findings: Technology is to an increasing extent 
substituting for cognitive skills, while social skills are more difficult to replace.  
When it comes to whether the impact of health and social background has changed over 
time, empirical evidence is limited. Bharadwaj et al. (2018) compare Swedish twin pairs born 1974 
and onwards with twin pairs born 1926-1958 and their twin fixed effects show that the estimated 
effects of birth weight on earnings and high school completion are quite similar across the groups 
of cohorts.6 Their study, however, does not explore whether individuals are employed or not and 
their sample is restricted to twins. Moving on to the role of social background, Markussen and 
Røed (2017) show that being born into the poorest families have become a stronger predictor of 
non-employment and lower earnings.  
  
3 Data   
In this paper, I utilize administrative register data covering the whole population of Norway. The 
data contains information about age, gender, level of education, employment status, annual earn-
ings and social security transfers. Most of the datasets are available for the period 1992-2015, while 
information about earnings is given back to 1967. The datasets include information on family-ties, 
making it possible to identify social background. I study labor market outcomes for all persons 
born in Norway from 1967 through 1984. 
                                                 
        6 One other study has focused on the development in the correlation between health and employment. Based on 
British data from the period 1973-2009, Minton et al (2012) find that the difference in employment rates among indi-




3.1 Definition of outcomes 
Earnings. Since I am interested in development of labor market outcomes and the first co-
hort in my sample is born in 1967, I have to focus on earnings at an early stage in life. I choose 
earnings at age 27-31. Earnings above 99th percentile are censored. In order to include individuals 
with zero earnings I add a small amount of earnings to every individual when using log-specifica-
tion of earnings.7 Earnings encompass wages and business income, including sickness benefits and 
parental leave payments. 
Employment. I define employment as having average annual earnings above 2 times the 
“basic-amount” (often called G) in the Norwegian public pension system during age 27-31. In 2017 
2G corresponds to NOK186,000(US$23,000), which is approximately 1/3 of average full-time 
earnings in Norway.8 With this definition, a person will be defined as employed if he/she has rela-
tively low earnings over, say, 4-5 years or high earnings over just one or two years. Since I have 
information on employment until 2015, I will be able to cover people born in the period 1967-1984 
in these analyzes. This means that I will identify changes during a period of 18 years.  
Mortality.  I will distinguish between infant mortality (mortality within the first year of life) 
and mortality the next years. 
Education. I focus on whether the individuals have completed high school or not at the age 
of 27. High school completion is defined as having at least 12 years of education. 
Disability. I define a person as disabled if he/she receives permanent disability insurance 
some time during the calendar year the person turns 19.  The reason I am interested in considering 
disability at this early stage of life is that my usage of this outcome is primarily intended to assess 
whether the relationship between birth weight and adult health has been stable over time. I therefore 
wish to avoid transitions into the disability insurance program that may have been caused by labor 
market developments.  
                                                 
7 This amount is 1 G=93,000 NOK during the whole period age 27-31, which correspond to 0.2 G per year. 





Information about birth weight is taken from The Medical Birth Registry, which covers all births 
in Norway since 1967. By this register, I also have information about year and month of birth, 
gestational length, and whether it is a single or a multiple birth. 
For men, I also use information obtained from the Norwegian military records. Every able 
men are obliged to attend the military service, and at the age of 18-19. Before actually entering the 
service, they are called in for an examination of whether they are liable for the service. From this 
examination I use information about height and weight, which are also combined into a body mass 
index (BMI). 
3.3 Ability 
From the military records, I also add results from cognitive ability tests. Men who are physically 
or psychologically disabled, in addition to people living abroad, are exempted from the tests. The 
general ability score (IQ) is a measure building on results from three time-limited tests: Arithmetic 
(25 min), Word Similarities (8 min) and Figures (20 min). The Arithmetic test measures not only 
arithmetic ability, but also elementary algebraic and logical reasoning ability. The test is quite sim-
ilar to the Arithmetic test in Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). The Word Similarities 
Test is similar to the Vocabulary Test in WAIS and the Figures Test is similar to the Raven Pro-
gressive Matrices. In the middle of the 1990’s the Arithmetic Test changed from having open an-
swers to multiple choice, apart from that all the test have remained unchanged. General ability is 
measured on a stanine (“standard nine”) score, which scale scores on a nine-point scale with a mean 
of 5 and a standard deviation of 2. For a more detailed description of general ability, see Sundet et 
al. (2004). 
3.4 Social background 
Markussen and Røed (2017) find that annual earnings obtained around age fifty are most highly 
correlated with lifetime earnings. In order to obtain a consistent measure of parents’ earnings which 
is representative for lifetime earnings, I have chosen the sum of the two parents’ earnings during 
their age 50-54. Since I have access to earnings data in the period 1967-2015, I am able to identify 
every parent born in the period 1917-1958. Some parents are born after 1958 and for those parents 




offspring’s parental earnings rank is identified cohort by cohort by ranking parental earnings in 20 
categories, which is done separately for male and female offspring.  
3.5 Sample  
Since family-ties often are missing among immigrants, I will focus on Norwegian (native-born) 
residents in the analyses. I will also exclude people with missing birth weight or birth weight less 
than 500 gr. Since I focus on employment age 27-31 my sample is also restricted to individuals 
living in Norway when they are between 27 and 31 years old.9  
 
4 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, I present some descriptive statistics about the main sample. Since the analyses is 
based on individuals born between 1967 and 1984, the descriptive statistics are also limited to this 
group. In order to look at developments over time, while maintaining sufficient statistical power, I 











                                                 
9 1,032,543 individuals are born between 1967 and 1984, out of which 974,149 individuals are natives (5.7 percent are 
excluded). Furthermore, 1,722 individuals are excluded due to missing birth weight or birth weight less than 500 gr. 
1.0 percent died within the first year of life and 1.5 percent died between 1 and 31 years of age and additional 3.5 






Table 1a). Descriptive statistics for the main sample. Males*  
      Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84
N 91,656 88,533 80,517 70,577 68,664 67,918 
Individual and background 
characteristics 
      
 Birth weight (in gr) 












   Birth weight categories (per   
cent)            
      
     <2,500 gr 3.41 3.50 3.44 3.34 3.24 3.49 
     2,500-3,000 gr  9.98 9.63 9.68 8.89 8.79 8.19 
     3,000-3,500 gr 30.07 29.82 29.94 29.49 28.55 28.65 
     3,500-4,500 gr 52.55 53.13 53.10 54.03 55.11 54.33 
     >4,500 gr 3.98 3.93 3.84 4.25 4.31 4.33 
 Percent multiple births 1.77 1.73 1.72 1.68 1.72 1.97 
Family characteristics       
  Mother’s age at birth 
26.51   
(5.82) 
26.02   
(5.38) 
25.95   
(5.08) 
26.24   
(4.99) 
26.62   
(4.97) 
27.05   
(4.99) 
  Number of siblings 
1.97     
(1.27) 
1.83     
(1.19) 
1.72     
(1.12) 
1.70     
(1.11) 
1.73     
(1.10) 
1.77     
(1.10) 
Military data        













  Missing height  2.04 2.78 4.03 2.83 2.86 4.52 
  Height group (percent)       
     <170 cm 5.21 4.94 5.15 5.09 5.19 4.98 
     170-180 cm 42.06 41.88 42.18 41.54 41.19 41.31 
     180-190 cm 45.85 46.09 45.44 45.75 46.34 46.34 
      >190 cm 6.88 7.09 7.24 7.62 7.29 7.37 
  BMI 












  BMI classification (percent)        
      Underweight (<18.5) 7.08 6.00 5.25 5.08 6.18 5.95 
      Normal weight (18.5-       
      25) 
80.45 79.14 78.86 77.74 75.85 71.63 
      Overweight (25-30) 10.42 12.25 12.98 13.71 13.90 16.40 
      Obesity (>30) 2.05 2.61 2.90 3.47 4.07 6.02 
  IQ (stanines) 












  Missing IQ (percent) 6.28 7.00 11.00 6.02 7.42 14.06 
  IQ classification (percent)       
    Low IQ (1-3) 19.36 18.52 16.79 15.83 16.89 17.03 
    Middle IQ (4-6)   58.38 57.79 58.16 60.43 61.51 61.72 
    High IQ (7-9) 22.26 23.69 25.06 23.74 21.59 21.25 
Outcomes       
   Percent employed when    
   27-31 
90.51 90.69 88.19 87.80 87.60 86.04 
   Average annual earnings   
   when 27-31 (NOK, 2017  













   Percent with completed  
   high school 
71.64 74.88 78.73 80.38 80.23 79.51 
   Percent receiving perma   
   nent disability insurance    
   when 19 




*The main sample is described in section 2.3. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
 
Table 1b). Descriptive statistics for the main sample. Females*  
      Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N 87,642 84,659 77,174 67,344 65,555 64,209 
Individual and background 
characteristics  
      
   Birth weight (in gr) 












   Birth weight categories   
(percent) 
      
     <2,500 gr 4.18 3.91 3.99 3.92 3.65 3.90 
     2,500-3,000 gr  13.75 13.38 13.47 12.56 12.00 12.58 
     3,000-3,500 gr 36.54 36.26 36.68 35.40 35.37 35.02 
     3,500-4,000 gr 43.53 44.53 43.94 46.05 46.77 46.34 
     >4,500 gr 1.99 1.91 1.93 2.06 2.20 2.16
   Percent multiple births 1.94 1.73 1.81 1.99 1.89 1.94 
Family characteristics       
  Mother’s age at birth 
26.52   
(5.82) 
26.03   
(5.36) 
25.94   
(5.08) 
26.20   
(5.00) 
26.61   
(4.97) 
27.03   
(4.96) 
  Number of siblings 
1.98     
(1.27) 
1.84     
(1.19) 
1.73     
(1.13) 
1.69     
(1.10) 
1.73     
(1.10) 
1.76     
(1.09) 
Outcomes       
   Percent employed when    
   27-31 
73.76 77.22 77.88 80.18 82.11 81.18 
   Average annual earnings   
   when 27-31 (NOK, 2017  













   Percent with completed  
   high school 
69.65 75.93 81.51 85.64 86.75 85.92 
   Percent receiving perma   
   nent disability insurance    
   when 19  
  0.30 0.44 0.50 0.54 
*The main sample is described in section 3.5. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis. 
 
 Table 1a) and 1b) show descriptive statistics for men and women. During the period 1967-
1984 there has been a gradual decline in the number of births in Norway, which is reflected in a 
shrinking number of observations in the tables. Mean birth weight among men (women) born in 
the period 1967-69 is 3,556 (3,425) gr while the mean is approximately 30 gr higher among men 
and women born in the latest cohorts. The fraction with low birth weight (<2,500 gr) has been quite 
stable among men (3.25-3.50 percent). Among women, the fraction with low birth weight has fluc-
tuated between 4.2 and 3.7 percent (the fraction was highest for women born in the period 1967-
69 and lowest for those born 1979-81). Being born with high birth weight (>4,500 gr) has become 




(women) born in the beginning of the period while the fraction was 4.3 (2.2) percent at the end of 
the period.  
  Mother’s age at birth has increased by about 0.5 years while the number of siblings has 
decreased from almost 2.0 to 1.8.10  Military data shows that mean BMI for men has increased from 
22 to 23 and the fraction with obesity has almost tripled; among the earliest cohorts 2.1 percent are 
classified as obese while it accounts for 6 percent among the latest cohorts. When it comes to 
ability, the mean stanine score is highest among men born in the middle of the 1970’s while the 
mean among the earliest and latest cohorts is almost the same.11 I do not have information about 
BMI and IQ for every men in Norway and one reason is that some of them are permanently disa-
bled. According to Eide et al. (2005), 1.4 percent are classified as disabled because of chronic 
disease or birth defects.  The fraction not appearing at the draft board is somewhat higher, espe-
cially among the last cohorts.12 Some men are registered with information about BMI, but not with 
IQ – approximately 7 percent among the group of cohorts born 1973 -75 and 10 percent among 
men born 1982-84, among the other groups of cohorts it accounts for about 4 percent. Very few 
(0.1-0.5 percent) are registered with IQ but not with BMI.  
The fraction employed and the development over time is quite different for men and 
women. Among men born in the period 1967-69, 90.5 percent were employed at the age of 27-31 
and the rate decreased to 86.0 percent among men born between 1982 and 1984. Among women 
the fraction employed has increased from 73.8 percent to 81.2 percent, but the fraction employed 
was even higher (82.1 percent) among the cohorts born in 1979-81. The fraction with completed 
high school is remarkably higher among cohorts born in the middle of the 1970’s compared to 
those born at the end of the 1960’s, but the fraction has remained quite stable after that. The prob-
ability of receiving permanent disability insurance at age 19 increases from 0.4 (0.3) percent for 
                                                 
10 Siblings are identified via mothers. Every link to children is identified, also for children born before 1967 child, 
meaning that I count every siblings having the same mother. 
11 An increase in intelligence test scores is observed in many countries and is known as the Flynn effect, but 
based on Norwegian military data, Sundet et al. (2004) conclude that the Flynn effect may have come to an end in 
Norway since the means of the scores stopped to increase in the mid1990s (corresponding to men born in the mid-
1970s).   
12 The fraction of men in our sample with no information from the military service is 1.9 percent for cohorts born 
1967-69, 2.6 percent for cohorts born 1970-72, 2.5 percent for cohorts born 1973-75, 2.2 percent for cohorts born 








Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of birth weight among natives living in Norway at the age of 
27-31. 
Note; Birth weight is divided in 100 gr- categories and birth weight below 1000 gr and above 5000 gr are grouped. 
Low birth weight is birth weight <2,500 gr. 
 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of birth weight among the earliest and latest cohorts; 
panel a) and b) show the whole distribution while I zoom in on individuals born with low birth 
weight in panel c) and d). In the middle of the distribution the latest cohorts lie to the right of the 
earliest cohorts meaning that people in the latest cohorts are somewhat heavier at birth, but the 
difference is quite small. On the very bottom of the birth weight distribution the development is 
                                                 
13 Brage and Thune (2015) show that persons granted permanent disability insurance at this stage in life are 
dominated by persons with mental retardation and congenital malformations, and part of the recent rice of young 
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different. As already shown in table 1, the overall fraction with low birth weight (<2,500 gr) has 
not increased. However, being born with very low birth weight (<1,500 gr) accounts for 0.18 (0.23) 
percent of men (women) belonging to the earliest cohorts while the fraction increased to 0.41 per-
cent among both men and women belonging to the youngest cohorts. This is due to improvements 
in neonatal health care making it possible for lighter babies to survive.14 
 
Table 2a) Parental earnings rank by health and ability indicators. Males  
    Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N 91,656 88,533 80,517 70,577 68,664 67,918 
       
 Birth weight categories        
     <2,500 gr 9.55       9.67       9.76       9.41       9.37        9.44       
     2,500-3,000 gr  9.79        9.82        9.70        9.76        9.66        9.69        
     3,000-3,500 gr 10.29       10.23       10.27       10.26       10.20       10.27       
     3,500-4,500 gr 10.71       10.68       10.74       10.74       10.72       10.69       
     >4,500 gr 10.84       10.83       10.79       10.80       10.83       10.99       
       
  Missing height  8.84    8.78  8.93       8.83       8.56       8.28      
  Height group        
     <170 cm 9.22        9.23        9.33        9.14        9.12        9.31        
     170-180 cm 10.09       10.12       10.20       10.18       10.14       10.20       
     180-190 cm 10.88       10.81       10.86       10.84       10.84       10.84       
      >190 cm 11.36       11.35       11.29       11.34       11.24       11.49       
       
  BMI classification       
     Underweight (<18.5) 10.23       10.28       10.18       10.24       10.11       9.98        
     Normal weight (18.5-25) 10.66       10.67       10.75       10.73       10.73       10.81       
     Overweight (25-30) 9.72        9.76        9.79        9.86        9.90        10.14       
     Obesity (>30) 8.74        8.70        8.66        8.72        8.76        9.07        
       
  Missing IQ (percent) 8.87       8.91       9.53       8.93       9.18        9.36      
  IQ classification       
    Low IQ (1-3) 8.29        8.19        8.32        8.08        8.17        8.28        
    Middle IQ (4-6)   10.51       10.44       10.40       10.44       10.48       10.59       
    High IQ (7-9) 12.68       12.65       12.54       12.55       12.57       12.60       






                                                 
14 When looking at the birth weight distribution among newborn children (and not only those surviving and living 
in Norway at the age of 27-31) the fraction of babies with very low birth weight (<1,500 gr) is quite stable during the 





Table 2b) Parental earnings rank by health indicators. Females 
   Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N 87,642 84,659 77,174 67,344 65,555 64,209 
       
Birth weight categories        
     <2,500 gr 9.67       9.51       9.52       9.31       9.30        9.44       
     2,500-3,000 gr  9.91        9.87        9.78        9.85        9.66        9.80        
     3,000-3,500 gr 10.38       10.43       10.35       10.38       10.39       10.35       
     3,500-4,500 gr 10.77       10.77       10.82       10.77       10.85       10.88       
     >4,500 gr 10.98       10.84       10.85       10.73       10.93       10.66       
Note; Parental earnings rank ranges from 1 to 20. The unconditional mean is 10.5. 
 
There is a clear social gradient in the various health and ability indicators I use in this paper. Table 
2a) and 2b) show that parental earnings rise with birth weight across the four lightest birth weight 
categories, while there is only minor differences between the two heaviest birth weight groups. 
Health – and ability measures (available only for men) also show the same; being shorter, devia-
tions from normal weight as well as lower ability are associated with lower parental earnings. In 
addition, mean parental earnings among men with missing information from the military service is 
lower compared to men registered by the military service, which is plausible since disabled men 
are not obliged to attend. The gradient of the different indicators is quite stable over time. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how the fraction with presumably poor health and ability varies 
with parental earnings and how this relationship has changed from the earliest to the latest cohorts.  
Lower birth weight is more common the lower the parental earnings are, and belonging to the 
poorest 5 percent families compared to the 5 percent richest families approximately doubles the 
risk of being born with birth weight below 2,500 gr. The indicators measured by the military service 
show differences by social background to various extent (figure 4). For men born in the period 
1967-69, the prevalence of low ability is 5 percent for men with the richest parents compared to 
nearly 35 percent of men with the poorest ones. The fraction of men with low ability is somewhat 
lower for the last cohorts, but the gradient is quite similar. For men belonging to the earliest cohorts, 
overweight accounts for almost 14 percent of men with the least favourable social background and 
7 percent of the richest ones. The prevalence of overweight is approximately 6 percentage point 
higher for men born in the last cohorts and this increase is quite constant across social background. 
Also, being obese has become more common among every group of men, but measured in percent-




the difference between economic classes is not very large, but the social gradient seems to be some-
what clearer for the latest cohorts. 
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Figure 4. Incidence of “poor” health/ability by parental earnings rank (divided in 20 bins).  
Males only.   
Note; underweight=BMI<18.5-25, overweight=BMI 25-30, obesity=BMI>30, low ability=stanine score 1-3. 
 
 
A social gradient in the health- and ability- indicators is also present when using parental education 
as measure of social background, see appendix table 1a) and 1b). Furthermore, the tables also show 
problems arising when comparing the education level across different birth cohorts since educa-
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5 Empirical strategy 
The focus in this article is whether health, ability and social background have become more crucial 
in order to be successfully integrated in the labor market.  My main dependent variables (  are 
log earnings and employment by young adulthood (age 27-31).  Other outcome measures are mor-
tality, high school completion and disability. My baseline specification is as follows:  
 
,                                                    (1) 
 
where  indexes the individual and c indexes birth cohort.  is a vector of indicators of health, 
cognitive ability and social background.  is a vector of individual specific control variables like 
birth order, month of birth, multiple birth, number of siblings and mothers age at birth.15 The mod-
els are estimated separately for males and females because the control variables may have hetero-
geneous impact across genders due to differences in mean outcomes and birth weight. Equation (1) 
is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 In order to explore whether the impacts of health, ability, and social background have 
changed over time, I assume that the cohort-effect, c, is constant over three-year intervals, meaning 
that I run 6 separate regressions; 1967-69, 1970-72, 1973-75, 1976-78, 1979-81 and 1982-84. Do-
ing this, I avoid the imposition of arbitrary functional form restrictions on the way causal impacts 
have developed over time. To check whether any estimated changes of the coefficients are signif-
icant I also run a regression where all cohorts are included in the same model.  
In robustness analyses, I estimate models with siblings and twins fixed effects. Many stud-
ies about birth weight have used sibling fixed effects in order to control for socioeconomic back-
ground, but within siblings there may still be genetic factors which potentially explain differences 
in birth weight. In order to deal with this problem, a number of studies have used twin fixed effects 
(Bharadwaj et al., 2018; Figlio et al., 2014; Royer, 2009; Black et al., 2007; Almond et al., 2005; 
Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004) where the variation in birth weight between twins are taken as 
random and suggested due to variation in nutritional intake. Family fixed effects give the following 
specification of the model: 
                                                 
15 Higher birth order is associated with higher birth weight (Seidman et al., 1988) while higher birth order is 
negatively correlated with outcomes later in life (Black et al., 2005). Number of siblings and age of mother are also 




   
,                                                    (3) 
                                           
where  indexes mothers and  is thus the outcome of one individual  born to mother  in cohort 
.  is the sibling/twin fixed effects. I estimate models for twins and non-twins separately and 
when I refer to siblings I mean siblings which are not twins. When estimating sibling fixed effects 
the control variables are birth order, month and year of birth. When estimating twin fixed effects 
 is identified based on differences in  within twin pairs meaning that any family and birth-
specific confounders are controlled out.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 Main results 
In this section, I present the estimated effects of health, ability, and social background on labor 
market performance at age 27-31. I start by presenting models where the vulnerability indicators 
include birth weight and social background (SES). Thereafter, I show results from models where 
health and ability-measures from the Norwegian military service are included. The latter results are 
available for men, only. 
Since the functional form of the relationship between birth weight and earnings/employ-
ment is a priori unknown, I will use dummies for different birth weight categories and aggregate 
data into 500 gr strata. Birth weight less than 2,500 gr and birth weight more than 4,500 gr are 
grouped and in the analyzes I also merge birth weight 3,500-4,000 gr with 4,000-4,500 gr since 
there are no statistical significant differences between those groups.16 Hence, I have 5 categories: 
<2,500 gr, 2,500-3,000 gr, 3,000-3,500 gr, 3,500-4,500 gr and >4,500 gr.  Birth weight 3,500-4,500 
gr are chosen as the reference group, intended to represent the group with the most favorable health 
condition. Similarly, social background is coded by means of 20 dummy variables, each represent-
ing the vigintile in the parental earnings distribution (see section 3). Here, I use the two medium 
vigintiles (10-11) as references, and to avoid too long tables, I report the estimated coefficients 
                                                 
16 I started out by running models with 6 different birth weight-categories:<2,500 gr, 2,500-3,000 gr, 3,000-3,500 
gr, 3,500-4,000 gr, 4,000-4,500 gr and >4,500 gr. Models on employment/earnings does not find any statistical differ-




associated with growing up in the four lowest vigintiles only (an overview of the complete social 
gradient estimates is provided in the appendix). 
 In this section, the results are presented as follows; I start with tables reporting detailed 
estimation results, and based on this results I present the main results graphically, with a focus on 
the effects of belonging to the groups with lowest birth weight and lowest socioeconomic status 
(SES). Additionally, I show results from tests of whether changes in the effects of poor health and 
low SES are significant.  
The labor market outcomes I focus on are log labor earnings and employment. As the causal 
variables of interest turn out to have a significant influence on employment, an analysis of earnings 
conditional on employment will be hard to interpret. In the main part of the analysis, I therefore 
focus on an unconditional earnings analysis, including also the non-employed. To circumvent the 
















                                                 
17 When adding a smaller amount (0.1 G per year instead of 0.2 G per year) the point estimates become somewhat 




Table 3. Estimation results on log earnings 
    Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
Males       
N  91,656 88,533 80,516 70,576 68,664 67,918 
Birth weight       






































   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 













Parental earnings rank 
(coefficients reported for 
the four lowest ranks 
only) 
      
   1 -0.393*** -0.438*** -0.492*** -0.511*** -0.566*** -0.604*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
   2 
-0.240*** -0.231*** -0.255*** -0.246*** -0.288*** -0.327*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
   3 
-0.161*** -0.149*** -0.225*** -0.201*** -0.247*** -0.260*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
   4 -0.143*** -0.140*** -0.161*** -0.174*** -0.233*** -0.201*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Females       
N  87,642 84,658 77,174 67,344 65,554 64,208 
Birth weight       




































   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 0.005      
(0.012) 
-0.017   
(0.021)
-0.014   
(0.022)
-0.008   
(0.022)
-0.014   
(0.022) 
-0.010   
(0.022)
Parental earnings rank       
   1 -0.447*** -0.515*** -0.527*** -0.564*** -0.614*** -0.648*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
   2 -0.270*** -0.259*** -0.294*** -0.298*** -0.326*** -0.366*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
   3 -0.202*** -0.214*** -0.238*** -0.219*** -0.274*** -0.318*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
   4 -0.194*** -0.169*** -0.200*** -0.219*** -0.227*** -0.253*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis. Parental earnings are divided in 20 bins 
(vigintiles). Vigintile 10 and 11 is the reference group. The following control variables are included in the models 
(number of categories for categorical variables in parentheses): multiple birth (1), birth order (4), siblings (4), 







Figure 5.  Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) and low SES.  Dependent variable is log 
earnings at age 27-31. 
Note; The reference group for birth weight is 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles 
based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11  is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, which is the five 
percent with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The list of 
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Table 4. t-test of significance of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) and low SES between each group 
of cohorts. Dependent variable is log earnings, as shown in figure 5.     
  Males Females 
    Year of   























          
  1967-69  0.73  0.73 -1.11 -0.84 -1.88* 1.67* - 0.28 0.50 0.75 0.09 
  1970-72  0.02 -1.79* -1.50 -2.55**  -1.87* -1.05 -0.76 -1.42 
  1973-75   -1.79* -1.50 -2.53**   0.73 0.97 0.34 
  1976-78        0.24 -0.72     0.25 -0.37 
  1979-81     -0.95     -0.60 
           
Low SES           



































  1973-75 








  1976-78 








  1979-81     -1.68*     -1.36 
           
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 3 shows that earnings for both men and women increase with birth weight, at least 
up to around 4,500 gr.  Concentrating on the two lowest birth weight categories, figure 5 illustrates 
that being born with birth weight <2,500 gr, compared to the reference category of birth weight 
3,500-4,500 gr, decreases earnings by 15-20 percent for both genders. For men, the negative effect 
of low birth weight is stronger among cohorts born after the middle of the 1970’s compared to 
those born earlier, and according to table 4 several of the differences between the latest and earliest 
cohorts are statistically significant.  
Estimates from the four lowest parental earnings ranks are presented in table 4 while all 
point estimates for parental earnings ranks among the last cohorts (1982-84) and the earliest cohorts 
(1967-69) are illustrated in appendix figure 1. There is a clear social gradient in earnings, particu-
larly in the bottom of the parental earnings rank where the impact of the gradient also has become 
more prominent over time. For example, the estimated coefficients show that coming from the very 




percent for the earliest cohorts while the difference has increased to 45 (48) percent for the last 
cohorts.18     
Figure 5 and table 3 present results from models where all individuals are included, also 
those having earnings below the threshold to be classified as employed (including individuals with 
zero earnings).19 When restricting the sample to employed individuals the effect on earnings is 
much smaller compared to what I find using the whole sample and there is no particular change in 
the effect over time. According to the conditional point estimates reported in appendix figure 2, 
being born with low birth weight decreases earnings by only 2-4 percent among both genders, while 
being born into the 5 percent poorest families decreases earnings by 8-12 percent among men and 


















                                                 
18 The log coefficient is transformed to percentage changes by using the formula - 1) 
19 1.4 percent of men born in the period 1967-69 have zero earnings. The fraction increases over time and among 
men born 1982-84 3.0 percent have zero earnings. Among women the fraction is quite constant at 3 percent. 
20 This is consistent with findings from Currie and Madrian (1999). In their literature review, they show that a 




Table 5. Estimation results on employment 
    Year of birth  1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
Males       
N  91,656 88,533 80,516 70,576 68,664 67,918 
Empl. rate ref. grp  91.40 91.56 89.14 88.76 88.66 87.06 
Birth weight   







































   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 













Parental earnings rank       
   1 -0.132*** -0.149*** -0.168*** -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.201*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   2 
-0.080*** -0.079*** -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.092*** -0.105*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   3 
-0.046*** -0.045*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.076*** -0.085*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   4 -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.066*** -0.060*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Females       
N  87,642 84,658 77,174 67,344 65,554 64,208 
Empl. rate ref. grp 73.37 78.61 79.48 81.52 83.39 82.60 
Birth weight       




































   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 0.006      
(0.011) 
-0.008   
(0.010) 
-0.008   
(0.011) 
-0.009   
(0.011) 
0.004   
(0.010) 
-0.003   
(0.011) 
Parental earnings rank       
   1 -0.183*** -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.225*** -0.245*** -0.252*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
   2 -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.142*** -0.156*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
   3 -0.086*** -0.092*** -0.101*** -0.095*** -0.113*** -0.128*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
   4 -0.083*** -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.091*** -0.096*** -0.107*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis. Parental earnings is divided in 20 bins 








Figure 6. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) and low SES. Dependent variable employment. 
Note; The reference group for birth weight is 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles 
based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11  is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, which is the five 
percent with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control 
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Table 6. t-test of significance of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) and low SES between each 
group of cohorts. Dependent variable is employment, as shown in figure 6.  
  Males Females 
    Year of     







1979-   
81 














          
  1967-69 1.02 0.93 -1.00 -1.89* -1.30 1.37 -1.24 0.14 0.59 -0.67 
  1970-72  -0.07 -1.95* -2.82*** -2.24**  -2.53** -1.12 -0.64 -1.90* 
  1973-75   -1.84* -2.69*** -2.12**   1.28 1.69* 0.48 
  1976-78    -0.85 -0.28    0.43 -0.76 
  1979-81     0.57     -1.16 
           
Low SES           

































  1973-75 








  1976-78 
   -0.78 -2.41  
** 




  1979-81     -1.62     -0.51 
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Moving on to the effects on employment propensity, Table 5 shows that the probability of 
being employed increases for both genders across the 4 lowest birth weight categories, while the 
effect of gaining weight at birth is less clear when birth weight exceeds 4,500 gr. This is consistent 
with what I find with earnings. Among men it seems like being born into the lowest birth weight 
category influences employment to a greater extent over time.  However, the influence fluctuates 
a bit and across the first three groups of cohorts. The effect of low birth weight actually declines 
somewhat from the first to the second group of cohorts; men born in the period 1967-69 have 5.2 
percentage points lower propensity to be employed compared to the reference group while the 
effect is 4.3 percentage points for men born 1970-72 and 1973-75. Among male groups of cohorts 
born later on, the estimated impact of low birth weight has increased to 6.1-6.9 percentage points 
and most of the differences between the first and last three groups of cohorts are significant (table 
6).  
For economic classes above the mean, there are no or only minor differences in male em-
ployment, while there is a social gradient in female employment for cohorts born 1967-69 (see 




differences in employment at the middle and top of the distribution. For economic classes below 
the mean, there is a strong association between parental earnings and employment. Additionally, 
the effect of coming from the very poorest becomes significantly more important over time.  Com-
pared to having parents with median earnings, being born into the 5 percent poorest families implies 
a 13 (18) percentage point reduction in the propensity to be employed for men (women) in the 
earliest cohorts (1967-69). For men (women) born in the latest group of cohorts (1982-84) the 
effect has increased to 20 (25) percentage point. The findings of social background are in line with 



























Table 7. Estimation results. Effect of health and ability on log earnings at age 27-31. Males 
only. 
    Year of birth  1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N  91,656 88,533 80,516 70,576 68,664 67,918 
Height (cm)       
   <170 -0.128*** -0.107*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.160*** -0.122*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
   170-180 -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.037*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
   180-190 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
    >190 -0.003 0.010 -0.027*** 0.014 -0.005 0.001 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Body Mass Index(BMI)       
 Underweight (BMI    
    <18.5) 
-0.118*** -0.136*** -0.158*** -0.164*** -0.179*** -0.205** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
 Normal weight  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
 Overweight (BMI25-30)   
0.009 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.052*** 0.036*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 Obesity (BMI >30) -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.066*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
Ability       
   Low ability (stanine   
    score 1-3) 
-0.168*** -0.145*** -0.184*** -0.178*** -0.183*** -0.168*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
   Medium ability Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   High ability (stanine   
    score 4-6) 
0.065*** 0.075*** 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.015* 0.017* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Birth weight       
   <2,500 gr -0.088*** -0.075*** -0.092*** -0.119*** -0.093*** -0.115*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
   2,500-3,000 gr -0.036** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.020* -0.065*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
   3,000-3,500 gr -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   >4,500 gr 0.003 -0.008 0.030** 0.017 -0.028 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Parental earnings rank       
   1 -0.313*** -0.360*** -0.423*** -0.424*** -0.469*** -0.495*** 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
   2 -0.198** -0.187** -0.224** -0.208** -0.240** -0.278** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
   3 -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.194*** -0.170*** -0.203*** -0.212*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
   4 -0.113*** -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.204*** -0.159*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis. Parental earnings are divided in 20 bins 









Figure 7. Estimated effects of various health-indicators on log earnings at age 27-31. Males only. 
Note; Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: 
medium ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight: 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles 
based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11 is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, which is the five 
percent with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control 
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Table 8. t-test of significance of various health indicators between each group of cohorts. 
Dependent variable is log earnings, as shown in figure 7.   
    Year of birth 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
Low height      
  1967-69 1.23 1.56 1.55 -1.77* 0.33 
  1970-72  0.35 0.37 -2.89*** -0.80 
  1973-75   0.04 -3.17*** -1.10 
  1976-78    -3.10*** -1.11 
  1979-81     1.94* 
Underweight                     
  1967-69 -1.24 -2.60*** -2.86*** -3.93*** -5.53*** 
  1970-72  -1.38 -1.68* -2.66*** -4.22*** 
  1973-75   -0.35 -1.21 -2.73*** 
  1976-78    -0.82 -2.28** 
  1979-81                                    -1.54 
Obesity      
  1967-69 0.44 0.46 1.86* 2.16** 2.23** 
  1970-72  0.02 1.49 1.80* 1.86* 
  1973-75   1.47 1.78* 1.83* 
  1976-78    0.27 0.21 
  1979-81     -0.08 
Low ability                            
  1967-69 2.44** -1.49* -0.91 -1.34 0.02 
  1970-72  -3.73*** -3.08*** -3.51*** -2.13** 
  1973-75   0.50 0.10 1.35 
  1976-78    -0.39 0.83 
  1979-81     1.22 
Low birth weight                  
  1967-69 0.63 -0.22 -1.43 -0.25 -1.25 
  1970-72  -0.84 -2.01** -0.83 -1.83* 
  1973-75   -1.19 -0.04 -1.01 
  1976-78        1.08 0.16 
  1979-81     -0.92 
Low SES      
  1967-69 -2.41** -5.53*** -5.37*** -7.45*** -8.69*** 
  1970-72  -3.15*** -3.08*** -5.17*** -6.41*** 
  1973-75   -0.05 -2.12** -3.34*** 
  1976-78    -2.00** -3.18*** 
  1979-81     -1.18 
      




I now turn to regression models where I also include indicators for cognitive ability and 
additional health variables measured at a time closer to potential labor market entry. More specif-
ically, I include information about height, weight and cognitive ability from the Norwegian military 
records. I will use four indicators for height; <170 cm, 170-180 cm, 180-190 cm and >190 cm. By 
height and weight I construct Body Mass Index (BMI), which is weight in kilograms divided by 
height in meters squared. I utilize WHO’s cut- off points for underweight (BMI <18.5), normal 
weight (BMI 18.5-25), overweight (BMI 25-30) and obesity (BMI >30). For cognitive ability, I 
use three categories (low, medium and high) depending on IQ measured in stanine score. Since 
these data are based on military records, they are available only for men. 
Controlling for the other variables, the relationship between height and earnings seems to 
be nonlinear (table 7). Being shorter than the reference group (180-190 cm) implies lower earnings, 
while being taller does not affect earnings significantly. The negative effect is most pronounced 
among men being shorter than 170 cm, which is consistent with findings in Lundborg et al (2014). 
The effect of low height (<170 cm) fluctuates somewhat, especially among the last three groups of 
cohorts, but there is no sign of gradual change in one direction or another.  
Relative to normal weight, both underweight and obesity are a statistically significant de-
terminants of male earnings. Overweight actually implies somewhat higher earnings, which is sur-
prising given that overweight is supposed to be a risk factor for morbidity and mortality. One other 
striking feature is that underweight affects employment more negatively than obesity.  However, 
the results of overweight can be supported by several studies (see f.ex. Flegal et al; 2013) where 
overweight implies lower mortality risk than normal weight. Aune et al. (2016) argue that studies 
finding this relationship may be driven by lack of important control variables, like smoking habits 
and prevalent disease.21 In their meta-analysis, Aune et al. (2016) find that when smokers and 
individuals with prevalent disease are excluded both overweight, obesity and underweight result in 
higher mortality. In my study, I do not have access to neither smoking habits nor diseases, which 
probably means that I underestimate the adverse influence of higher BMI. One other reason why 
individuals defined as overweight have no higher risk of non-employment may be that the BMI- 
measure has an ambiguous interpretation, since the measure is not able to distinguish between body 
                                                 




fat and fat-free mass. Johansson et al. (2009) use measures of both BMI, weight, fat mass and waist 
circumference to investigate how obesity influence labor market participation. They find that obe-
sity, defined by BMI, does not influence employment significantly, while obesity defined by fat 
mass, implies significant lower propensity to be employed.  
 Underweight is found to have a more negative influence on earnings over time. Table 7 
shows that the point estimates of underweight on log earnings change significantly, from -0.12 for 
the first cohorts to -0.21 for the last. When it comes to the effect of obesity on earnings the effect 
has become significantly less important over time.  
Low ability compared to medium ability has negative effect on earnings, but there is no 
particular trend in the estimated effects. There are, however, declining differences between men 
with high and normal ability. Men born in the period 1967-69 have around 7 percent higher earn-
ings compared to men with medium ability, while men with high ability born in the latest cohorts 
have only 1.7 percent higher earnings. When running a model with IQ as a continuous variable I 
find that IQ affect employment to a lesser extent over time. This is in line with findings in Deming 
(2017) and Edin et al. (2017) which indicate stable or decreasing returns to cognitive skills during 
the last decades.  
 The effect of birth weight is lower compared to what I find in table 3, meaning that the 
effect of lower birth weight is partly explained by increased risk of being underweight at age 18-
19, being shorter and being registered with low ability. But also with control for these indicators 
there is an effect of birth weight, and the tendency that lower birth weight affects employment to 
somewhat greater extent among the last groups of cohorts is still present.  
Controlling for the variables from the military records reduces the estimated effects of so-
cial background somewhat. In particular, the coefficient for the lowest economic class is cut by 
about one fourth, meaning that part of the social gradient is explained by lower cognitive skills, 
lower height, underweight and obesity measured at age 18-19. 
Appendix figure 5 illustrates results for log earnings condition on employment. The mag-
nitude of the coefficients for all vulnerable groups in the figure is lower compared to what I find 







Table 9. Estimation results. Effect of health and ability on employment. Males.  
    Year of birth  1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84
N  91,656 88,533 80,516 70,576 68,664 67,918 
Height (cm)       
   <170 -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.052*** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
   170-180 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.009***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
   180-190        Ref.  Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
    >190 -0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Body Mass Index (BMI)       
   Underweight (BMI    
    <18.5) 
-0.034*** -0.036*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.060*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
   Normal weight Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
   Overweight (BMI 25-30)   0.008** 0.008** 0.002 0.009** 0.017*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
   Obesity (BMI >30) -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.013* -0.021*** -0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ability       
   Low ability (stanine   
    score 1-3) 
-0.049*** -0.042*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.047*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
   Medium ability Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
   High ability (stanine   
    score 7-9) 
0.006** 0.006*** 0.002 -0.003 -0.010*** 0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Birth weight       
   <2,500 gr -0.028*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   2,500-3,000 gr -0.008** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.010** -0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
   3,000-3,500 gr -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
   3,500-4,500 gr Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
   >4,500 gr 0.001 -0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008 (0.009) 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Parental earnings’ rank       
   1 -0.107*** -0.125*** -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.165*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   2 -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.075*** -0.068*** -0.077*** -0.090*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   3 -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.069*** -0.055*** -0.062*** -0.070*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
   4 -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.054*** -0.041*** -0.057*** -0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
Note; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard error in parenthesis. Parental earnings are divided in 20 bins 







Figure 8. Estimated effects of various health-indicators on employment. Males only. 
Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: medium 
ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight: 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles based 
on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11 is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, which is the five percent 
with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control variables 
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Table 10. t-test of significance of various health indicators between each group of cohorts.. 
Dependent variable is employment, as shown in figure 8.   
  1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
      
Low height      
  1967-69 0.63 1.15 1.41 -1.43 0.41 
  1970-72  0.52 0.80 -1.99** -0.18 
  1973-75   0.29 -2.44** -0.66 
  1976-78    -2.65*** -0.92 
  1979-81     1.69* 
Underweight                         
  1967-69 -0.31 -3.16*** -2.20** -3.69*** -3.88*** 
  1970-72  -2.76*** -1.85* -3.26*** -3.46*** 
  1973-75   0.75 -0.47 -0.71 
  1976-78    -1.21 -1.42 
  1979-81 
Obesity                             
    -0.25 
     
  1967-69 0.20 -1.00 0.96 0.14 0.56 
  1970-72  -1.26 0.81 -0.07 0.37 
  1973-75   2.08** 1.24 1.77* 
  1976-78    -0.91 -0.53 
  1979-81     0.46 
Low ability                            
  1967-69 1.90* -1.65* -0.66 -0.87 0.55 
  1970-72  -3.38*** -2.36** -2.57*** -1.13 
  1973-75   0.87 0.69 1.99** 
  1976-78    -0.19 1.10 
  1979-81     1.29 
Low birth weight      
  1967-69  0.92  0.23 -1.22 -1.44 -0.84 
  1970-72  -0.66 -2.07** -2.28** -1.68* 
  1973-75   -1.41 -1.62 -1.03 
  1976-78    -0.23 0.36 
  1979-81     0.58 
Low SES                                
  1967-69 -2.22** -4.74*** -5.15*** -5.55*** -6.79*** 
  1970-72  -2.56** -3.05*** -3.46*** -4.70*** 
  1973-75   -0.57 -0.99 -2.21** 
  1976-78    -0.41 -1.59 
  1979-81     -1.18 
      









Investigating the effect of the various health- and ability measures on employment (table 9, 
figure 8 and table 10) gives much of the same pattern as that of log earnings.  
Low height (height <170 cm) is associated with 3-5 percentage point lower propensity to 
be employed compared to the reference group with height 180-190 cm. For the first groups of 
cohorts, being underweight (compared to having normal weight) implies approximately 3.5 per-
centage point lower probability of being employed. For the last group of cohorts the negative effect 
has increased significantly; to around 6 percentage point. Obesity, compared to normal weight, is 
associated with around 2 percentage point lower employment propensity. 
Low ability compared to medium ability has negative effect on employment, but there is no 
particular change over time. There are only minor differences in the employment propensity be-
tween men with high and medium ability. 
 As with earnings, the magnitude of the estimate of low birth weight and low socioeconomic 
class becomes lower when controlling for the variables measured by the military service. Accord-
ing to the point-estimates low birth weight (compared with birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr) decreases 
the probability to be employed by 2.9 percentage points for the first group of cohorts while the 
effect has increased somewhat (to 3.6 percentage points) for the last group of cohorts. Controlling 
for the variables from the military records reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of lowest eco-
nomic class by about forty percent. But still, belonging to the poorest economic class decreases the 
employment probability considerably, and the effect becomes significantly stronger over time. For 
cohorts born in the period 1967-69 men born into the 5 percent poorest families has 10.7 percentage 
point lower employment probability (compared to median earnings families), while the effect has 
increased to 15.5 percentage point for cohorts born in the period 1982-84.   
Taken together, I find strong evidence of steadily increasing negative impact on labor mar-
ket performance for young adults of being born into the very poorest families. There are also some 
indications of stronger negative impact of poor health among males, but the results are sensitive to 
what kind of health indicator I use. Low birth weight and underweight at age 18-19 have become 
a stronger predictor of low earnings and non-employment, while there is quite constant effect of 
low height and obesity. One possible explanation is that underweight individuals to a greater degree 
face common mental health problems, such as anxiety and depression. With more emphasize on 




rewarded in the labor market. When it comes to cognitive ability, the influence on employment and 
earnings has decreased over time, which is driven by decreasing return to high ability.   
                                                           
7 Reliability and robustness 
I start this section by comparing the main results based on the control function approach with mod-
els with family – or twin fixed effects. Furthermore, I check whether low birth weight seems to be 
a stable predictor of health. Finally, I investigate whether the estimates are robust with respect to 
some sample selection issues and some choices of variable definitions. 
  
7.1 Comparison with family fixed effects 
Several studies, particularly in economics, have used twin or sibling fixed effects in order to ex-
plore the effect of health on different outcomes. 
In the main estimations above, I have divided the sample into six groups of cohorts. With 
both sibling and twin-fixed effects, the sample size is strongly restricted and estimating models for 
each group yields large standard errors. In order to receive more precise estimates with family fixed 
effects, I will instead divide the sample into three groups of cohorts corresponding to birth year 
1967-72, 1973-78 and 1979-84. By estimating models for men and women separately, the sample 
with family fixed effects are restricted to same-sex siblings being born within the same group of 
cohort. Appendix table 3a) - 3d) give descriptive statistics of this sibling (being born as singletons) 
and twin sample.22 The most striking observation in these tables is the tremendous difference in 
birth weight between singletons and twins, where the mean birth weight among twins is approxi-
mately 900 gr less than singletons. Approximately 40 percent of female twins and 32-36 percent 
of male twins are born with low birth weight (<2,500 gr), while it accounts for less than 3 percent 
of singletons. A small fraction of twins are represented in the reference category 3,500-4,500 gr; 
6-7 percent of male twins and 4 percent of female twins.  
 
 
                                                 





Figure 11. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on log earnings at age 27-31. Comparison 
with family fixed effects. 
Note; The reference group for birth weight is 3,500-4,500 gr. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in 
the figure. Control variables for OLS; see note to table 3. For sibling fixed effects; birth order (4 dummy variables), 








Figure 12. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on employment. Comparison with family 
fixed effects. 
Note; The reference group for birth weight is 3,500-4,500 gr. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in 
the figure. Control variables for OLS; see note to table 3. For sibling fixed effects; birth order (4 dummy variables), 
month of birth (12 dummy variables). For twin fixed effects; none. 
 
The data sources utilized in Black et al. (2007) are similar to what I use in my study, but 
they include all twins in their models (not only same-sex twins) and estimate one regression for 
both genders. Furthermore, they use a loglinear specification of birth weight. When I run a regres-
sion on log earnings with the same specification as theirs, twin fixed effects give an estimate of 
0.18 with standard error 0.06. This is somewhat higher compared to their estimate of 0.12.23   
                                                 
23 The deviation may be due to their sample restrictions, which only contains persons working full-time. Other 
reasons for deviations are differences in how earnings are measured; they measure earnings in 2002, while I look at 


















































































































Figure 11 and 12 show estimation results with sibling and twin fixed effects, where the 
outcome measure is log earnings and employment, respectively. In order to facilitate comparisons 
of the different models I have also included estimates from models without family fixed effects 
based on the exact same samples. With twin fixed effects, the standard errors are large, and the 
point estimates fluctuates a lot. When log earnings is the outcome measure (see figure 11) the point 
estimates of being born with low birth weight (<2,500 gr) compared to the reference group of 
3,500-4,500 gr ranges from minus 0.29 to plus 0.33. Using a loglinear specification of birth weight 
(not shown in figure or tables) also gives unstable results, f.ex., male twins born in the period 1967-
73 experience that being 10 percent heavier than their twin raises the probability of being employed 
by 2 percentage points, while female twins born in the same period experience that a 10 percent 
increase in birth weight actually decreases the propensity to be employed by almost 3 percentage 
points. The estimates with sibling fixed effects are more similar to what I find by running OLS for 
the whole sample, but the standard errors are quite large and the estimates do not show any partic-
ular trend in the importance of birth weight.  
Given the large difference in weight-distributions between twins and non-twins, there are 
good reasons to question the external validity of findings based on twin-data. As earlier mentioned 
there have also been major improvements in neonatal health care and since twins are overrepre-
sented with lower birth weight and complications at birth, they may be more sensitive to given 
changes in technology, which in turn may affect outcomes later in life. The small sample sizes and 
the highly ambiguous results also suggest that twin fixed effects are not the appropriate strategy in 
order to identify trends in the effects of poor health.  
Another problem with family fixed effects is that there may be spillover effects among 
siblings which affect the outcome variables (see f.ex. Fletcher et al., 2012; Breining, 2014; Black 
et al., 2017). This effect is probably strongest when one of the siblings has severe illnesses, which 
is more common the lower the birth weight is. If this is the case the fixed effects models give results 
that may not be generalizable to other groups. Furthermore, parents may invest in activities that 
reinforce or compensate initial health differences between siblings/twins (Almond and Mazumder, 
2013; Yi et al., 2015), which in turn may affect the outcome variable.  
Earlier research on the effect of height, BMI and ability has not focused on family-fixed 




out the effect of height from social background. Figure 13 and 14 illustrate estimates on log earn-
ings and employment from models with family fixed effects when incorporating health- and ability 
measures from the military records. Models based on twin fixed effects give very imprecise esti-
mates, making it difficult to draw any conclusion about the magnitude of the changes in the effects 
of the different variables. Compared to the estimates presented in figure 7 and 8, sibling fixed 
effects give more imprecise estimates of the different health- and ability- measures. The results are, 
however, more precise than the twin-fixed estimates. The size of the point-estimates with sibling 
fixed effects also differ somewhat from the OLS-estimates. When it comes to development over 
time, it seems like being underweight influences earnings and employment steadily more, while it 


















Figure 13. Estimated effects of health-  and ability indicators on log earnings at age 27-31. Family fixed 
effects. Males only. 
Note; SFE=sibling fixed effects, TFE=twin fixed effects. Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-
group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: medium ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight: 3,500-4,500 gr. Point 
estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. Control variables for sibling fixed effects; birth order (4 









Figure 14. Estimated effects of health-  and ability indicators on employment. Family fixed effects. Males 
only. 
Note; SFE=sibling fixed effects, TFE=twin fixed effects. Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-
group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: medium ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight: 3,500-4,500 gr. Point 
estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. Control variables for sibling fixed effects; birth order (4 
dummy variables), month of birth (12 dummy variables). For twin fixed effects; none. 
 
7.2 The effect of birth weight on other outcomes 
The reliability of the results of the various indicators depends on whether the indicators capture the 
same degree of vulnerability over time. When it comes to birth weight, a stable relationship may 
be questionable and my primary concern is whether health of the individuals with birth weight less 
than 2,500 gr has changed. Many babies in this group are in need of extensive health care at birth 
and improvements in neonatal health care have resulted in substantially lower infant mortality rates. 
This may have affected health of the group with low birth weight, but it is not clear in which 




of individuals who were on the margin of survival as infants. However, Bharadwaj et al. (2013) 
have shown that additional treatment at birth also has positive effect on test scores and grades in 
school. This may imply that health of the whole group with low birth weight has improved over 
time.   
 In this section I test the assumption of stable relationship between low birth weight and 
adult health by exploring how low birth weight affects other potentially health-related outcomes 
and the degree to which this effect has changed over time. For both genders, I am able to explore 
the effect on mortality, high-school dropout and take-up of disability insurance. For men, I also 
investigate the impact on health- and ability variables from the military service.     
Figure 15 shows how mortality (infant mortality and mortality at age 1-31), permanent dis-
ability insurance at age 19 and high school drop-out are influenced by low birth weight compared 
to the reference category with birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr.24 When mortality is the outcome meas-
ure, every native being alive at birth or at age 1, respectively, are included, while the sample is 
identical to what is explained in section 2.3 when studying the effect on the other outcomes.  
As expected, the figure shows that low birth weight affects infant mortality to a lesser extent 
over time. When surviving the first year of life, being born with low birth weight is also associated 
with higher risk of mortality afterwards for both genders, but there is no change in this effect over 
time. Furthermore, low birth weight is associated with higher risk of receiving disability benefits 
at age 19 and high-school dropout, which is consistent with findings in previous literature. For both 
genders, there has been an increase in the importance of low birth weight on take up of disability 
insurance, and the effect is significantly stronger among the last group of cohorts compared to the 
earliest group.25 The association between low birth weight and high-school dropout has decreased 
over time for women, while there is no particular change for men. 
Taken together, the results are somewhat ambiguous. An increasing effect on disability in-
surance may reflect that health of the group with low birth weight, at least for some individuals, 
has deteriorated, According to Brage and Thune (2015) the group of individuals being granted 
permanent disability insurance before age 20 is dominated by people with mental retardation and 
                                                 
24 High-school dropout is defined as not completed high school by the age of 27.  
25 Since information about disability insurance is available from 1992, I am not able to explore this outcome for 
cohorts born before 1972. Being granted permanent disability insurance at age 19 is a rare outcome, accounting for 




congenital malformations, suggesting that disability at this early stage in life is not influenced by 
changes in the labor market. On the other hand, weaker importance of low birth weight on female 
education may be interpreted as a sign of better health among women with low birth weight. An-
other interpretation is that poor health has become less important for girls in order to complete high 






                                                 
26 This result is not consistent with results from Black et al. (2007). Using variation within twins, they find that 
cohorts born 1977-86 compared to cohorts born 1967-76 have stronger return of birth weight on education. Deviations 





Figure 15. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on various outcomes.  
Note; The reference group is birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr. High-school dropout is defined as not completed high school 
at the age of 27. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control variables are the same 
as those reported for table 3. 
 
Furthermore, figure 16 illustrates the impact of low birth weight on the health measures 
from the military service. Health and ability- measures are registered for the great majority of men 
and using these as outcome-variables, I am able to investigate whether the effect of birth weight on 
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able men, men who are not registered with any information from the military service are probably 
negatively selected. Results from estimations (not shown in any tables or figures) show that men 
not registered with information from the military service have substantially lower earnings and are 
less likely to be employed. Hence, I will use missing information from the military service as an 
outcome measure indicating poor health. 
 
Figure 16. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on health outcomes registered by the military 
service. Males only.  
Note; The reference group is birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr. Low height=height<170 cm, underweight=BMI<18.5, 
obesity=BMI>30, low ability=stanine score 1-3, no information=not registered with any information from the military 
service. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control variables are the same as those 
reported for table 3. 
 
In line with earlier studies, figure 16 shows that low birth weight increases the risk of low 






















































which is consistent with findings in Black et al. (2007).27 Furthermore, I find that low birth weight 
does not imply higher risk of obesity. Given the numerous studies detecting that low birth weight 
increases the risk of obesity, it is a surprising result. However, a study from Switzerland (Jornayvaz 
et al., 2016) find a U-shaped relationship between birth weight and body mass index, and a study 
using Norwegian register data (Eide et al., 2005) finds that higher birth weight implies higher adult 
weight.  My models show that men with birth weight 2,500-3,500 gr have the lowest risk of being 
obese while men with high birth weight (>4,500 gr) have the highest risk. The latter effect also 
becomes substantially stronger over time. This may reflect that an increasing proportion of men 
with high birth weight have mothers with health problems, like diabetes and obesity.28 
Figure 16 does not show any clear evidence of changing impact of low birth weight on the 
various health measures, but there are some estimators that deviate from the others. Low birth 
weight has a significantly stronger impact on low height for men born in the last period (1982-84) 
compared to earlier periods, while low birth weight affect low ability most for men born in the 
earliest period (1967-69). Black et al. (2007) find that the impacts of birth weight on different 
outcomes (height, BMI, IQ and high school completion) increase over time when comparing esti-
mates based on twin fixed effects from the cohorts 1977-1986 with cohorts 1967-1976. Their study 
is also based on Norwegian register data, but their estimates are not directly comparable to my 
estimates since they only use twins. Bharadwaj et al. (2018) also investigate changes in the impact 
of birth weight, but they compare cohorts further apart than I do. They compare Swedish cohorts 
born 1974 and onwards with cohorts born 1926-1958 and their twin fixed effects give quite con-
stant impact of birth weight on outcomes like earnings and high school completion. 
Using missing information from the military service as an indicator of poor health, I do find 
that the effect of low birth weight has become stronger over time. This may imply that the propor-
tion of individuals with severe health problems in the group with low birth weight have increased, 
which is consistent with the findings on disability (see figure 17). The overall fraction with missing 
                                                 
27 Apart from Black et al. (2007) I am not aware of any studies that focus on birth weight and underweight later 
in life.   
28 Estimating models where I switch the reference category to be 2,500-3,000 g, I find that men with birth weight 
<2,500 g use to be somewhat (0-1 percentage point) more likely to be obese. Men with high birth weight (>4,500 g) 
have the highest risk of being obese, which also become substantially stronger over time. Compared to the reference 
category men with high birth weight born in the period 1967-69 have 1.3 percentage point higher risk of being obese 




information has also increased considerably, hence, relative to the size of this group, the impact of 
low birth weight has not become a more important determinant.  
7.3 Robustness checks 
In this section I test whether my results of low birth weight are sensitive to how I define employ-
ment and social background, and whether the estimates are driven by changes in the composition 
of people with lower birth weight. Results from the robustness checks of low birth weight are 
reported in figure 17 (results on log earnings) and figure 18 (employment).  
 Panels a) and b) in figure 17 and 18 show results from models where individuals with per-
ceived severe health problems are excluded, i.e. individuals born with very low birth weight 
(<1,500 gr) and individuals being disabled at age 19. As expected, excluding those individuals give 
lower point estimates for the group with birth weight below 2,500 gr. Furthermore, the increasing 
impact of low birth weight among men is no longer significant, which may be attributed to the fact 
that the proportion of people born with very low birth weight has increased (see figure 2). This also 
seem to be the case when excluding individuals receiving permanent disability insurance at age 19, 
meaning that the increasing impact of low birth weight on males earnings and employment is sen-
sitive to whether groups with very poor health are excluded.  
 Social background could be measured in different ways and I have used two alternative 
definitions. Measuring social background by parents’ education level only (alternative 1) gives 
stronger association between birth weight and earnings and employment which indicate that con-
trolling for parents’ earnings is essential to separate health from social background. Having chil-
dren with poor health may affect parents’ earnings, which implies that parents’ earnings at age 50-
54 could be an endogenous variable. To circumvent this problem I use parents’ earnings at birth 
instead (alternative 2). This definition also shows stronger impact of birth weight on employment, 
which may imply that I control away part of the effect of birth weight on earnings and employment 
when I use parents’ earnings at their early fifties. However, since earnings in early fifties are more 
representative for lifetime earnings than earnings earlier in life (see Markussen and Røed; 2017) I 
will argue that this is a better measure of social background than earnings at birth. The estimated 
time trends are in any case very similar.  
For men, the results are to some degree sensitive to how I define employment (see figure 




effect of low birth weight. When identifying the development over time there are also some differ-
ences and the weakest definition of employment gives the strongest changes in the importance of 
low birth weight. With the strictest definition of employment, the tendency of increasing impact of 
low birth weight is less clear.  
 
Figure 17. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on log earnings at age 27-31. Robustness 
checks.  
Note; The reference group is birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr. Point estimates are shown in the figure. The point estimates 
from figure 5, panel a) for males and panel b) for females are depticted in every panels and labeled by “original.” 
Panel a) and b) compare the “original” estimate with estimates from models where indididuals with birth weight less 
than 1,500 gr and persons receiving disability insurance at age 19 are excluded. Panel c) and d) compare the 
“original” estimate with estimates from models where social background is defined by parents’ education level only 
(alternativ 1) and parents’ earnings rank at birth of the child (alternativ 2).  






































































Figure 18. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on employment. Robustness checks.  
Note; The reference group is birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr. Point estimates are shown in the figure. The point estimates 
from figure 6, panel a) for males and panel b) for females are depticted in every panels and labeled by “original.” The 
“weaker” definition of employent in panel a) and b) refers to employment defined as having average annual earnings 
above NOK93,000 ( US$11,500) at age 27-31 while the stronger definition refers to having average annual 
earnings above NOK279,000 ( US$44,500) at age 27-31. Panel c) and d) compare the “original” estimate with 
estimates from models where indididuals with birth weight less than 1,500 gr and persons receiving disability 
insurance at age 19 are excluded. Panel e) and f) compare the “original” estimate with estimates from models where 
social background is defined by parents’ education level only (alternativ 1) and parents’ earnings rank at birth of the 
child (alternativ 2).  












































































































f) Females - def. economic status
 
 
8 Concluding remarks 
The intention with this paper is to investigate whether it has become more difficult for vulnerable 
groups to be part of the labor market in Norway. I define vulnerable groups as individuals having 
either poor health, low cognitive ability or coming from low socioeconomic classes. My health 
indicators are birth weight which is registered for almost all residents in addition to height and BMI 
measured at age 18-19 for men entering the military service, while cognitive ability is also meas-
ured for men entering the military service. Socioeconomic class is defined according to parental 
earnings rank. Employment is defined as having average annual earnings above a certain amount 
during the age 27-31.29  
Using variation across cohorts born during the period 1967-84 I find clear evidence of 
steadily increasing negative impact on labor market performance of being born into the very poor-
est families. This conclusion is robust with respect to the inclusion of health indicators, such as 
birth weight, and indicators for cognitive ability. Hence, low socioeconomic position appears to 
have become a more important handicap in the labor market over time, beyond its influence on 
health and ability.  
I also find some indications of stronger impact of health on labor market performance 
among males, but the results are sensitive to what kind of health indicators I use. Lower birth 
weight and underweight affect employment and earnings to a greater extent over time, while there 
is no evidence of increasing impacts of low height or obesity. One interpretation of the results is 
that some aspects of health has become more important, while other aspects have become less 
important. Moreover, the health indicators I use are obviously far from capturing all dimensions of 
health, and they are also likely to be correlated with other characteristics that are valued in the labor 
market. For example, height has been found to be correlated with cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills, muscular strength and social background. In my study, I control for cognitive skills and 
social background while I have no information about non-cognitive skills and muscular strength, 
indicating that some of the effect of low height is affected by these factors.  
I find no evidence whatsoever that having low cognitive ability, as measured by IQ tests at 
age 18/19, has become a larger handicap in the labor market. Overall, the influence of cognitive 
                                                 




ability appears to have declined, as the employment and earnings premium associated with having 
very high ability decreased over time.30   
According to the point estimates, poor social background is a much stronger predictor of 
low earnings and non-employment than any of the health variables. However, as the health indica-
tors used in this study are likely to be noisy, and thus only weakly correlated with the actual health 
status relevant for labor market performance, this does not rule out an important role for health. To 
the contrary, it is probable that parts of the association between social background and earnings/em-
ployment may be explained by poor health among children from poor socioeconomic class, as well 
as class-related differences in health at higher ages. 
 Has the labor market become less inclusive and subjected to more sorting? Most of the 
evidence provided in this paper suggests that the answer to this question is yes. In terms of family 
background, it is clearly the case that the social gradient in labor market performance has become 
steeper, particularly at the bottom of the socioeconomic status distribution. This pattern is only 
slightly modified by controlling for observed health indicators and cognitive ability. When it comes 
to the influence of health itself, the evidence is a bit more mixed. While the findings reported in 
this paper point toward an increased importance of health for men, there is no evidence of increased 
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Appendix table 1a). Health indicators and parental education. Males*  
    Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N 91,656 88,533 80,517 70,577 68,664 67,918 
       
   Birth weight categories        
     <2,500 gr 34.80 39.06 45.34 48.56 56.80 60.75 
     2,500-3,000 gr 34.78 40.07 46.04 51.99 57.75 64.30 
     3,000-3,500 gr 37.94 42.79 49.23 55.57 61.05 67.10 
     3,500-4,500 gr 38.82 44.12 50.99 57.72 62.92 68.95 
     >4,500 gr 36.40 42.30 48.69 54.40 61.30 67.95 
       
  Missing height  31.73 37.18 42.14 48.12 54.07 57.37 
  Height group        
     <170 cm 28.64 34.35 41.50 46.88 52.85 61.06 
     170-180 cm 35.26 40.71 47.84 53.57 59.50 65.94 
     180-190 cm 40.53 45.25 52.09 59.06 64.13 69.95 
      >190 cm 45.62 51.53 55.77 61.70 67.52 74.07 
       
  BMI classification        
      Underweight (<18.5) 37.81 43.34 48.40 55.43 60.44 65.72 
      Normal weight (18.5-       
      25) 
39.25 44.69 51.73 58.08 63.65 69.94 
      Overweight (25-30) 31.33 36.91 43.60 50.69 56.83 65.25 
      Obesity (>30) 25.85 29.25 35.30 41.70 48.51 57.22 
   
  Missing IQ  28.59 33.08 43.40 47.04 55.51 62.07 
  IQ classification        
    Low IQ (1-3) 19.30 22.89 29.23 34.38 41.90 49.88 
    Middle IQ (4-6)   37.19 42.16 48.36 55.35 61.57 68.46 
    High IQ (7-9) 58.81 64.33 69.63 75.06 79.66 83.94 




Appendix table 1b). Health indicators and parental education. Females* 
   Year of birth 1967-69 1970-72 1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 1982-84 
N 87,642 84,659 77,174 67,344 65,555 64,209 
       
   Birth weight categories        
     <2,500 gr 33.16 37.09 44.53 48.11 53.17 61.65 
     2,500-3,000 gr  35.94 40.26 45.74 52.18 57.15 63.39 
     3,000-3,500 gr 38.16 43.49 49.00 55.40 61.80 67.11 
     3,500-4,500 gr 39.12 44.74 51.18 57.12 63.30 69.09 
     >4,500 gr 37.41 42.63 50.37 54.43 59.99 68.01 







Appendix table 2. List of explanatory variables used in the OLS models. 
Birth weight: 5 dummy variables; <2,500 gr, 2,500-3,000 gr, 3,000-3,500 gr, 3,500-4,500 gr,   
            >4,500 gr. 
Height: 5 dummy variables; <170 cm, 170-180 cm, 180-190 cm, >190 cm, missing. 
Body Mass Index (BMI): 5 dummy variables; underweight (BMI <18.5), normal weight (BMI  
           18.5-25), overweight (BMI 25-30), obesity (BMI >30), missing. 
Cognitive ability: 4 dummy variables; low ability (stanine score 1-3), medium ability (stanine  
            score 4-6), high ability (stanine score 7-9), missing. 
Parental earnings’ rank: 20 bins. 
Multiple birth: 1 dummy variable. 
Birth order: 4 dummy variables; 1st, 2nd, 3rd-4th, >4th.  
Siblings: 4 dummy variables; no siblings, 1 sibling, 2-3 siblings, >3 siblings.  
Mothers’ age at birth: 6 dummy variables; <20, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40+. 
Month of birth: 12 dummy variables (one for each month). 
 
 
Appendix table 3a). Descriptive statistics for brothers (singletons) 
    Year of birth  1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 
N 45,329 29,494 25,628 
Fraction (in percent) of the whole sample 25.16 19.52 18.76 
Individual and background characteristics    
 Birth weight (in gr) 3,592 (532) 3,603 (533)  3,598 (532) 
   Birth weight categories (percent)    
     <2,500 gr 2.49 2.48 2.25
     2,500-3,000 gr 8.83 8.23 7.91 
     3,000-3,500 gr 29.65 29.61 27.99 
     3,500-4,500 gr 54.92 55.38 57.30 
     >4,500 gr 4.11 4.30 4.56 
    
Family characteristics    
  Mother’s age at birth 25.39   (4.67) 25.61   (4.42) 25.84   (4.62) 
  Number of siblings 2.29     (1.34) 2.07     (1.29) 2.02     (1.16) 
    
Military data     
  Height (centimeters) 179.79 (6.50) 179.93 (6.54) 180.13 (6.50) 
  Missing height  2.15 3.19 3.34 
  Height group (percent)    
     <170 cm 5.31 5.16 4.85 
     170-180 cm 42.23 41.63 40.76 
     180-190 cm 45.45 45.74 46.79 
      >190 cm 7.01 7.47 7.61 
  BMI 21.97 (2.89) 22.23 (3.02) 22.40   (3.06) 
  BMI classification (percent)     
      Underweight (<18.5) 6.49 5.00 6.03 
      Normal weight (18.5-25) 80.69 79.73 75.10 
      Overweight (25-30) 10.73 12.40 14.58 
      Obesity (>30) 2.09 2.86 4.28 
  IQ (stanines) 5.06  (1.85) 5.27  (1.80) 5.23  (1.73) 




Appendix table 3a). Descriptive statistics for brothers (singletons) 
    Year of birth  1967-72 1973-78 1979-84
  IQ classification (percent)    
     Low IQ (1-3) 20.21 16.18 15.84 
     Middle IQ (4-6)   57.41 58.76 60.77 
     High IQ (7-9) 22.38 25.06 23.40 
    
Outcomes    
   Percent employed when  27-31 90.98 89.04 87.87 
   Average annual earnings when 27-31 (NOK,   
   2017 value) 
497,680 
(211,785) 




   Percent with completed high school 72.74 80.51 82.20 
   Percent receiving permanent disability  
   Insurance when 19 
 0.47 0.57 
 
 
Appendix table 3b). Descriptive statistics for sisters (singletons) 
    Year of birth 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 
N 41,877 26,345 23,436 
Fraction (in percent) of the whole sample 24.30 18.23 18.06 
Individual and background characteristics    
 Birth weight (in gr) 3,462 (505) 3,481 (507)  3,517 (501) 
   Birth weight categories (percent)    
     <2,500 gr 3.07 2.81 2.35 
     2,500-3,000 gr  12.16 12.01 10.60 
     3,000-3,500 gr 36.68 36.07 34.52 
     3,500-4,500 gr 46.06 46.92 50.17 
     >4,500 gr 2.03 2.19 2.03
    
Family characteristics    
  Mother’s age at birth 25.37   (4.62) 25.59   (4.42) 25.84   (4.62) 
  Number of siblings 2.32     (1.34) 2.07     (1.28) 2.02     (1.16) 
    
Outcomes    
   Percent employed when  27-31 74.60 79.33 87.87 
   Average annual earnings when 27-31 (NOK,   
   2017 value) 
320,642 
(187,006) 




   Percent with completed high school 71.19 84.22 88.02 
   Percent receiving permanent disability 
   insurance when 19 











Appendix table 3c). Descriptive statistics for brothers (twins) 
    Year of birth  1967-72 1973-78 1979-84 
N 1,924 1,612 1,622 
Fraction (in percent) of the whole sample 1.07 1.07 1.12 
Individual and background characteristics    
 Birth weight (in gr) 2,705 (541) 2,718 (519)  2,668 (562) 
   Birth weight categories (percent)    
     <2,500 gr 33.37 32.13 36.07 
     2,500-3,000 gr  35.14 37.53 34.71 
     3,000-3,500 gr 24.79 24.32 23.43 
     3,500-4,500 gr 6.65 6.02 5.67 
     >4,500 gr 0.05 0.00 0.12 
    
Family characteristics    
  Mother’s age at birth 27.52   (5.62) 27.51   (4.82) 27.60   (4.87) 
  Number of siblings 2.66     (1.32) 2.41     (1.07) 2.40     (1.00) 
    
Military data     
  Height (centimeters) 179.27 (6.47) 179.28 (6.69) 179.07 (6.42) 
  Missing height  2.44 3.04 5.07 
  Height group (percent)    
     <170 cm 6.23 6.01 6.59
     170-180 cm 44.01 46.32 45.06 
     180-190 cm 43.90 39.92 42.84 
      >190 cm 5.86 7.74 5.51 
  BMI 21.56 (2.72) 21.84 (2.75) 22.07  (3.11) 
  BMI classification (percent)     
      Underweight (<18.5) 9.64 6.97 6.97 
      Normal weight (18.5-25) 81.57 83.30 79.72 
      Overweight (25-30) 7.09 8.06 11.22 
      Obesity (>30) 1.70 1.66 2.09 
  IQ (stanines) 4.94  (1.87) 5.08  (1.80) 5.07  (1.74) 
  Missing IQ (percent) 6.50 8.31 10.97 
  IQ classification (percent)    
    Low IQ (1-3) 21.79 18.94 18.21 
    Middle IQ (4-6)   58.42 59.27 61.77 
    High IQ (7-9) 19.79 21.79 20.01 
    
Outcomes    
   Percent employed when  27-31 90.70 89.70 89.70 
   Average annual earnings when 27-31 (NOK,   
   2017 value) 
492,172 
(210,777) 




   Percent with completed high school 73.18 82.75 84.09 
   Percent receiving permanent disability 
   insurance when 19 









Appendix table 3d). Descriptive statistics for sisters (twins) 
    Year of birth 1967-72 1973-78 1979-84
N 1,920 1,762 1,584 
Fraction (in percent) of the whole sample 1.11 1.22 1.22 
Individual and background characteristics    
 Birth weight (in gr) 2,590 (516) 2,603 (546)  2,580 (550) 
   Birth weight categories (percent)    
     <2,500 gr 41.46 39.33 40.97 
     2,500-3,000 gr  37.50 35.13 37.56 
     3,000-3,500 gr 16.98 21.91 17.61 
     3,500-4,500 gr 4.06 3.63 3.85 
     >4,500 gr 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Family characteristics    
  Mother’s age at birth 27.42   (5.62) 27.09   (5.11) 27.70   (4.90) 
  Number of siblings 2.71     (1.32) 2.48     (1.19) 2.41     (1.06) 
    
Outcomes    
   Percent employed when  27-31 76.20 80.53 83.08 
   Average annual earnings when 27-31 (NOK,   
   2017 value) 
324,379 
(181,217) 




   Percent with completed high school 71.51 84.68 87.21 
   Percent receiving permanent disability  
   insurance when 19 






















Appendix figure 1.  Estimated effects of parental earnings rank on log earnings at age 27-31. 
Note; Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11 is 
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Appendix figure 2. Estimated effects of birth weight <2,500 gr and low SES.  Dependent variable log 
earnings at age 27-31. Employed individuals, only. 
Note; The reference group for birth weight is 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 20 vigintiles 
based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11 is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, which is the five 
percent with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. The control 
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Appendix figure 3. Estimated effects of parental earnings rank on log earnings at age 27-31. Employed 
individuals, only.  
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Appendix figure 4. Estimated effects of parents’ earnings rank on employment 
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Appendix figure 5. Estimated effects of various health-indicators on log earnings at age 27-31. Males. 
Employed individuals only. 
Note; Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: 
medium ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight-category: 3,500-4,500 gr. Socioeconomic status (SES) is divived in 
20 vigintiles based on parental earnings’ rank. Vigintile 10 and 11 is the reference group. Low SES is vigintile 1, 
which is the five percent with lowest parental earnings. Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the 
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Appendix figure 6. Estimated effects of low birth weight (<2,500 gr) on log earnings at age 27-31. 
Comparison with family fixed effects. Employed individuals only. 
Note; The reference group is birth weight 3,500-4,500 gr. Results from separate estimations on each cohortgroup. 
Point estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. Control variables for OLS; see note to table 3. For 












Appendix figure 7. Estimated effects of health-  and ability indicators on log earnings at age 27-31. 
Family fixed effects. Males. Employed individuals only. 
Note; SFE=sibling fixed effects, TFE=twin fixed effects. Reference groups are the following; height:180-190 cm, BMI-
group: normal weight (BMI 18.5-25), ability: medium ability (stanine score 4-6), birth weight: 3,500-4,500 gr. Point 
estimates with confidence interval are shown in the figure. Control variables for sibling fixed effects; birth order (4 
dummy variables), month of birth (12 dummy variables). For twin fixed effects; none. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
